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

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## NOTES ON INTUITION

Intuition is of the order of the day. Everyday language has come to abuse the word. Thus, very often one hears the phrase, —quite obviously decisive on the lips of certain individuals— " I have an intuition regarding it; " and everyone is well aware of the important role that intuition plays in present-day philosophy. Celebrated thinkers, from whom greater precision in the use of language should reasonably be expected, make of intuition the source of all philosophical thought. Indeed, so strong has been this trend that, today, in certain views of the world and of life, intuition has become the fundamental method of all philosophical speculation.

Bergson has had his highly original intuition of " pure duration." He has established the fact that the time of mathematicians and physicists does not endure; and since these very practical scientists arrive at their equations and theories by means of the intelligence, Bergson concludes that the intelligence in its discursive processes does not grasp the reality of the world. It is adapted to the permanent, the static. It presents reality in discontinuous sections that never reveal the *totality* of an object. It never arrives at more than a cinematic view of nature, sufficient for practical purposes, but never really aiding the mind in its irrepressible need for knowledge. Beyond the discursive procedure of the intelligence, there is, therefore, an " intuitive " knowledge, which is brought about by a kind of identification of the person knowing with the thing known. Bergson recognized that this intuition is opposed to the spontaneous flow of our intellectual habits. It can be arrived at only by a laborious contortion upon ourselves; but that is, after all, the price of philosophical knowledge. All Bergsonian philosophy is essentially intuitive. Furthermore, it is evident that intuition is characterized by its opposition to the discursive knowledge of the scientific disciplines.

The German " phenomenologists " are, radically, intuition-

ists. They surrender themselves to the "*Wesenschau*," to the intuition of essences; and it must be acknowledged that their keen analyses have been fruitful. Indeed from this point of view, they can be linked up with the scholastic tradition. By way of comparison one need only examine St. Thomas Aquinas' treatise on prudence and justice. The painstaking analyses of the Angelic Doctor are in no way inferior to the labors of the most penetrating of the phenomenologists and conclude to a synthetic view, uncovering the essence of the object studied.

Or again one may direct one's attention to those who are allied with "the philosophy of life," that "*Philosophie des Lebens*" which aroused the fury of Henry Rickert. They have been accorded the intuition of that which "Life" gives them, without the trouble of rational demonstration, which would have guaranteed their visions an objective value. It is not without reason that Rickert thinks that they give us no more than the raw materials, the point of departure for philosophical research; nevertheless they have been allowed to wield a tremendous influence on the public at large, especially through the medium of literature.

In a word, intuition is the fashion of the day. There is not a philosopher, even among the most rationalistic, who does not speak of it, does not in some way make use of it. But it must not be forgotten that the intuitive fruits of their labors can hardly be united into a synthetic view of the real. One rejects intuitions that another considers unquestionable. And since the object of an intuition can hardly be discussed, the method is blamed and there are mutual reproaches of not having grasped the nature and role of intuition.

There is, in fact, much confusion upon the question as a whole. A common term is made to signify very different attitudes. Intuition seems to spring forth upon every level of our intellectual life; and we believe that Bergson himself who is undeniably the master in this domain, has not adequately distinguished intuitions of greatly varying worth. We do not believe, for example, that the intuition which gave birth to his

notion of " pure duration " is the same as the one which led him to his " creative evolution." He pretends, it is true, that a philosopher never has but *one* fundamental intuition which dominates the whole of his philosophy. This is, of course, true in some respects; but there is nothing to prevent the central intuition from provoking others not only subordinate to the first, but also quite different both in origin and objective bearing.

We understand by " intuition " in general a form of knowledge distinguished from all others by reason of its objective origin. It is not the result of an intellectual elaboration, of a process of reasoning which leads to a conclusion. Rather, it is imposed by the immediate presence to the mind of a particular object. For certain intuitions a lengthy preparation, a previous elaboration, may be indispensable; but this is nothing more than a pre-requisite, a disposition of the knowing subject, necessary for the object to impress itself on his intuition. When the intuition takes place, the object is not perceived as a conclusion is perceived in its premises which are its guarantee. Instead, it is perceived *of itself,* shedding light upon and giving meaning to *what has preceded it.*

From the foregoing it can be seen that every intuition carries with it a feeling of certitude. We do not come upon the object of knowledge after a lengthy, and always fallible, reasoning process. Rather it seems to present itself gratuitously; it imposes itself in its naked reality. How then can it be doubted? Nevertheless we know that some perceptive intuitions can be hallucinatory and the intellectual intuitions of some philosophers confront others in irreducible opposition. There are, therefore, erroneous intuitions the sole worth of which is often measured by their psychic origin.

It has seemed opportune to us to enumerate and briefly characterize the different intuitions, mention of which can be found in psychological studies. Such a differentiation seems necessary if one is to avoid the confusions that are all too frequent. This is the only end that we have in view in this article.

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I. *Perceptive Intuition*

This intuition is familiar to everyone. Sensible objects impose themselves on our perception without any intermediary. We do not construct them, we submit to them; in them we find the first source of all our knowledge. For knowledge always remains to a greater or lesser extent dependant upon perceptive intuition. We willingly return to it even in those speculations that are farthest removed from the sensible order. To it we constantly appeal, even though only by way of images, examples, or simple literary metaphors. The perceptive intuition is so important that it has become the foundation of the pedagogical method that is called precisely the "intuitive method." Although it has its dangers when employed in certain branches of instruction, no one can question the great utility of this method.

We must not allow ourselves to lose sight of the fact that our sensible perceptions are exceedingly complex. They are not pure sensations effected by the action of the object on our senses. We may abstract from the everlasting controversies over secondary qualities and from the fantasies of subjectivism. Let us admit firmly the objectivity of our sensations; it remains true none the less that into the perceptions which appear to be well guaranteed we project images that are purely subjective. We do not perceive all that sensation gives up; but we complete and interpret what has been sensed by means of previously acquired images, which enable us to recognize the objects sensed. Undoubtedly our perceptions are often exact; however, it is no less certain that the images projected upon our sensations depend to a great extent upon our personal dispositions. Witnesses in a court of justice themselves bear witness to the number of mistakes that can creep into the apparently most normal perceptions. Perceptive intuition then can become illusory; also, a perception which is, as a matter of fact, nothing but an hallucination, can be endowed with so genuine an objectivity and precision as to be comparable to those ordinary perceptions by which our every-day life is directed.

Perceptive intuition is, then, to be regarded with caution. The object impresses itself, but the knowledge thereby awakened must be placed under the cold light of criticism. Scholars expert in the experimental method are well aware of this. They realize that it is not uncommon for strange illusory perceptions to be subsequently destroyed by further observation. Indeed, very often, the most conscientious of naturalists becomes obsessed by a pet explanatory idea, which, without warrant, he links up with the observed facts, thus profoundly altering them. Exact perception is an art which is acquired only after a period of vigorous discipline; one which, furthermore, demands a generous sacrifice of many of one's most cherished ideas.

We may add that not only the acquired images enter into a truly human perceptive intuition; intelligence properly so-called also plays a part. Thus, we can force ourselves to remember an object which arouses only vague and incomplete sensations. A luminous point which appears far away in the darkness may be one lamp among many others. However, it appears different. Might it not be the reflection of other lamps on a metallic surface? It moves, it is extinguished. Immediately we *perceive* that it is the headlight of an automobile. In such a perception there is evidently some reasoning stemming from the intelligence. Then, too, in his spontaneous perceptions, man does not perceive the simple sensible qualities. He perceives "things" having these sensible qualities. He perceives *being*, being which is immanent in every quality, which is the object of the most abstract intellectual thought. It is "*ens, concretum rebus sensibilibus*," as Cajetan expresses it. It is the first confused idea of being, the precise terrain of the most abstruse speculation of the metaphysicians. Without it, no theory of knowledge can be constructed. We shall return to this intuition of *being* later.

The perceptive is the most fundamental of intuitions. It serves, in a way, as a model of all the others. That it is of less interest to us here is owing to the fact that it is familiar to everyone. Then, too, other intuitions have played a more decisive role in certain philosophies.

II. *Imaginative Intuition*

It is a truism that all our images have their origin in external experience. Even those which seems most original and creative in us are nothing more than the complexes of images, the elements of which, at least, were acquired in this way. Even the most ingenious artist must depend upon sense experience. Without this indispensable foundation, his creations are devoid of meaning either for himself or for others. The establishment and progress of the experimental sciences of nature often demand the supposition, by " hypothesis," of a cause which eludes direct observation. Such a cause is always conceived on the model of the causes furnished by sensible experience, even though from a purely rational point of view, there is nothing to prove that a cause which defies observation must be of the self-same order as those which fall within the realm of sensible experience. In short, our whole imaginative life comes under the domination of the perceptive intuition; and it is by means of this perceptive intuition that we may be said to live imaginatively.

From what has been said it is evident that given an imaginative intuition there must be presupposed an elaboration devoid of the intuitive and in many cases not even conscious. However, the image is flashed upon the screen of consciousness as an intuition. Thus, in a dream a wholly imaginative world is revealed by means of an internal vision. It is elaborated in our subconsciousness; but it imposes itself upon us and sometimes in it we are made to play a role from which we would only too willingly escape.

There is yet another intuition in which the influence of imagination is often preponderant; it is the particular intuition which presides over our intellectual initiatives, artistic or practical. However, since the dominant source is sometimes the intelligence, which, in fact, is never absent from this intuition, we shall speak of it later as the " infra-rational intuition."

What appears of greater importance is the fact that upon the imagination is imposed the sensible form of the whole material

world order together with the modalities furnished undoubtedly by sensible experience. But this form is not imposed upon the intelligence; nor can any effort of the imagination succeed in changing it. The realm of our imaginative space is necessarily three dimensional.

In general, psychologists admit that three dimensional space is a conquest of experience resulting in the enrichment of the primitive two dimensional space. Hence, the number of dimensions which we attribute to space is determined by the necessity of interpreting our spatial experiences. Three only are necessary to comprehend the localization, extension and movement of material objects. From this one can understand why imagined space spontaneously takes three dimensions.

But one must likewise understand that if our sensible experience were more varied or altogether different, we might perhaps construct an imaginative space of four dimensions. We recognize that the intelligence can assign no reasons why there should necessarily be three dimensions. Why not four? Or ten? Some physicists do not hesitate to suggest a fourth dimension which certain phenomena, in themselves mysterious, suggest to them. And yet strangely enough, it is impossible for us to imagine a space of four dimensions which the intelligence, however, is able to conceive perfectly. In our imaginative space it is impossible to trace more than three axes perpendicular one to another. Three-dimensional space is so tyrannical that throughout the ages the most penetrating minds have never conceived of any other. It imposes itself on our imagination. Perhaps we ourselves have elaborated it. Still, we are in no way conscious of such an elaboration. Through the ministry of the imagination we have a direct intuition of three-dimensional space and on this basis we can speak of an imaginative intuition.

Can the same be said for time? One has been made cognizant of the mathematical structures intended to give us a new image of the cosmos. Time is no longer a simple variable to be introduced, together with the three dimensions of space, into the formulas which symbolize the universal dynamism. It becomes,

rather, a fourth dimension. The world may be " temporal," but there is no " time " in it. Thus an intelligence superior to our own could see in a single glance all its successive phases which, for us, are unfolded in time. Time, then, would be an intuitive form of our sensibility and especially of our imagination.

We persist in believing that there is here an irrational deviation which should be corrected from the philosophical point of view. Only the quantitative aspect of the real which cannot itself be a pure quantity, is arrived at by the mathematician. When one attempts—and not without success—to enclose in an equation the movement which takes place in time, it is natural for him to reduce time to a simple quantity. However paradoxical the statement may appear, we believe that time in itself is not measured. One measures, i.e., determines quantitatively, only the space within which a movement takes place. But time is essentially *duration*; and duration is nothing more than the existential actuality of things. Time is a successive duration, an actuality pregnant on all sides with potentiality, with non-act. It is existence which belongs to the whole material order because this order is itself composed of beings whose very essence implies a potentiality. By its domination over all material essences, whether substances or accidents, it reveals its elevation above all genus and species. If the notion of it becomes obscure upon occasion it is owing to a confusion with " relative time "—which is nothing more than the humanly possible determination of time—or even with " psychological time " which is the subjective estimation of a temporary duration. Time then has nothing whatever to do with imaginative intuition.

Only by a consideration of the enormous influence exercised over our intellectual life by our imagination, can we come to any adequate appreciation of the importance which philosophers attach to our imaginative intuition. It is within their province to discover how far it conforms with the real. Common sense, of course, affirms its conformity; but its testimony is evidently not decisive. Present day physics, ministered to by mathematics, contests it; but no one pretends that these in-

genious speculations are not subject to further revision. This is one of the most heated problems of the philosophy of nature, a problem that does not appear to be close to solution.

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## III. *Infra-Rational Intuition*

Everyone at some time or another gets a new idea, a new image, which is not the fruit of reasoning, something which is offered brusquely to the attention of the mind. In spite of this phenomenon not everyone contributes to the scientific or esthetic progress of culture. These new ideas or images can have been acquired long since by other minds; they can be trite, even stupid. Yet by them genius reaches its fruitful creations—creations that seem to have been given gratuitously in a sudden illumination.

It is obvious that inspiration is not without some source. Often there is a long and apparently sterile period of labor; and then, quite suddenly, a new idea springs into being. The solution of a problem which has long tormented the mind is seen quite clearly. There is granted a sudden insight into the work of art which will reveal the creative genius of the artist. The origin of this new intellectual departure, esthetic or practical, appeared indeed so mysterious to the ancients that Plato could find a sufficient reason for it only in the intervention of a demon or a god; and such words as " inspirations," " genius," still bear the mark of this supernatural origin. The theory of the " subconscious " has, however, more or less stripped the robe of mystery from the phenomenon. All the impressions, all the images spontaneously acquired or consciously elaborated, all the judgments which we have formed seem to be preserved forever in the obscure substratum of our soul. There they remain, active, living, combining and separating into original structures. Whenever one of these combinations reaches maturity, it presents itself before the eyes of our consciousness and we are said to have had an " inspiration " more or less fruitful or falla-

cious as the case may be. This emergence from the unconscious remains truly mysterious. We are inclined to believe that association, following the classical rules, is no stranger to it; for it is certainly through association by proximity that we are enabled to evoke from our subconscious self the whole of a poem we have known, merely by hearing its first line. All subconscious constructions are not so timely; some people seem to be possessed of a veritable genius for stupidity. Privileged souls, men of talent and true genius, unknowingly elaborate new combinations which present themselves without warning to the mind. These are seized upon by an alert consciousness, expressed in various artistic media and assure progress in some aspect of culture.

What appears new is often nothing more than an orderly synthesis of all the disjointed results painfully acquired by discursive reflexion or by the conscious elaboration of the imagination. Hence it is said that this intuition is essentially synthetic. Moreover, some theorists see in this very spirit of synthesis the characteristic of genius. The particular inspiration of genius generally presupposes a period of stubborn effort. But in itself genius is sudden and cannot be obtained through any voluntary effort. The new aspect is presented to the mind and we see it, are granted an intuition of it.

It is not so very surprising, then, that these original insights which manifest the fecundity of our soul bring with them a feeling of certitude which is very often irresistible. Subjective certitude appears to us to be the result of objective evidence, since without conscious elaboration we assure ourselves that "this thing is simply so." This confidence is rendered all the more impregnable by the fact that yet another personal element is brought in to reinforce it. This inspiration is "ours." It is the child of our own soul. We love it because we love ourselves. It is our good, our beauty; and with the facility by which we pass from one value to another, we come to think of it as the absolutely true.

Nevertheless, this intuition, however precious, does not carry

with it a guaranty of itself. It can be completely false. Hence, even the most fascinating intuitions must be questioned. This particular intuition is very often only a unified view of a mass of previously acquired information, but are we certain that all these acquisitions are equally sound? And, more especially, can we vouch for their completeness? New discoveries concerning the same reality can furnish unsuspected information which renders our intuition insufficient and even radically false. In this regard, the history of the sciences affords us an object lesson. Such an intuition, notwithstanding the charm which it exerts upon its originator, must be rigorously verified lest it descend to the intellectual level of a romance. It is necessary that we establish the solidity of the logical bond that unites the facts into a unified view. We must be certain that no new information can demolish our beautiful intuitive structure. Such verification cannot be had except by the most exacting " discursus," by the most rigid logical operations. This is the reason why this intuition can be called " infra-rational." It is anterior to, and subjected to, reason. It may be said that most of our physical theories which propose facts far removed from all direct experience, do not for the most part penetrate beyond this very useful stage of infra-rational intuition.

Only insofar as " the Beautiful " implies a reflection of " truth," may the inspiration of the poet, painter, or sculptor be said to be subject to this rational verification. Nevertheless, it is common knowledge that their inspiration must often be subjected to most rigorous correction. They cannot—with all due deference to the surrealists—express all that occurs within the realm of their imagination. Their original departures from the accepted must be submitted to " criticism." There the reason always fulfills its function, but criticism appeals as a last resort to good taste. Let us stop there; for " *de gustibus*. . . ."

Let us not presume to think, however, that we can verify everything. Pascal has made current the distinction between the geometrical spirit and wit (*l'esprit de finesse*). This latter is at the very roots of the infra-rational intuition. It is this

which, before all verification, estimates its fruitfulness for science and for life. One must always endeavor to rationalize the intuitions; but one is not always successful. It might be asked, in spite of appearances, whether the great synthesis which directs us in life,—what the Germans call our "*Lebensanschauung*"—can ever be completely verified. Our earthly existence faces us with problems the solution of which escapes us, and, as far as can be seen, will always escape us. These problems are of vital interest for they relate to the meaning and destiny of our life. Is it matter for wonder, then, that the appeal to a divine Revelation springs spontaneously from our soul. Plato in the *Symposium* ends by appealing to the intuition of Diotima, in an effort to obtain the last word on love. From a purely natural point of view we must all conclude in the same way. Beyond our rational philosophies we construct syntheses, sought not from some Diotima but from our own wit, which is always sustained by some "love."

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## IV. *Fundamental Intellectual Intuition*

In the same manner as sight has color for its common object and hearing has sound, and as all our sensible cognitions have reference to the quantitative order, so the intelligence should have a common object expressed in all our operations. Such an object is certainly not quantitative, for we conceive of a soul, an idea, God, of all those things which obviously have nothing of the quantitative about them. We rise to the heights of the categories, to substance, relation, action; but in this very ascension we again find a multiplicity which does not correspond to the unity of the intelligence. To the unique nature of the intelligence there should correspond a common object. All that we conceive must present a common aspect rendering it intelligible. This common aspect, we soon discover, is nothing other than *being*, taken in all its fullness. It makes little difference that here is a question of reality in the order of essence, of what

we call possible being. Always the object of our intelligence is being, whether it be garbed in ideal actuality as in thought, or that possessed of existential actuality. We conceive only being; its contradictory, non-being, cannot consciously be conceived. As a matter of fact, the famous idea of nothing, which is sometimes called a pseudo-idea, and in which Heidegger discovers such very strange things, is nothing more, in every case, than the idea of *being* destroyed in a radical negation.

We have an intuition of being, which, obviously, can be obtained neither by a discursive operation—which presupposes some concepts of being—nor by an abstraction in the ordinary sense of the word, for an abstraction cannot be made except from that which is already conceived as being. The intuition of being arises from our first truly human sensible perception. In this perceptive intuition we easily unearth concurrence of the intellect, for we perceive some *beings* endowed with sensible qualities. And necessarily so; for how could one make " abstractions " of the essences of sensible things if the essences were not in some way included in our perceptions and images. The undivided, ever simple, essence of the realities of nature eludes us; we conceive it as a being having such multiple properties. And we draw this knowledge from the material essences in our sensible perceptions, because in these perceptions, very complex from the psychological point of view, the intelligence has an intuition of *being*.

Further, we have an intuition of being in our conscious life. There, being imposes itself on us with all the weight of an existential actuality which will not be denied. Descartes saw it well when he posed his famous principle, the precious statement and fatal source of idealism in Cartesian thought. In " I think," or indeed in the simple word " thought," we have an intuition of being in that actuality without which no being would ever be known and which remains, in all the finite order, the measure of existential reality.

This is the fundamental intuition of our intelligence. On every side it impregnates all our intellectual operations. We

conceive of everything as *being*. Limited beings are conceived in all the fulness of *being*. Certain thinkers have gone so far as to consider the idea of being as innate, and even as the idea of the plenitude of being, which we do not, as a matter of fact, attain except by the laborious effort of analogical cognition. These ontologistic fantasies are completely useless; we have an intuition of being from the very dawn of our intelligence, and this " logical first," absolutely undetermined, is most certainly not the " ontological first." Nor can this fact be emphasized too strongly. The idea of being which is itself a form of every idea, is not an innate idea, nor is it an " a priori form." It is acquired by intuition, but it is joined with the intelligence, because it is the object corresponding to the nature of the intelligence, and remains always the condition of its subsequent progress.

The metaphysicians have concerned themselves with this intuition, distinguishing three or four concepts of being, and giving themselves over to subtle considerations of the question. But the intelligence will not brook the delays of metaphysical speculations, and in accord with its normal and spontaneous function, it sets out to grasp the precious judgments the idea of being delivers up to us. Whether we are conscious of it or not, we make constant use of first principles which are nothing more than the evolution of the idea of being in the form of judgments. This is true whether being be taken in all its extension, as in the principles of identity and contradiction, or whether it be considered in its existential actuality, as in the principle of causality. The intelligence is quickly fashioned by our equipment of principles. We acquire spontaneously the " habit of principles," because the principles are imposed by the idea of being of which we have an intuition.

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## V. *The Post-Rational Intuition*

The intuitions which remain to be examined are perhaps less familiar than those which are constantly made use of in discursive work. However, all can detect in their consciousness the intuition which we call " post-rational."

We labor intellectually: we analyze, abstract, reason; nor does this labor fail to bear fruit. We are enriched in a permanent way by acquired science; we have the "habit of knowledge." What interests us particularly in this are the conclusions arrived at. They take their place, by a definitive assent, in the mental synthesis which directs our life. The means by which we have arrived at these conclusions always retain their importance, for they are the sole guarantee of the conclusions themselves. At times we enjoy recalling them to our minds simply to assure ourselves of their validity and to confirm our conclusion. However, the means, naturally enough, tend to become more or less obscure once the end has been obtained. It is the conclusion, assented to, and sanctioned, sometimes, by action, that is our good. It modifies our soul; it becomes, in the soul, a second nature; and its object assumes such clarity that we grasp it immediately as we do an intuition. Let us point out a concrete case. A man of remarkable intelligence and philosophical penetration, meditates during a long period of years on the problem of the existence of God. He arrives at a firm conviction: God, sanely conceived, stripped of all anthropomorphic illusions and personal by an absolute independence, exists, a supra-existence of which the existential actuality of finite being is no more than a shadow cast in the cave of space and time. He returns constantly to this conviction which to him, and rightly so, appears to be of fundamental importance, and conscientiously arranges his life accordingly. After some time he seems to free himself of all the laborious demonstration which led him to this state of conviction. Indeed, he appears to conceive of it as mere child's play. He perceives the existence of God intellectually with compelling evidence; he has acquired an intuition of it.

One can consider such conviction as illusory; psychologically it exists and more frequently perhaps, than is imagined. Nevertheless, such an intuition is acquired and acquired very discursively. For this reason we have termed it "post-rational." The victorious evidence, which in the perceptive intuition arises from the object, here has its source in a disposition acquired by

the subject. The habits become a "second nature." Nature itself imposes on us only the intellectual intuition of being, "*et eorum quae consequuntur ens*"; but when a conclusion has become "second nature" to us, we accept it, we submit to it intuitively, we judge it by a "connaturality."

We believe that the judgments "by feeling" of Scheler, whose theory, it might be added, remains obscure,—are nothing else than judgments by connaturality. They present the guaranty that the subject presents; and we know that the worth of the subject, even the intellectual worth, depends on the subject's own affective dispositions when he adduces no other reason than his impression, his intuition. These connatural judgments are likewise encountered especially in the terrain of morals and esthetics. It is the just man who judges best when there is question of justice; it is the man expert in esthetic appreciation who discovers at a single glance and before all analysis, the beauty of a work of art, when it does not clash too violently with his acquired taste. However, these post-rational intuitions are to be found as well in the purely theoretical field. It goes without saying that they are valid for those who possess them; for others, their validity is equivalent to nothing more than an argument from authority.

A psychological phenomenon often pointed out by the masters of the spiritual life approaches in some way this post-rational intuition. It is generally agreed that serious and fruitful life necessarily supposes "reflection" (*cogitatio*) or what religious tradition has designated as "meditation." Terminating negatively in asceticism and positively in action, meditation is the necessary means whereby one's soul attains a harmonious unity, wholly directed to the pursuit of the supreme end. Meditation is at first "discursive." One tries to determine the nature of the object meditated upon, to discover its antecedents and its consequences. If these intellectual considerations awaken, by means of appropriate images, our affective life, they soon become efficacious for action. When the same subject is meditated upon many times, when, especially, the precious "*mens cogitabunda*" is acquired by long practise, one passes,

according to the authors who speak from experience, from discursive meditation to "contemplation." The different steps of "reasoning" are combined, abridged, simplified into a single synthesis as rich as the long chain of our reasonings. With one stroke, that is attained which before had been considered successively. The whole is contemplated with a minimum of analysis, if, indeed, there be any analysis whatsoever. The object is seized in an acquired "intuition."

The post-rational intuition is precious. Without it we would be exposed to an eternal marking of time in the one place, for our power of synthesis in conscious reasoning is limited. We should be able to regard certain points as acquired, because we have an intuition of them by connaturality. But we must never lose sight of the fact that such an intuition is acquired, that its guaranty is to be found in the anterior "reasoning" which we have seemingly abandoned. We know how powerfully our subjective dispositions tempt us to cast ourselves headlong upon a fascinating conclusion. Moreover, such an intuition is incommunicable; and those who enjoy it derive great profit from returning periodically to its modest source which should always nourish their post-rational intuition.

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## VI. *The Supra-Rational Intuition*

It is here, we believe, that we come into contact with the highest operation of which the nature of man is capable. One never succeeds in communicating it either by word or by reasoning. The most that can be done is to place others on the road that leads to it. At the end of the road, if nature has gifted them with a metaphysical sense, they will lift themselves up to this supra-rational intuition which thenceforward they will know from experience.

The human intelligence does not attain to the realities of nature save through the medium of successive diagrams. In each concept we grasp the whole of the object conceived, but

only according to certain characteristic lines. "Man is a rational animal." Man is nothing more than that; that is the whole of his nature. But many people, knowing this hackneyed formula, suspect none of the wonders hidden therein. In order to reveal these wonders, the comprehensive character of the concept must be limited; we take the concept of *animal* apart, and there we discover that of sensitive living things; the concept of *living thing* carries the object of our considerations further, and so on. In each stage, we touch no more than two or three predicates, each of which demands separate and further analysis until we come to the supreme categories and the first idea of *being*. Thus may we be said to "fathom" a concept. We enrich it without extending it. This is what may be called the "schematization of the intelligence." Even in our purely intellectual activities we are able to proceed only by a series of schemata, following one another in time and capable of being grasped as a whole, in order to furnish us with the humanly possible knowledge of the real.

It must be recognized that this schematization is, surprisingly enough, a weakness of human intelligence. Why, when we know all of a reality, do we not know it totally? What actually escapes us at any stage of the analysis is not inaccessible to our minds and yet we can grasp it only in a succession, in a division which is postulated neither by the object, nor, apparently by the nature of the intelligence itself. Why is it that our intellectual penetration is so lamentably limited?

The weaknesses of our knowledge—division, temporary succession—remind us immediately of material beings. Assuredly, our concepts have nothing of the quantitative about them; and yet the imperfections of the material order seem to have overcast our spiritual activity. But man, we need only recall, is not a pure spirit. All the delicate movements of the intelligence are conditioned by the plasticity of the imagination which remains fatally immersed in the material. We magnify the inexhaustible wealth of our imagination; but, compared to what we conceive of as pure intelligence, the imagination is heavy and rigid. It is the imagination which condemns the intelligence to its

tiresome schematization. It is, without doubt, our indispensable support; it is likewise a chain which holds in check the impulse of our spirit. It lets the intelligence suspect the existence of a superior region where the mind could find the atmosphere adapted to its spiritual aspiration.

If this be true relative to the objects of our immediate experience, with how much greater reason does the imagination become a hindrance—though a necessary one—when we strive to grasp the spiritual world to which we belong through the higher reaches of our being and where we should discover the meaning of our life? We live by the soul of which we do not have an immediate intuition; we live by God Whom no intelligence can clearly comprehend, even by the highest effort of its nature. However, we must conceive of the soul and of God for by them we live. And in all our ideas of them we remain indebted to the imagination. In the last analysis, we appeal to the quantitative, to the material, in order to elevate ourselves to that which is free of all quantity.

The supernatural realities are obviously of so great a richness that, in comparison, the splendors of earth and sky are paltry. To grasp a reflection of them we must make use of all the resources of our imagination; we must make appeal to all our images, however irrelevant some of them may seem. Each will furnish us with an intellectual concept; and in privileged moments, we will, perhaps, arrive at a synthetic concept of the spiritual reality.

But,—and it is here that we approach to the supra-rational intuition—it can happen and it does happen that the immediate concepts which we " abstract " from these multiple images seem absolutely irreconcilable among themselves.—God is infinitely just; therefore He confers upon free beings what is their due. In accord with His justice He punishes the sinner to the point where, to certain theorists " vindictive justice " appears to pertain but to God. However, God is infinitely merciful; all Nature and the whole evolution of human life are no more than a startling manifestation of His mercy. Nothing is owing to anyone or anything. The existence of finite beings once posited,

God gratuitously pardons the sinner and sometimes makes of him a " vessel of election." He does not give to the sinner what is his due according to justice. Can one still maintain, then, that God is just? Are the infinite mercy and the supreme justice irreconcilable?

Let us take an example that is fundamental in all our speculations on the divinity, and which the pantheists have singularly abused.—God is the cause of the world and it is by that fact that human reason makes its first contact with Him. But what do we mean by that? A " cause " is an existing being which by an operation is the sufficient reason for the existential actuality of another being, which is its effect. Abstract for the moment from the many and subtle problems relative to this subject. The existence of one being does not imply, in itself, the existence of another being distinct from itself. Kant abused this truth to the extent of reducing causality to an " a priori form " of the understanding. More than the existence of a cause is necessary; we must likewise appeal to an " operation." But if that be so, how can God be the " cause " of the world? If the world is established by the very being of God, the world must be a part of the being of God, and we are in an inconceivable pantheism. Further, a free operation of God is needed, an operation distinct from His being. But how can we introduce such a distinction into the being of God, into pure act, into absolute simplicity? Must we conclude, then, that God is not the " cause " of the world?

We here find ourselves confronted with an aporia. Since the conclusions on each side rest upon solid reasoning, we are faced with an antimony which no verbal artifice can dissipate. The opposition, obviously, is not to be found in the object, for we know that the contradictory is non-being. It can only result from the defective manner in which we reach the superior realities. Is it possible to free ourselves from this defect? There are, of course, certain clichés by which one may attempt to shake off the difficulty; God is the cause of the universe; all that there is of perfection in causality must be attributed to Him; but He is free of all the imperfection we find in finite causes, especially

of the distinction between being and operation. Now, this is all very true, but for many minds it is pure verbalism. If the distinction between being and operation is of our very notion of cause, then God is not the cause of the world and we are delivered over to all the absurdities of pantheism.

We are convinced that in the highest intuition one escapes from this antimony. We believe that at certain happy moments, one " sees," as in a spiritual flash of lightning, the unity of that which the reason breaks up and sets in opposition. Beyond all rational duality, we can sometimes cast an intuitive glance into this superior world in which the partial and successive views of discursive reasoning—always captive to the tyrannical imagination—are made to vanish. We can enjoy a supra-rational intuition which, better than any reasoning, leads us to suspect our ultra-temporal destiny. No human word can communicate this intuition; but the manner in which the human reason forces itself painfully to rise above itself, the " eternal problems " that seem to place a barrier to the continuous progress of philosophy, these should dissuade us from a denial of that supra-rational intuition in which some thinkers seek the proper domain of metaphysics. This intuition constitutes the supreme conquest of the intelligence. It is a promise of eternity.

We find a clear indication of it in the doctrine of the School on analogical knowledge. We shall not here concern ourselves with the " analogy of inequality " which throws its precious beams of light on the unity indicated by all multiplicity. Nor are we interested here in the " analogies of attribution," and of " proportion " which are reduced to univocacy by simple abstraction and which sometimes are allied to a simple literary metaphor. We are speaking of the " analogy of proportionality " which Cajetan declares to be the only metaphysical analogy. Like the mathematical proportion, this is posited in two relations united by a sign of equality. But this sign, obviously, has nothing to do with quantity, nor in any way indicates identity. It signifies a relation (e. g., that of an effect to its cosmic cause) " is as " another relation (e. g., that of the

universe to God). But we are well aware that at the same time the first relation " is not as " the second. And we are incapable of determining, by an immediately abstract concept, in what measure the equality between the two relationships is to be affirmed and denied. For by this road we shall return to simple univocacy. All analogical knowledge begins by a duality, by a " yes " and a " no."

It would be naive to believe that this is itself analogical knowledge. It is no more than the point of departure and the bait of analogical knowledge. To attain to it we must transcend the multiplicity of terms, the duality of relationships; we must grasp the unity of the real in a " supra-rational intuition." Only by the commonplace proportional equation shall we be able to express our intellectual conquest. In itself, the intuition is ineffable; it remains the privilege of him who has made the conquest.

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## VII. *The Mystical Intuition*

It might seem rash in a purely philosophical study, to venture into the territory of mysticism whose subtleties evidently belong to theology, which is not content to consider God under the aspect of " being " and can aspire to the consideration of Him in the light of " divinity." However, mystical phenomena as such cannot be allowed to escape the attention of the philosopher. To reject them as completely illusory, as does James Leuba, is an intolerable absurdity. They are indisputable as facts of consciousness. Hence, it is necessary to recognize that they assume an importance equal to the phenomena of Nature in the construction of our " philosophy of life." Bergson sees in the experiences of the Christian mystics a decisive proof of the existence of God; in his eyes such experiences assume the proportions of an experimental fact. Contained in them is an element that is decisive in all philosophy.

Therefore, the philosopher can and should treat of mystical intuition. In the face of certain disconcerting affirmations, he

rapidly loses his footing and every advance in this territory appears to him as rashness. So we limit ourselves to certain summary indications in order to complete, as far as is permitted to a philosopher, our enumeration of the forms of intuitive knowledge. The mystics teach us many good and beautiful things. Saint Theresa, Saint John of the Cross, Saint Francis de Sales, Eckhart, Tauler, Ruysbroeck recount marvels on the subject of the ascent of the soul towards God. Let us admit that their states are clearly supernatural. In order to grasp some knowledge of them we must possess at least some analogy with the conscious situations that are open to our speculation.

All, especially the German mystics, express themselves ultimately in terms that bear a relation to knowledge. Indeed, it must be so, since the goal toward which they make their way, is, in one manner or another, the *vision* of God. It is, moreover, established that the active force in their ascent is the *love* of God. Now, love, by its very nature, is unitive. They aspire to union with God, and this union must be conscious; it should be a union of knowledge. Likewise the goal of the mystical life should be characterized as "an experimental knowledge of God." The infinite Being appears to the mind of the mystic with all the compelling evidence that can be had by a perceptive intuition in the sensible life, or by a fundamental intellectual intuition which gives us being and first principles. These privileged souls insinuate very clearly that they see the *essence* of God. Assuredly this is most disconcerting, and regarding it, one can at least ask what kind of an idea we can form of this state, which the mystics themselves declare to be ineffable, and incapable of description except through images which are hackneyed and sometimes deceiving.

All the mystics speak of a previous purification, which refers not only to sensible reality, but also to images and ideas. Everything, it seems, should disappear to make place for the divine. It is this fact which leads Leuba to declare naively when confronted with the most thoroughly authorized statements, that the mystics see nothing but "a void." It should be observed that we are not here concerning ourselves with asceti-

cism, which is the condition of every worthy and fruitful life. We shall agree, readily enough, that in the supra-rational intuition, a man is stripped of every manner of image and of the concepts immediately given by images in order that he may rise to the unity of this ineffable life. This is certainly not the mystical vision of the divine essence. Nevertheless, an analogy occurs which seems most pertinent. Hence, one can ask if certain mystical contemplations, opposed to Christian mysticism,—that of Plotinus, for example,—cannot be conceived as very natural supra-rational intuitions.

The preliminary stages, described by the great mystics with pleasure, because they are concerned with mental states which do not completely escape human language, do not seem to us to throw much light on the final goal. One speaks of " discursive meditation," familiar to everyone, of " acquired contemplation," which is hardly more than a post-rational intuition, of " affective prayer," in which the ideas and representations are veiled by the impulses of the heart, and of the " prayer of union," which to the psychologist seems to designate no more than an intuition, strongly emotional, which has become habitual, and is sustained by wisdom which envisages everything in the light of God. Many degrees are noted; but, from the psychological point of view, one is given the impression that it is really only a question of *degrees* of these four fundamental stages in which there is no break of continuity. We believe that all of this can be linked to that purification which is the prerequisite condition for the mystical vision of God.

Then comes the great event, which is either a state of transitory ecstatic contemplation or of the " mystical marriage." Just what happens here is most difficult to determine. The mystics, even those most expert in the science of theology, cannot tell us. Their stammerings and gropings sometimes embarrass us. Have they an intuition of the divine essence? They seem indeed to say so, and their feeble efforts at explanation place them instead under suspicion of pantheism. They are united to God in a manner more intimate than all conceivable unions. Such a union, more intimate than any we are able to

conceive of, is a union " to the infinite," which is unity for the human intelligence. Moreover, they are careful to note that their vision is in some respect inferior to the " beatific vision," which itself does not imply unity. Let us remember that we are throughout this whole inquiry in the presence of a profound difficulty. We stand before a certain phenomenon which will never enter into our usual classification. Nor should we forget that our philosophy is no more than human, and that it is lamentably awkward when confronted with the divine.

There is, then, a mystical intuition which cannot be reduced to any other intuition. Let us admit in plain language that its object and its nature (its *quod* and *quo*) do not fall within the grasp of the human intelligence. It would be remarkably rash to see in it no more than a particular case of supra-rational intuition. This latter never presents us with an objective which can give us the illusion of having seen the divine essence. Then, too, one must examine the psychology of the men who have been favored with this mystical intuition. Many of them are very intelligent, which is in itself a precious guarantee; but very few seem to have been experienced in the exactitudes of intellectual life which might have prepared them for supra-rational intuition and given them the illusion of the mystical vision. Everything in their lives seems to escape from the rules of nature. Apparently, even their modest preliminary asceticism obeys an impulse which has nothing in common with the preoccupation of a worthy and fruitful life. They are acted upon much more than they act. The " *pati divina* " of pseudo-Denis maintains its full vigor, even in the stages of which we have found analogues in natural life. Mysticism, in the fullest sense of the word, is divine in its source, and its path seems to be in continuity with eternal life, before which the philosopher can only stand silent in admiration.

* * *

Intuition plays a primary role in all our intellectual life; for reason does not function in a vacuum, nor does it find an object within itself. It is necessary then that it acquire this object

from outside of itself, that it submit to the object, that it have an intuition of it. This will be conceded with respect to the perceptive intuition which affords us the spectacle of the universe. But it must be insisted upon that intuition accompanies and sustains us in all the ascents of the mind. Many thinkers have maintained or suspected this but they do not seem to have sufficiently distinguished intuition. And, since not all intuitions have the same objective validity, illusions and sterile controversies sometimes result from this confusion. We have attempted to introduce a little order in what has seemed to us an intellectual chaos.

We have distinguished seven intuitions in an ascending scale. We have hardly done more than enumerate them as methodically as possible. Each of these intuitions, or, at least, many of them, merit a profound study. May the various distinctions here made serve as a guide to philosophers in their reflections upon their own valued experiences.

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# A THOMISTIC ANALYSIS OF PEACE

For its speculative interest alone the study of peace in the thought and spirit of St. Thomas is not without its interest. But the task assumes overwhelming practical importance in these days of cosmic headaches, produced by economic, social and political disturbances. Aristotle remarks in the early parts of his *Ethics* that it is of great moment to know what one is aiming at. Amidst a cacophony of voices the world over clamoring for peace, it might be of profit to know what peace really is, how it is brought about, and what are the possibilities of realizing it. What the philosopher can offer is not a detailed program, of course. But what he has to say ought to be said clearly and emphatically today. It will probably surprise many to learn how deeply and thoroughly the Angelic Doctor pondered over the metaphysical and theological foundations of peace.

This essay will be divided into three parts: first, the nature of peace; second, the cause of peace; and third, as a conclusion, the possibility of effecting peace. As we believe one of the chief values of an article of this sort rests in exposing the most important texts of Aquinas, quotations will be generously given. It will be evident to every student of Thomism that occasionally we have permitted ourselves a personal interpretation.

## I

### The Nature of Peace

All minds have some idea of peace. It is the function of the philosopher to subject this more or less vague idea to analysis, and thereby to render it distinct and clear. Peace, in the judgment of all, has something to do with repose, and repose is a consequent of, or concomitant with, the well-ordered state or operation of beings. The athlete, endowed with the well-developed physique, knows the joys of bodily peace. The man with

the disordered liver resorts to the physician to recover that euphoria formerly had. All are familiar with the peace of a good conscience when one is " right " with himself and his God. The joy of family life is found in the frictionless and orderly conduct of those gathered about the hearth. The peace of a nation is a result of good order among its own citizens and in its relations to other states. It is not difficult, then, to perceive why both Aquinas and Augustine defined peace as the " tranquillity of order." [1]

The concept of " order " likewise demands a brief analysis. Things are in order when they are in their proper place. Order involves certainly a plurality of things, or at least of parts. Order involves also a definite arrangement of these elements. Order, is, in the words of Aquinas, " a disposition by which things of equal and unequal nature are given each its place." [2] In another place Aquinas affirms that the tranquillity of order, which is the essence of peace, requires three things: first, a distinction of beings; second, the establishment of each thing within the proper limits of its nature; and third, the conservation or maintenance of each thing within the limits assigned to it.[3]

What is important to emphasize in this relation of order to peace is the *unity* characteristic of ordered things. Ordered things share in tranquillity precisely to the degree of their unity.

[1] St. Augustine: *De civitate Dei,* Bk. 19, c. 13. St. Thomas: *Summa Theol.* II-II, q. 29, a. 1, ad 1; q. 45, a. 6, c.; *In Ep. ad Coloss.* iii, 15; *In Matt.,* c. 5, n. 7; Cf. *In Ep. ad Eph:* ii, 14: " Pax, quae est secundum Augustinum, tranquillitas modi, speciei et ordinis."

[2] *In Matt.,* c. 5, n. 7: " Ordo est parium dispariumque sua cuique loco tribuens dispositio."

[3] *In de Divinis Nominibus,* XI, lect. 1: " Unitas autem pacis in tranquillitate ordinis consistit, ut Augustinus dicit XIX *De civ. Dei,* ad quam quidem tranquillitatem ordinis tria requiruntur. Primo quidem, ut ab invicem distinguantur; non potest esse ordo nisi distinctorum, et ideo dicit quod ' omnia definit.' Secundo, necesse est ad tranquillitatem ordinis ut rerum distinctarum nulla exeat limitem suae naturae, et ad hoc pertinet quod dicit: ' Terminat.' Tertio, requiritur quae haec definitio et terminatio stabiliatur, et ad hoc pertinet quod dicit: ' et firmat.' Alioquin si rerum definitio et terminatio non esset firma, sed una res a termino suo egrediens, alterius fines invaderet, confunderetur ordo rerum, et sic non esset tranquillitas ordinis."

It is this note of unity which formally gives them peace.[4] That is why, though a being may be devoid of a plurality of parts, it may enjoy peace, and may have this peace to a greater degree than composite natures, insofar as its degree of unity surpasses them.

To link peace with unity, of course, is to carry the problem to the transcendental plane. It is to link peace with a property of being itself. Unity, truth, and goodness are convertible with being. A nature, howsoever low it may be in the scale of reality, participates in these attributes to the degree that it participates in being. The greater its share of being, the greater is its share in the attributes that follow being. But more than this, it is also a fact that as all things desire the preservation of, and increase in, their being, likewise all things are in quest of unity.[5] And where there is unity, there is peace.

The quest for peace, therefore, is as extensive as the quest for the enrichment of being. Every order of creatures is marked with this pursuit of peace, from the angelic natures down through the rational animals to the lowest order of being, wherein the creature, though deprived of consciousness, seeks through its natural appetite, and in its particular manner, the tranquillity of order. The cosmic sweep of the notion of peace is proper to Christian philosophy. In analyzing the nature and foundations of peace, we are not concerned with some superficial thing in the sphere of reality, but with an element that is part and parcel of the innermost structure of being itself.

St. Thomas, true to his profound instincts as a lover of wisdom, delights to view things in relation to the whole of which they form a part. The wise man differs from others precisely in this world-view of things. Now if the quest for peace is universal, it should and actually does characterize the whole as well as the part. The created universe is an harmonious whole. It is therefore endowed with unity, and this cosmic unity of

[4] *Ibid.*: "Sic igitur ad rationem pacis duo concurrunt: primo quidem, quod aliqua sint unita; secundo, quod concordent ad unum."

[5] *Ibid.*: "Est autem naturale cuilibet rei ut unitatem desideret, sicut et esse et bonum."

order is evidence for St. Thomas that essential peace envelops the universe.[6] All created natures seek their own unity and perfection, but all likewise conspire together to weave a cosmic fabric of perfect design. Will one object that individual natures fail to attain their particular goals, and thus disfigure the cosmic pattern? To suggest such a possibility is to question the efficacy of the Divine Will. The universe is necessarily one, because endowed with one order, and directed to one supreme end.[7] No defect of a particular nature can conflict with the basic cosmic order willed by God. If a nature recedes from the Divine Will in one respect, it is brought back to the divinely willed order in another way. The sinner subtracts himself in one manner from the cosmic plan, but the punishment to which he becomes subject restores the balance, and leaves intact the fundamental order and unity of the universe.[8]

The peace that characterizes the universe, both as a whole and in its parts, is a reflection of the Divine Peace. The created cosmos draws its being from a source which is Being Itself. Likewise, cosmic unity and cosmic peace have their ultimate foundations in Divine Unity and Divine Peace.[9] But can the mind of man comprehend the peace of God? Strictly speaking, it is ineffable. Neither man nor any other intellectual creature, no matter how elevated, penetrates into the secrets of the peace of the Deity, save for the insights afforded by the Beatific

[6] *Ibid.*, lect. 2: "Omnia conveniunt in uno ordine universi, qui indissolubilis manet, secundum quod ex Deo in ipso universo quaedam harmonia, id est proportionata concordia, causatur."

[7] *Summa Theol.*, I, q. 48, a. 3, ad 1.: "haec est ratio quare mundus est unus, quia debent omnia esse ordinata uno ordine et ad unum."

[8] *Ibid.*, I, q. 19, a. 6, c: "Cum igitur voluntas Dei sit universalis causa omnium rerum, impossibile est quod divina voluntas suum effectum non consequatur. Unde quod recedere videtur a divina voluntate secundum unum ordinem, relabitur in ipsam secundum alium: sicut peccator, qui quantum est in se recedit a divina voluntate peccando, incidit in ordinem divinae voluntatis, dum per eius justitiam punitur."

Cf. *In de Div. Nom.*, XI, lect. 2: "Ubi considerandum est quod etsi aliqua discordent quantum ad fines proprios, omnia tamen concordant in appetitu finis ultimi."

[9] *Vide* under "The Cause of Peace" below.

Vision. But if this direct knowledge is lacking to us, we can at least analogically view the peace of God. God's peace is firstly the peace of *silence*. It is no accident that one associates peace with silence. The clamorous man is generally not, if ever, the peaceful man. God's peace is also the peace of *immobility* and *quietude*. Serenity and calmness are the invariable traits of the peaceful character. Turbulency and restlessness are just as foreign to the nature of true peace as extensive clamor. The peace of God is naturally devoid of all those elements that would adulterate its form, however so little.[10] God's peace is necessarily the supreme mode of peace. It is the peace of perfect unity, and where there is unity, there is peace. God is supremely one in His essence. He is one, in Himself, within Himself, and wholly to Himself.[11]

Herein we find the deepest reason for the quest for peace on the part of the creature. The end of every creature is to effect the greatest possible resemblance to God.[12] This hunger for God takes various forms, and is satisfied in various ways, depending upon the nature of the particular creature. Some re-

[10] *In de Div. Nom.*, XI, lect. 2: "Dicit ergo primo quod neque licitum est neque possibile non solum alicui hominum, sed neque alicui existentium creaturarum dicere ore aut cogitare corde ipsam divinam pacem, secundum quod in se est, et ipsum divinum silentium . . . Adjungit autem silentium paci, quia signum perturbatae pacis solet esse strepitus et clamor. Adjungit etiam paci immobilitatem Dei ad omnem processum, qui a nobis cognoscitur; . . . Conjungitur autem quies et immobilitas pacis, sicut et silentium, quia ea quae pacem habent, et hoc ipso quietem quamdam habere videntur."

[11] *Ibid.*: "Unitio autem ut supra dictum est, ad rationem pacis pertinet. Invenitur autem aliqua quae in seipsis diversa sunt sed uniuntur in aliquo uno, sicut multi homines uniuntur in una domo; sed Deus in seipso unitus est. Est autem aliquid quod in seipso quidem unum est, sed tamen intra seipsum non est unum, sicut unus homo intra seipsum non est unus, quia multa et diversa intra seipsum continentur. Sed Deus intra seipsum est unus, quia nulla diversitas invenitur in ipso. Invenitur etiam aliquid quod intra seipsum est unum, quia non componitur ex divisibilibus partibus, sed tamen non totum sibi toti unitur, quia una pars ejus non est unum cum altera. Sed Deus totus ad totum unitur, quia in eo nullus est numerus partium, sed est omnino simplex."

[12] III *Contra Gentiles*, 19: "Ex hoc autem quod acquirunt divinam bonitatem, res creatae similes Deo constituuntur. Si igitur res omnes in Deum sicut in ultimum finem tendunt ut ipsius bonitatem consequantur, sequitur quod ultimum rerum finis sit Deo assimilari."

semble God insofar as they exist, others also insofar as they live, and still others, higher in the scale of being, insofar as they know. But at every level, there is a quest for greater unity, resembling the perfect unity of the First Cause, and this is the quest, dynamizing every finite being, for greater participation in the peace of the God of Peace.

St. Thomas Aquinas has not merely viewed the question of peace in relation to God or to the cosmos as a whole. He has firmly, and with all the clarity that the subject matter allows, exposed the meaning of peace insofar as it affects men, and with no less vigor has laid bare the causes, ultimate and proximate, of such peace. Probably the most intensely discussed problem of the day is this question of the preservation and promotion of peace among men. The modern man fears war, and hates war, and contemplates with no little panic a future not so distant when a culture may go down in ruins. Hardly less intense than his panic is his sense of helplessness in the face of catastrophe. Many are the solutions proposed to avert war: trade agreements, the free flow of goods, access to raw materials, political alliances, a world state, disarmament, economic sanctions, etc. Some of the measures are undoubtedly good, some are questionable, and some are decidedly bad. What one does not generally discern in these discussions is a recognition of the necessity of putting first things first, of providing for the secondary aids to peace after the primary basis has been laid. Undoubtedly the cause of much of this confusion is owing to an ignorance of first principles, when it is not due to devotion to false or perverted philosophies. Perhaps the greatest message Aquinas can offer to twentieth-century man is his philosophy of human peace.

In determining the nature of peace insofar as it affects men, we are seeking to establish the kind of unity existing among them that can be properly characterized as peace. Obviously there are different types and degrees of unity possible among rational creatures. All could not conceivably be regarded as expressive of true peace. The unity existing among a band of criminals is hardly a peaceful union; nor the unity of operation among unfortunate humans, produced by the lash of a watch-

ful slave-driver. There are even subtler forms of unity which to the unwary might be accepted for true peace. Absolute and therefore materialistic dictators naturally strive to effect the greatest possible unity among their subjects, compatible with their aims. It is a mistake to suppose that the unity they effect is purely external, or the product of sheer physical force. Dictators are too clever psychologists to rest content with such a flimsy type of concord. Their people must be bound together by stronger, though less tangible, chains. The elements that make for cohesion must effect the soul itself. Unity will be effected on the basis of feelings and emotions. With utter disregard of the primacy in man of intellect and will, the absolute and so materialistic totalitarian will produce concord on the sub-rational level. It is unity analogous to the kind found in a flock of sheep. But precisely because it ignores or contemns the true nature of man, it is a type of unity which is not productive of true peace.

Peace is one thing, another thing is concord. Concord is the agreement of men upon the same object. There may be concord, Aquinas says, among the impious.[13] Peace adds to concord the union of the appetites of one and the same man. There is no peace in the individual heart so long as a man is pulled in two different directions by his desires. The subject of the dictator is at peace in a sense when his emotions are harmonized with those of his fellows, but can it be true peace when he observes in the less tense moments of his life his unfulfilled aspirations for the higher goods of freedom of expression and of action? There is peace in a man when his desires are not only one with his fellow man, but also when his own appetites are unified: "Whence concord imports the union of the appetites of diverse beings; but peace, beyond this union, imports likewise the union of appetites of the single nature."[14]

[13] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 29, art. 1, *Sed contra*: "est quod concordia potest esse aliquorum impiorum in malo. Sed *non est pax impiis*, ut dicitur Is., xlviii 22. Ergo pax non est idem quod concordia."

[14] *Ibid.*: "Unde concordia importat unionem appetituum diversorum appetentium; pax autem, supra hanc unionem, importat etiam appetituum unius appetentis unionem."

The desires of men are hierarchically organized. Not all of his appetites are of equal worth. There is an order to be recognized among them. The true unity of his appetites, which is productive of true peace, will arise from the satisfaction of those appetites in accordance with their intrinsic dignity and importance. At the present time, men appear to have difficulty in perceiving this simple truth. With some misgivings, a number will embrace the good of economic security, though it may and often does mean the sacrifice of the good of freedom. Or the opposite choice is made: one cleaves to the good of freedom, though frequently at the price of security. Most generally, perhaps, the choice is exclusively practical, without much attention paid to the metaphysical principles involved. That man is able to embrace all good appears to many as a vain hope. To adopt such an attitude is to admit, of course, that peace is an illusion.

Illusion or not, the quest for peace is stamped upon the very soul of man. Like every creature, he is dynamized by this urge for unity and peace. Conforming to the laws of being itself, all men desire peace. All men seek to acquire the object of their appetites, and to triumph over those obstacles that impede its possession. The obstacles that impede his path to peace are chiefly the conflict of desires within the individual man himself, or a conflict with the desires of other men.[15] Ordinary experience confirms the point that all men wish to resolve these conflicts, and to attain to the object of their desire. Hence they desire peace: "Therefore it is necessary that every being which desires at all, desires peace, insofar as every such being wishes to attain tranquilly and without hindrance the object of his desires."[16]

The constant recurrence of war in the history of the race

[15] *Ibid.*, art. 2, c.: "Dicendum quod, ex hoc ipso quod homo aliquid appetit, consequens est ipsum appetere eius, quod appetit, assecutionem; et, per consequens, remotionem eorum quae assecutionem impedire possunt. Potest autem impediri assecutio boni desiderati, per contrarium appetitum vel suiipsius vel alterius; et utrumque tollitur per pacem, sicut supra (a. 1) dictum est."

[16] *Ibid.*: "Et ideo necesse est quod omne appetens appetat pacem: inquantum scilicet omne appetens appetit tranquille et sine impedimento pervenire ad id quod appetit; in quo consistit ratio pacis."

would seem to belie this assertion as to the universal quest for peace. Is not war itself for some men a good? Are not the desires of some for unification and fulfillment of their appetites satisfied by the frenzy of combat? Such a unity of opposites might satisfy a Hegelian, but it cannot stand serious analysis. Fighting for the sake of fighting, with indifference to defeat or to victory, is not a characteristic of even the most belligerent type of mind. Why do men wage war? Certainly because of a state or condition repugnant to their wills. Men plunge into war to alter this state and to attain a more perfect peace: "Wherefore, all those who wage war seek through warfare to attain to a more perfect peace than they previously had." [17]

The peace of men, therefore, is not found in a unity effected by physical coercion; nor is it found in an infra-rational unity of feelings. It is found in the unity of rational appetites, embracing the same object, and in the conforming of the lower appetities to the dictate of reason. As one writer has recently expressed it, the unity alone worthy of men must consist in a *moral communion*:

> An act of communion is a delicate one: it supposes in the communicants a common moral orientation towards the same end—a moral orientation which can be conceived only as a momentary suspension of other desires and projects, decreed by the will, and arising in the certitude that all participate in it in the same way, with the same renunciation of the momentary desires, with the same purity of sacrifices or intentions. A moral communion is an act of free beings, conscious of their nature and accepting an attitude. The communion is created not by the fact that they all feel the same way at the same time, for a flock of frightened sheep would constitute a biologically perfect communion group, but it is created by the fact that a certain number of individuals adopt, for the same thing and about the same time, a same *voluntary* attitude.[18]

If peace is so intimately linked with unity and, in a manner,

[17] *Ibid.*, ad 2: "Et propter hoc omnes bellantes quaerunt per bella ad pacem aliquam pervenire perfectiorem quam prius haberent."

[18] *Review of Politics*, Etienne De Greeff: "The Psychology of the Totalitarian Movement," April, 1939, p. 148.

coextensive with being itself, then its opposites must be ranged among the non-rational things in the universe. St. Thomas calls them sins. He enumerates these opposites as discord, contention, schism, brawling, war, and sedition.[19] Sin is a defect, a falling away from the fullness of being. The enlightened intelligence concurs instinctively in the judgment of the Angelic Doctor. War and sedition (to mention those opposites of peace of particular moment today) are always repugnant to the virtuous and intelligent. Even when engaged in legitimately, they are instruments of a distasteful nature. Aquinas permits warfare between states only when the cause is just, when undertaken by proper authority, and when there is a right intention present (either of promoting good or avoiding evil).[20] The sin of sedition is grave, inasmuch as opposed to justice and to the common good.[21] Nevertheless, it is not always wrong to revolt. When a ruler seeks his own good, instead of the common good, he is by definition a tyrant. It is the tyrant who is the really seditious person, especially when he creates discord among his people in order more securely to dominate. How carefully, however, Aquinas circumscribes this right to rebel is manifest from his insistance that sedition becomes unlawful when the evils resulting from such action outweight the good possible of accomplishment.[22]

[19] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 37, preface. [20] *Ibid.*, q. 40, c.

[21] *Ibid.*, q. 42, a. 2, c: "Dicendum quod, sicut dictum est (a. 1), seditio opponitur unitati multitudinis, id est, populi, civitatis vel regni. Dicit autem Augustinus, II De civitate Dei (cap. XXI), quod populum determinant sapientes, *non omnem coetum multitudinis, sed coetum juris consensu et utilitatis communione sociatum.* Unde manifestum est unitatem cui opponitur seditio, esse unitatem juris et communis utilitatis. Manifestum est ergo quod seditio opponitur et justitiae et communi bono."

[22] *Ibid.*, a. 2: "Dicendum quod regimen tyrannicum non est justum: quia non ordinatur ad bonum commune, sed ad bonum privatum regentis; ut patet per Philosophum in III Polit. (lect. vi) et in VIII Ethic. (lect. x). Et ideo perturbatio huius regiminis non habet rationem seditionis; nisi forte quando sic inordinate perturbatur tyranni regimen, quod multitudo subjecta maius detrimentum patitur, ex perturbatione consequenti, quam ex tyranni regimine. Magis autem tyrannus seditiosus est, qui in populo sibi subjecto discordias et seditiones nutrit, ut tutius dominari possit. Hoc enim tyrannicum est: cum sit ordinatum ad bonum proprium praesidentis cum multitudinis nocumento."

## II

### The Cause of Peace

Peace is rooted in unity. Unity is inseparably associated with being. It is axiomatic with the Thomist that being and unity are convertible—*ens et unum convertuntur*. It is a simple corollary to say that the source of being must also be the source of unity. This takes us, of course, to God. The Divine Peace—the perfect peace of the absolutely simple Nature—is in the profoundest sense the foundation of the unity of finite and created things. The metaphysician perceives three aspects under which this Divine Peace lies at the basis of the unity of the created order. It is firstly the *efficient* cause of this unity, binding all created natures into one.[23] It is likewise the *exemplary cause* of unity—hence of peace—insofar as all creatures share, in different degrees, in a similitude of the Divine Peace. The highest of the creatures participate in the Divine Peace to the greatest degree. They in turn communicate it in a certain manner to those natures which are lower in the scale of being. These noblest creatures, through their participation in the peace of God, have a three-fold union: in themselves, insofar as each is some one thing; secondly, with other things, insofar as they are all one with a unity of order; and thirdly, the union by which they are united to the principle of peace of all things, namely, God.[24] Though the lower natures communicate in one manner in this three-fold union through the medium of the

[23] *In de Div. Nom.*, XI, lect. 1: "Et ideo Dionysius dicit quod divina pax est 'unitiva omnium' quantum ad primum, inquantum scilicet facit omnia communicare in uno."

[24] *Ibid.*: "Est autem considerandum quod sicut alias perfectiones a Deo procedentes, ita istas abundantius aliis supremae creaturae participant, ut per eas possint quodammodo ad infimas derivari. Supremas ergo creatures dicit esse digniores de numero congregativarum virtutum, quia scilicet in tanta abundantia congregationi divina pacis participant, ut etiam aliarum congregativae sint. Harum enim virtutum unaquaeque per participationem divinae pacis triplicem unionem habet. Una quidem est ad seipsas, secundum quod una unitur ad aliam in aliquid unum. Alia vero unio est secundum quod una unitur aliam in ordine vere unius. Tertia vero unio est secundum quam uniuntur ad unum principium pacis omnium rerum, id est, ad Deum."

higher creatures, it is God ultimately who effects absolutely this unity, whatever the order of being. And He does this insofar as He establishes the distinction among things, and maintains each within the limits of its nature.[25]

There is nothing which does not participate in the Divine Peace to some degree, from the atoms in the inorganic molecule to the highest of the angelic natures. God has effected, moreover, such a unity of order among creatures that the extremes of the created order are joined together by the intervening natures. There is a continuity of being among creatures. It results from this continuity that there is a natural friendship existing among all created natures.[25a]

The Divine Peace is also the *final cause* of all things. All creatures hunger for being and goodness. But this hunger inevitably connotes a parallel love for unity. Division, the opposite of unity, corrupts the being and destroys the goodness. How could one crave for the former pair (being and goodness) and be insensible to the latter, unity? The Divine Peace is the source of this unity in things. Hence it is the Divine Peace that all natures seek in seeking more perfect unity.[26]

From all points of view, therefore, the basic cause of that peace and unity which pervades the entire order of things is the utterly simple divine nature:

[25] *Vd. supra,* note 3. Cf. *Ibid.,* "Ostendit quod divina pax faciat communiter in omnibus, et dicit quod prima causa pacis omnibus supervenit simpliciter, quia licet diversa sint in quibus operatur; tamen ex parte operantis, non est aliqua diversitas nec in operatione nec in modo operandi. Ostendit autem quod supervenit rebus et ad conservandam unitatem pacis et ad instituendam."

[25a] *Ibid.,* lect. 2: "Haec quidem pax divina ad omnia transit, omnia uniendo, per hoc quod reducit omnia in quemdam ordinem. Qui quidem ordo consistit in hoc quod quaedam extrema conjunguntur aliis extremis per media . . . Nihil enim est ita infimum in rebus quod non aliquo divino dono participet; ex qua participatione sortitur ut habeat connaturalem amicitiam ad alias creaturas, et ut ordinetur ad Deum sicut ad ultimum finem, qui est frui Deo."

[26] *Ibid.,* lect. 1: "Ostendit quomodo divina pax est causa finalis omnium rerum. Est autem naturale cuilibet rei ut unitatem desideret, sicut et esse et bonum, quia per divisionem res deficit et corrumpitur, et bonitas rei minoratur. Et quia divina pax causat unitatem in rebus, ideo concludit quod omnia suo modo desiderant divinam pacem, inquantum etiam est omnium unitiva."

From these considerations he [Dionysius] concludes that we must consider that there is a certain simple nature, namely the divine nature, which effects peace in things by union, in so far as it assimilates all things to itself through the bestowal of its gifts, and ordains them to itself as to an ultimate end, and moreover unites the things of the universe to themselves, that is, whatsoever thing to itself.[27]

Peace among men is achieved by their conforming to the order willed by God. Being free agents, as they direct themselves to their ultimate end, likewise in accordance with moral law and supernatural precept they freely effect peace within themselves and with each other. In the last analysis "perfect peace" and "ultimate end" coincide. One distinguishes only to make understandable their basic union. Now the factors that make for peace among men are three: Justice, Charity, and Wisdom. What is the precise role of each in this work of human peace, and how are they correlated one with another?

### *Peace and Justice*

*Opus justitiae pax*[28]—Peace is the work of Justice. What the Scriptures affirm, and what the great theologians have emphasized, is the sense of mankind itself. Who can conceive of true peace existing with injustice? And in a world unsettled as ours is today, with injustice rife in the social, economic and political spheres, with peoples clamoring for freedom against the yoke of the oppressor, and with other peoples demanding access to a greater share of the world's goods and markets, the necessity of correcting injustices as a necessary aid to peace is obvious to all. Render to each what is his due—the precept of justice —is patently linked with the tranquillity of order. Order is the state wherein things are in their proper places, wherein each has what belongs to him, whether it be a question of material

[27] *Ibid.*: "Ex his igitur concludit quod debemus considerare unam quamdam simplicem naturam, qua per modum unionis facit pacem in rebus, scilicet naturam divinam, quae unit omnia sibi ipsi, dum omnia sibi assimilat per influentiam suorum donorum, et ad se ordinat sicut ad ultimum finem, et iterum unit universa illis ipsis, id est, quamlibet rem ad seipsam."

[28] *Isa.*, xxxii, 17.

goods, social and educational opportunity, economic security, or even of the most elementary rights of worship and marriage. Peace is inconceivable apart from justice.

The traditional division of justice into commutative, legal and distributive is not merely an academic one today. If injustice is to be corrected, it must of course be corrected in a reasonable and orderly manner. This implies an understanding of the types of justice involved. Paradoxically, in the very act of correcting abuses, rights may be violated, and what is equally possible, duties may be shirked. To keep clearly in mind the different kinds of justice is to save well-meaning zeal from making costly blunders.

Every man living in a political society is a part of a certain whole. As such he has certain obligations in justice for the promotion of the common good. It pertains to *legal justice* to regulate the action of the individual in relation to the common weal. Citizens can and do shirk obligations to the common good in selfish pursuit of their own interests. If the state is thereby weakened, and if the radicals are thereby encouraged, on whom really rests the blame? There might be a different story to tell than the present one of national insecurity and discontent—very opposites of peace—if the rich and powerful in all nations had, in their own selfish (and necessarily irregular) pursuit of peace, observed more faithfully the precepts of legal justice.

Justice, insofar as it concerns the good of the individual, as distinct from the common good, is divided into *distributive* and *commutative* justice. The former concerns the apportioning of burdens and benefits by the state to individuals; the latter regulates the relations between individuals. States, as individuals, can be unjust. There is no room in Thomistic philosophy for the theory that a state is above law and justice, and is free to trammel the fundamental rights of individuals, or to deprive an individual of his rightful share of the common resources or the common opportunities for advancement in a social or economic way. It is needless to dwell upon current flagrant violations of the principles of distributive justice in many parts of the world today.

Granting that the reign of justice be quite triumphant, it would be hasty to conclude that perfect peace would prevail. Peace, we have insisted, is more than the stabilized concord of objective relations among men, which is the fruit of justice. True peace is rooted in the hearts of men. Peace truly is present, not merely when men respect each other's rights, but also when the individual man is at peace with himself, and when the wills of all men are centered upon the same supreme good. As Gilson remarks:

> Where social justice reigns, there can be order and accord of fact between wills. If one wishes, we will even say that there can be a kind of concord. But peace is something more. . . . What men call peace is never more than an interval between two wars. The precarious equilibrium which constitutes it endures only so long as mutual fear prevents dissensions from declaring themselves. Parody of true peace, this armed fear, which it is superfluous to describe to men of our time, can indeed maintain a certain order, but it does not suffice to give to men tranquillity. For tranquillity to reign, the social order must be the spontaneous expression of an interior peace at the heart of men.[28a]

Justice, therefore, causes peace, but only indirectly, by removing those obstacles that prevent the realization of perfect tranquillity of order. It prompts men, particularly, to abstain from injuring others, thereby eliminating the occasions of controversies and tumults.[29]

### *Peace and Charity*

Justice prepares the way for peace, but it is Charity which directly brings it about: "By its very nature Charity causes peace. For love is a unitive force, as Dionysius says. And peace is union, the union of the inclinations of the appetites."[30]

[28a] E. Gilson: *L'Esprit de la Philosophie Médiévale* (Deuxieme serie), Paris: Vrin, 1932. P. 197.

[29] II-II, q. 29, a. 3, ad 3: "Dicendum quod pax est *opus justitiae*: inquantum scilicet removet prohibens."

*Ibid.*, q. 180, a. 2, ad 2: "Pax autem causatur ex justitia quae est circa operationes; secundum illud Isa. xxxii, 17, *Opus justitiae pax*: inquantum scilicet ille qui ab iniuriis aliorum abstinet, subtrahit litigiorum et tumultuum occasiones."

[30] *Ibid.*, q. 29, a. 3, ad 3: "Quia, secundum propriam rationem, caritas pacem

Charity regulates and unifies the appetites or desires of the individual man, insofar as it prompts him to love God with his whole heart, referring all things to Him. The diverse appetites of man can only be unified by their fixation upon the one object. Every order demands a principle of order. A plurality of tendencies becomes ordered when these tendencies are directed towards one thing. The appetites of man find their unity in the unity of the object. This of course means that man must look *outside of himself* for peace. The affirmation of egotism is the first step in making permanent the warfare of human appetites. To cut man off from his ontological roots in objective reality, to declare his self-sufficiency, to sever him from his ties with the transcendent object that alone can effect order within his turbulent nature is to consign him to a state of perpetual conflict, and make the task of effecting peace impossible. And yet what other goal is offered to modern man by current philosophies of a subjectivistic nature, philosophies which declare man's impotency to attain objective reality? Kant, the alleged philosopher of peace, bears a heavy responsibility here. Many modern ethical theories likewise sin either in affirming the essentially relativistic character of moral standards (the impossibility, in other words, of apprehending an immutable object by which our appetites can be regulated and unified) or by delivering man over to himself, with all his conflicting tendencies, to attain unity within himself and by himself.

Charity, or love of God, not only unifies the appetites of the individual man. It likewise prompts men to love their neighbor as themselves, and to fulfill their wishes as they would their own. My neighbor's will becomes my own. There is an identity of choice among us. Our respective desires are unified. We are at peace:

> It must be said that a two-fold union is involved in peace, as was said. One is the union of the different appetites of the individual man; the other is the union of the appetites of one man with those

causat. Est enim amor *vis unitiva,* ut Dionysius dicit, iv. cap. *De divin. nomin.,* (lect. xii). Pax autem est unio appetitivarum inclinationum."

of another. Now Charity effects this two-fold union, the first kind insofar as we refer all things to Him. Thus, all of our appetites are directed towards one thing. The second union is effected, insofar as we love our neighbor as ourselves, from which it follows that a man desires to fulfill the will of his neighbor, as his very own. Because of this, among friends there is an identity of election, as is said in the Ethics.[31]

There is no true peace without Charity. One can imagine a man's whole energies and inclinations directed upon a morally bad object. The successful criminal is usually the one who effects this unity of effort and concentration of power. There is a kind of peace here, because there is a unity of inclinations to some degree. But in the nature of things it can be only an apparent peace. Not every object can effect the proper unity. There is a true object and a false object, a true good and a false or apparent good. Evil has its attractive side, and in this respect can quiet and unify the appetites. But it is always accompanied by its very nature with many defects which inevitably provoke perturbation in the appetite. The criminal has his conscience to worry him, or the arm of the police. The fruits of depravity are never sweet in all respects. Whence true peace can be produced only by adhering to what is truly good. It is had by union with God.[32]

[31] *Ibid.*, c: "Dicendum quod duplex unio est de ratione pacis: sicut dictum est (a. 1). Quarum una est secundum ordinationem propriorum appetituum in unum; alia vero est secundum unionem appetitus proprii cum appetitu alterius. Et utramque unionem efficit caritas. Primam quidem unionem, secundum omnia referamus in ipsum; et, sic omnes appetitus nostri feruntur in unum. Aliam vero, prout diligimus proximum sicut nosipsos; ex quo contingit quod homo vult implere voluntatem proximi, sicut et suiipsius; et propter hoc, inter amicabilia unum ponitur identitas electionis, ut patet in IX *Ethic.* (lect. iv.) et Tullius dicit in lib. De amicitia (Sallust., Catilin.), quod *amicorum est idem velle et nolle.*"

[32] *Ibid.*, q. 29, a. 2, ad 3: "Dicendum quod pax consistit in quietatione et unione appetitus. Sicut autem appetitus potest esse simpliciter boni vel boni apparentis, ita etiam et pax potest esse et vera et apparens. Vera quidem pax non potest esse nisi circa appetitum veri boni; quia omne malum, etsi secundum aliquid appareat bonum, unde ex alia parte appetitum quietat, habet tamen multos defectus, ex quibus appetitus remanet inquietus et perturbatus. Unde pax vera non potest esse nisi in bonis et bonorum. Pax autem, quae malorum est, est pax apparens et non vera: unde dicitur *Sap.*, xiv, 22: *In magno viventes inscientiae bello, tot et tam magna mala pacem appelant.*"

God is love, and since love is the cause of union, the Thomist is careful to emphasize that peace among men is properly the work of God. We are face to face with one of the mysteries of grace and freedom. But St. Thomas is explicit: "Peace is nothing other than the unity of affections. To effect such a unity is proper to God alone, inasmuch as it is through Charity, which is only from God, that hearts are united." [33]

Christ, the mediator between God and man, has brought tidings of true peace to the world.[34] Christ's manner of expressing His gift of peace—*My peace I give to you*—denotes that the whole effect of peace is dependent upon Him. Whatever, therefore, there is of peace among men is caused by Christ.[35] And what is this peace which Christ gives to us? It is not the apparent peace of the world, but the true peace. And the characteristics of true peace are serenity of mind, tranquillity of soul, simplicity of heart, the love of neighbor, and the fellowship of Charity.[36]

[33] *In Epistolam ad Hebraeos,* xiii, 20: "Pax enim nihil aliud est, nisi unitas affectuum. Quos unire est proprium solius Dei, quia per charitatem, quae a solo Deo est, uniuntur corda. Deus enim novit colligere et unire, quia Deus est charitas, quae est vinculum perfectionis."

*In Ep. ad Colossenses,* iii, 15: "Ex charitate mox oritur pax, quae est, secundum Augustinum tranquillitas ordinis, sibi a Deo instituti, quod facit charitas. Qui enim aliquem diligit, concordat cum eo in voluntate."

*In II Ep. ad Corinthios,* xiii, 11: "Et ideo dicit: *Deus pacis et dilectionis erit vobiscum,* et hoc ideo est, quia qui est in vera pace cordis et corporis, est in charitate; et qui manet in charitate, in Deo manet, et Deus in eo, ut dicitur I Joan. iv."

[34] *In Ep. ad Ephesios,* ii, 17.

[35] *Ibid.,* ii, 14: "Unde dicebat: *Pacem meam do vobis* (Joan. xiv). Hic autem modus loquendi fieri consuevit, quando totum quod est in effectu dependet ex causa, sicut cum dicimus de Deo, quod ipse est salus nostra, quia quidquid salutis est in nobis causatur a Deo; quia ergo quidquid pacis est in nobis causatur a Christo, et per consequens quidquid appropinquationis, quia homo quando pacificatus est cum alio, secure potest ambulare seu appropinquare ad ipsum, ideo dicit quod est pax nostra."

[36] *In Joan.,* xiv, 7: "Quod vero Dominus adjunxit, *Non quomodo mundus dat, ego do vobis,* quid est aliud, nisi non quomodo homines dant qui diligunt mundum? Qui propterea sibi dant pacem ut sine molestia mundo perfruantur: et quando justis dant pacem ut non eos persequantur, pax esse non potest vera ubi non est vera concordia, quia disjuncta sunt corda. Chrysostomus (hom. ead.) Pax etiam exterior ad malum fit multoties, et eis qui habent eam nihil prodest. Augustinus de

The peace of the world will not proceed from conferences (however valuable otherwise they may be), but in the nature of things will proceed from the individual hearts transfixed by Charity, no matter how lowly their station. The statesman has his necessary role to play in preserving mankind from the scourges of war, but it is sheer folly to believe that the kind of peace thereby effected can be lasting or profound. The makers of true peace in the world will be the saints. Not the impressive diplomat, but the humble nun; not the strident politician, but the lowly laborer; not the heads of states, but their most unassuming citizens. This is the teaching of St. Thomas Aquinas, and he is but giving voice to the teachings of Christianity itself.

### *Peace and Wisdom*

No treatment of the causes of peace can be complete without a consideration of the rôle of wisdom. In a certain sense the Gift of Wisdom is pre-eminent over both Justice and Charity in effecting peace. The world lacks to a large measure the teachings and directions of wisdom today. Its insecurity and discontent are directly related to this deficiency. But what is wisdom? With the ancients this concept had a definite meaning, in contrast to the almost meaningless employment of the word today. Wisdom was defined as an intellectual perfection by which one is enabled to contemplate the totality of things in the light of their ultimate causes. The wise man, moreover, according to Aquinas, judges and ordains all through the medium of this knowledge.[87]

There are three forms of Wisdom it is important to distinguish. The least noble form is metaphysics. The philosopher, by the light of reason alone, analyzes the nature of the universe about him, and ascends to a consideration of its cause,

verb. Dom. (serm. 59). Est autem pax serenitas mentis, tranquillitas animi, simplicitas cordis, amoris vinculum, consortium caritatis."

[87] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 45, a. 1: "Dicendum quod, secundum Philosophum, in princ. *Metaph.* (I, lect. 2) ad sapientem pertinet considerare causam altissimam, per quam certissime de aliis judicatur, et secundum quam omnia ordinare oportet." Cf. *In Metaph.* (ed. Cathala, n. 43); *I Cont. Gent.*, 1.

God. His knowledge of God is tantalizingly imperfect, and is no greater than the analysis of created effects can afford him. Of God's inner life, he knows nothing. Of the precise mode in which God possesses the analogical perfections of intelligence, wisdom, justice, mercy, etc., he knows nothing. He can affirm that there is an order of supernatural perfections in God, but of what these are in detail he is ignorant. He does not dare even to affirm the positive possibility of man's elevation to the supernatural order of grace, though he insists that there is no argument to prove its impossibility. The metaphysician is a wise man, but necessarily of a humble sort. It is, moreover, a type of wisdom essentially concerned, not with direction of practical affairs, but with contemplation of the real world.

Above the wisdom of philosophy is the wisdom of supernatural theology. It is supernatural, because its principle is the infused virtue of Faith. It has for its end the conceptual analysis of revealed truths and the deduction of other truths virtually contained in the data of Revelation. Its proper object is God, and therefore it is wisdom. It is a higher wisdom than metaphysics, because it studies God not merely insofar as He is knowable through creatures, but insofar as He is known only to Himself naturally—an intimate knowledge communicable to others only by revelation. The theologian knows God as God, God in His very Deity or in His intimate life, God as the author of grace and of eternal beatitude, as an Object of knowledge essentially supernatural.

Theology is the complement of philosophy, as grace is of nature. The one (theology) draws its first principles from Revelation; the other (philosophy) draws its from nature. Philosophy primarily ascends, from man and nature to their Creator: theology primarily descends, from the Creator and Redeemer to creature. Both are types of wisdom, but the superior wisdom, Theology, not merely considers, but also directs. It is not merely speculative: it is likewise practical. Because of its practical nature, theology is of utmost importance to the apostle of peace.

There is a third wisdom, the supreme wisdom of life. It is the

wisdom of the saints, the gift of the Holy Ghost, the gift of Wisdom. Founded on infused Charity it accords to its possessor the ability to have a quasi-experimental knowledge of God, and enables him not merely to assent to the truth of the veiled mysteries but also to regard them as sovereignly good and worthy of love. The Gift of Wisdom differs from the acquired intellectual virtue (metaphysics) in two main respects: first, it is the effect of an intimate union and connaturality with divine things—it is rooted in Charity, and Charity unites the soul to God; [38] second, it is not merely speculative, as metaphysics, but likewise practical.[39] By the Gift of Wisdom one is enabled primarily to contemplate the Divine Mysteries, but one is enabled, secondarily, to regulate human acts.[40] As regulative of human acts the Gift of Wisdom is paramount in the work of peace.

*Sapientis est ordinare*! It pertains to those endowed with wisdom to put things into order.[41] Only he who perceives the *whole* knows where the *part* properly belongs. Now what is peace, save the tranquillity of order? It is therefore the work of those who have the Gift of Wisdom, declares St. Thomas, to bring about peace, both in themselves and among others.[42]

[38] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 45, a. 4, c.: "Dicendum quod sapientia quae est donum Spiritus Sancti, sicut dictum est (aa. 2, 3), facit rectitudinem judicii circa res divinas, vel per regulas divinas de aliis, ex quadam connaturalitate sive unione ad divina. Quae quidem est per caritatem, ut dictum est. Et ideo sapientia de qua loquimur praesupponit caritatem."

[39] *Ibid.*, a. 3, ad 1: "Dicendum quod, quanto aliqua virtus est altior, tanto ad plura se extendit; ut habetur in lib. *De causis* (prop. x, xvii). Unde ex hoc ipso quod sapientia quae est donum, est excellentior quam sapientia quae est virtus intellectualis, utpote magis de propinquo Deum attingens per quamdam unionem animae ad ipsum: habet quod non solum dirigat in contemplatione, sed etiam in actione."

[40] *Ibid.*, a. 3, ad 3: "Unde ad sapientiam prius pertinet contemplatio divinorum, quae est visio principii; et posterius dirigere actus humanos secundum rationes divinas."

[41] *Ibid.*, a. 6, c.: "Ordinare autem pertinet ad sapientiam; ut patet per Philosophum, in principio *Metaph.* (lect. ii).

[42] *Ibid.*: "Pacifici autem dicuntur quasi pacem facientes, vel in seipsis, vel etiam in aliis. Quorum utrumque contingit per hoc quod ea in quibus pax constituitur ad debitum ordinem rediguntur: nam pax est *tranquillitas ordinis*, ut Augustinus dicit. XIX *De civ. Dei.* (cap. xiii). Ordinare autem pertinet ad sapientiam; ut patet per Philosophum, in principio *Metaph.* (lect. ii). Et ideo esse pacificum convenienter attribuitur sapientiae."

Wisdom from one point of view is more important even than Charity in effecting peace. It is more proper to say, according to Aquinas, that it pertains to Charity to *have* peace, but that it pertains to Wisdom to *make* peace.[43]

"Blessed are the peacemakers," the seventh Beatitude declares. "Who are these peacemakers?" Aquinas asks. And he answers that they are those endowed with the Gift of Wisdom.[44] The wise man, specifically, effects peace within himself by avoiding the corruptions of sin, by observing due moderation in all things, and by a willingness to accept advice from others. He is then temperate and docile, perfectly in control of his own appetites, with his mind and heart open to enlightenment from his fellow men. He is the opposite of a fool, as wisdom is the opposite of folly. Such a man likewise brings peace to his fellows, and he does this by the practice of the spiritual and corporal works of mercy. He respects the rights and goods of all; he is compassionate towards the unfortunate; he assists others in their needs; and he does not scruple to correct in a fraternal fashion his neighbor when the latter is at fault.[45] All perhaps

[43] *Ibid.*, ad 1: "Dicendum quod caritatis est habere pacem: sed facere pacem est sapientiae ordinantis." Perhaps we can interpret this to mean that wisdom furnishes the plan of order, while Charity provides the execution of the plan as well as maintenance of it in being. Wisdom then would be the *formal* cause of peace, while Charity would be the *efficient* cause.

[44] *Ibid.*, a. 6, c.: "Dicendum quod septima beatitudo congrue adaptatur dono sapientiae et quantum ad meritum et quantum ad praemium."

[45] *Ibid.*, ad 3: "Dicendum quod, sicut iam (a. 3) dictum est, ad sapientiam, secundum quod est donum, pertinet non solum contemplari divina, sed etiam regulare humanos actus. In qua quidem directione, primo occurit remotio a malis, quae contrariantur sapientiae; unde et timor dicitur esse *initium sapientiae*, inquantum facit recedere a malis. Ultimum autem est, sicut finis, quod omnia ad debitum ordinem redigantur; quod pertinet ad rationem pacis. Et ideo convenienter Jacobus dicit quod *sapientia quae desursum est*, quae est donum Spiritus Sancti, *primum est pudica*, quasi vitans corruptelas peccati; *deinde* autem *pacifica*, quod est finalis effectus sapientiae, propter quod ponitur beatitudo.—Iam vero omnia quae sequuntur manifestant ea per quae sapientia ad pacem perducit: et ordine congruo. Nam homini per pudicitiam a corruptelis recedenti, primo occurit quod, quantum ex se potest, modum in omnibus teneat; et, quantum ad hoc, dicitur *modesta*. Secundo, ut in his in quibus ipse sibi non sufficit, aliorum monitis acquiescat; et, quantum ad hoc, subdit, *suadibilis*. Et haec duo pertinent ad hoc quod homo consequatur pacem in seipso. Sed, ulterius, ad hoc quod homo sit paci-

are ready to admit that such conduct of men towards one another would bring peace to the world over-night, and equally ready to assert that it is a fantastic dream. If it be a dream, then of course the message and promise of Christian wisdom is a dream. But what some have accomplished, fortified by mystical wisdom, others can do. Such wisdom is of the elect, only in the sense that every Christian belongs to the elect. The potential universality of Christian wisdom is the hope of the world.

Not all can be learned theologians. Many have neither the time nor the ability to probe into the doctrine of the great masters of this Christian wisdom. But all can share in the work of peace. The Gift of Wisdom is not denied to the lowly. Like Charity itself, it is not dependent upon what a man knows, but upon what he is. Though the theologian must always be near to watch over, for correction or approval, the judgments of mystical wisdom, it is not mere learning that can bring into being, and preserve, peace. It is the work of love, and the wisdom that springs from love. St. Catherine of Siena knew little about the intricacies of formal theology, but she had loved much. And in loving, she had the strength and intelligence to move the Rock of Peter, and restore peace to the Church in her time. The world of today needs more Catherines.

## III

### Conclusion

True peace is found only in the possession of what is truly good. Can man obtain perfect peace in this life? The answer is fairly obvious. Perfect peace is reserved for those who have attained their ultimate end; it is the prerogative of those enjoying the Beatific Vision, wherein all desire is at rest. But there

ficus etiam aliis, primo requitur ut bonis eorum non repugnet; et hoc est quod dicit, *bonis consentiens.* Secundo, quod defectibus proximi et compatiatur in affectu, et subveniat in effectu; et hoc est quod dicitur, *plena misericordia et fructibus bonis.* Tertio requiritur ut caritative emendare peccata aliorum satagat; et hoc est quod dicit, *judicans sine simulatione;* ne scilicet correctionem praetendens, odium intendat explere."

is an imperfect peace, attainable in this world. Such peace could only be the privilege of those who cleave to God through the virtue of Charity. But it is a genuine, if imperfect kind of peace:

> True peace does not exist except in relation to what is good. And as there is two-fold true good, so there is a two-fold true peace: the perfect peace, which consists in the perfect enjoyment of the supreme good, by which all the appetites are at rest and united in one thing. This is the ultimate end of the rational creature, according to the Psalm cxlvii, 3—"Who placed thy ends in peace." The other is the imperfect peace, which is had in this world. Because, although the principle movement of the soul is quieted in God, there are nevertheless inner and outer disturbances to such peace.[46]

The Thomistic position, therefore, on the possibility of peace in the world of men is neither extravagantly utopian nor hopelessly pessimistic. It neither envisions a perfect harmony attainable among men *in via*; nor does it despairingly consign the cosmos to perdition and chaos. Perfect order, hence perfect peace, is beyond the reach of men in this life. Yet men are charged by natural law and supernatural precept to effect the best order possible, to achieve the best possible reflection of that perfect peace of another life. And the means for doing this are clearly indicated by St. Thomas. These means are Justice, Charity, and Wisdom.

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[46] *Summa Theol.*, II-II, q. 29, a. 2, ad 4: "Dicendum quod, cum vera pax non sit nisi de bono; sicut dupliciter habetur verum bonum, scilicet perfecte et imperfecte; ita est duplex pax vera.—Una quidem perfecta, quae consistit in perfecta fruitione summi boni, per quam omnes appetitus uniuntur quietati in uno. Et hic est ultimus finis creaturae rationalis, secundum illud psal. cxlvii, 3; *Qui posuit fines tuos pacem.*—Alia vero est pax imperfecta, quae habetur in hoc mundo: quia, etsi principalis animae motus quiescat in Deo, sunt tamen aliqua repugnantia, et intus et extra, quae perturbant hanc pacem."

# INTRODUCTION TO PHILOSOPHY

The purpose of this article is to manifest in the order of discipline what philosophy is. We shall treat first of the nominal definition of philosophy, then of its real definition.

## I—MEANING OF THE WORD PHILOSOPHY

The word philosophy is derived from the Greek word *philosophia*, whose elementary meaning is love of wisdom. Among the ancient Greeks the carpenter's art and the art of navigation were called *sophia*, that is, wisdom. In later times the same term was applied to excellence in poetry and music. Thus *sophia* originally meant proficiency in any art, and the word *sophos*, that is, wise man, signified one who was distinguished from his fellows by any kind of art or skill, or by broad common sense like that which was characteristic of the so-called Seven Wise Men or Sages.

Beginning in the sixth century B. C., some of the Greeks devoted themselves to the investigation of the nature of things. They wanted to know the reasons of things, that is, what and how and why things are. They tried to attain an understanding of things by means of their natural powers of observation and thought and by making some experiments. The words *sophia* and *philosophia* were used to signify knowledge of this sort, and the pursuit of this knowledge, and life lived in accordance with this knowledge. It is said that Pythagoras was the first to designate this knowledge by the name *philosophia*, and to call one who pursued or possessed it a *philosophos*, that is, a friend or lover of wisdom. There is a note of modesty in the names *philosophia* and *philosophos*. This has been interpreted by some writers to mean that human wisdom is imperfect, and that man at best is rather a lover of wisdom than truly wise.

The word philosophy means the love of wisdom as leading to the search for it. This name is used to signify the concept of perfect human knowledge or human wisdom itself, either as a whole or in part.

## II—NEED FOR PHILOSOPHY

By philosophy we here understand a kind of human knowledge which is more perfect than the knowledge that is attained in ordinary experience and thought.

### *Difficulties*

It seems that ordinary human knowledge is sufficient for the natural needs of man, and hence there is no need for philosophy.

1. Knowledge which is sufficient for the preservation and propagation of human life is sufficient for the natural needs of man, because life itself is first and foremost. But ordinary knowledge is sufficient for the survival of the human race. Therefore ordinary knowledge is sufficient for the natural needs of man.

2. Nature is not deficient in what is required for the natural needs of man. But nature normally supplies man with the means of attaining only ordinary knowledge. Therefore ordinary knowledge is sufficient.

3. Knowledge which contains the highest truths and clearest insights is sufficient for the natural needs of man. But ordinary knowledge contains many admirably clear and shrewd insights into the nature of things. Even uneducated people can distinguish truth and error, good and evil. They know that justice will be done, if not in this life, then in the life to come. When they have the desire and opportunity, they can learn anything that anyone else knows, and they already know enough to avoid many of the dreadful mistakes which better educated people sometimes make. Therefore ordinary knowledge is sufficient for man.

4. Divine revelation completes and perfects our ordinary knowledge. We need only to consult the Bible and the teaching of the Church in order to find the answers to the problems which we cannot settle by means of our ordinary knowledge. Hence there is no need for any other kind of natural knowledge.

*Proof*

In order to see the need for philosophy, we must first understand what is meant by this expression. We say that there is need for something when it is required for some special purpose or is very desirable, for example, money or music. When we are not satisfied with what we already possess, we desire something more either as an end, that is, for its own sake, or as a means for attaining something else, and then we properly have need. There is need for philosophy if ordinary human knowledge is not satisfactory, and a more perfect kind of human knowledge is required or very desirable.

Ordinary knowledge is truly wonderful, because it includes knowledge of being and not-being. It appears that even children can distinguish between something and nothing, because they often ask for something to eat, and complain that they have nothing to play with, and are not satisfied when they want something and we give them nothing. Since our ordinary knowledge contains some knowledge of being; it seems that we are capable of knowing something about everything.

Yet ordinary knowledge is deficient in several important respects. In the first place, it includes clear and distinct knowledge of only a small part of all that we are capable of knowing. It is largely knowledge of the particular things which enter our ordinary experience. But the total number of particular things is immense. It is impossible for us to have experience of all of them, but we can distinguish between being and not-being, and we know that many things are similar to each other in some respects, for example, robins have red breasts. Hence it seems that we are capable of attaining generalized knowledge which is true of all or of many particulars, perhaps true even of those which we have not experienced.

In the second place, our ordinary knowledge is restricted to the things which are easy to know. But the difficult and wonderful works of human art, the modern buildings and bridges, ships and trains, and the masterpieces of painting and sculpture, of music and literature and social organization, manifest

that by the diligent and correct use of our natural powers of observation and thought we are able to attain knowledge of many things which are difficult to understand.

Moreover, our ordinary knowledge is a mixture of fact and fiction, truth and error, doubt, opinion, and traditional faith. One who possesses only ordinary knowledge is able to assign good reasons for some of his convictions, but not for all of them. He may know, for example, that a window is a useful thing, because it is suitable for letting in the light and keeping out the wind and rain. He may also be sure that stealing is wrong, and not be able to tell precisely what it is, or how he knows it to be so, or why it cannot be otherwise than he thinks it is. But from the fact that we do know the reasons of some things, it seems that we can know the reasons of other things, perhaps even the reasons of life and knowledge and being itself.

Furthermore, our ordinary knowledge is chiefly practical knowledge. It is knowledge especially of the things which are useful and approved, and contains only a small amount of knowledge for its own sake. Yet knowledge is not only useful, but also delightful. It is delightful to hear beautiful sounds and to see beautiful colors and shapes and forms. It is more delightful to know the truth for its own sake, as everyone knows who has clearly seen any truth and solved a doubt or difficulty.

Finally, ordinary knowledge is disorderly, confused and unconnected. One who possesses only ordinary knowledge can hardly talk for five minutes in an orderly way about anything. Yet the broader aspects of the world in which we live, and from which it seems we derive our ordinary knowledge, are orderly. Hence it seems possible for us to put order in our knowledge.

It is not only possible for us to improve upon our ordinary knowledge, but also desirable to do so. It is a truism that children are naturally inquisitive. When they encounter something new and strange they want to know what it is, how it works, why it is or acts as it does. Even in adults this rational instinct persists to greater or less extent and intensity. Everyone is inclined to wonder at particular things and events, and some people marvel at the whole of reality. We all at times deplore our

own ignorance, and desire to understand things more perfectly than they are understood in ordinary knowledge. Hence there is need for knowledge more perfect than the ordinary, that is, for philosophy.

Moreover, insofar as we are master of our own destiny, our success and happiness in life depend upon our actions and desires. But our actions and desires are dependent upon our knowledge. We do not desire what we do not know. When we know better it is possible for us to desire the better and do better. One who has only a little knowledge of human nature and of the reasons of human behavior has little regard for orderly social life. He is not able to manage his own life well or to direct others. He frequently falls into excesses, and is excessive in his demands of others. He frequently finds himself in trouble, and makes trouble for others. He sometimes fears what is not to be feared, for example, the uncertain future, and thinks little of what is truly dreadful, as the neglect of important duties. He sometimes expects or attempts what is impossible, and suffers disappointment or defeat. He may have true and abiding happiness within his reach, and yet lose it because he does not recognize it, or know what means are required to possess it. Hence in order to attain greater happiness there is need for knowledge more perfect than the ordinary, that is, for philosophy.

*Reply to Difficulties*

1. Life itself is fundamental and prior to every perfection that we can attain, because we must first be before we can act. But we are not content merely with life. We all desire more perfect knowledge and happiness, and some are willing to risk or lose their life for this end. The human race, for the most part, survives without philosophy, but it does so on a low level in regard to the knowledge and happiness naturally attainable by man. Yet so long as there is life, there is hope for improvement.

2. Nature is not deficient in what is necessary for the survival of the human race. By the ordinary use of our natural

powers we attain a knowledge of the basic truths on which our continued existence depends, for example, that something is not nothing, that half a loaf is better than no bread, that what is desirable is to be sought after, and what is undesirable is to be avoided. These truths are as fundamental in our knowledge as life itself is in our being. But we are not content with the foundation which nature gives, and our instinctive desire for more perfect knowledge reveals that we are naturally ordained to attain it. Nature does not supply us with all that is required for the perfection of our knowledge and happiness, and hence nature is not sufficient for all our natural needs. Because of the magnitude and difficulty of the task, the weakness of our intellects, the shortness of time, and the necessity of other occupations, we do not attain perfection in knowledge without special effort and without special aid.

3. Ordinary knowledge contains the basic truths on which all increase in our natural knowledge depends, because before we can know something else we must first know something. These truths are so evident and certain, so easy to attain and yet so penetrating into the very heart of reality, that one who clearly apprehends them can on occasion manifest the keenest insight, especially in the things with which he is familiar. He knows, for example, that the whole is greater than its part, and that the common good is greater than private interest. Aside from their traditional faith, uneducated people live and think close to what is immediately evident, and this evident knowledge of things preserves them from some of the frightful errors into which better educated people sometimes fall. But the basic truths contained in ordinary knowledge are capable of magnificent development into a system of thought that partly satisfies our craving for perfect knowledge and greatly promotes our happiness.

4. Some of the truths which we can attain by the use of our natural powers are required not only for the perfection of our knowledge but also for the intelligent direction of our life to the end for which we exist. These truths are contained in divine

revelation, along with other truths not naturally knowable to us, because they are so important and are not all attained otherwise, especially not by children and uneducated people, and because, since these truths chiefly concern God, they are attained more certainly and more fittingly by way of divine revelation than in any other way. Yet divine revelation does not remedy all the imperfections of our ordinary knowledge, but only the most important ones. Moreover, the same truth can be known in more than one way, for example, either by our own experience or by hearing about it from someone else. It is a happy achievement to establish by the use of our natural powers some of the truths that are contained in divine revelation.

### III—PHILOSOPHY IS SCIENCE

The term science is here used in a wide sense to signify knowledge of anything that is certain because of a known reason of its being, that is, certain because something is known which is required for the being either of our knowledge of the object or of the object itself, without which our knowledge or the object would not be. For example, it is science or scientific knowledge that we possess when we know that the Washington monument was built by skilled workmen because otherwise it would not be.

#### *Difficulties*

It seems that philosophy is not science, for the following reasons: 1. It is notorious that the philosophers dispute about everything, and do not agree upon anything. But no one disputes about certain or scientific knowledge. Therefore philosophy is not science.

2. We can be certain only about the things that are evident to us and that we clearly see. But the reasons of being are not evident to us. Hence we cannot be certain of them, and so philosophy is not science.

3. Some philosophers teach that our knowledge and its object are identical. If this is true, then we cannot know the rea-

sons of things that are distinct from our knowledge of them. Hence philosophy is science only of our own knowledge.

4. Some philosophers teach that being simply is, and has no other reason of being than itself. If this is true, then philosophy consists merely in knowing that being is because it is. But such knowledge does not seem to be worthy of the name science. Therefore philosophy is not science.

5. Some philosophers teach that we know only phenomena, that is, the sensible aspects of things. If this is true, then we cannot know the reasons of being, and so philosophy is not science.

6. Some philosophers teach that being is becoming, that is, constantly changing or evolving. If this is true, then there is no stable being, and we cannot be certain of the reasons of being, and we cannot be certain of anything. Hence philosophy is not science.

7. Some philosophers teach that, in order that our scientific knowledge be true, the object must be in our knowledge exactly as it is in itself. If this is true, then we cannot have scientific knowledge of sensible things, because we cannot know the reasons of sensible things exactly as they are in themselves. Hence philosophy is not science of sensible things.

8. Some philosophers teach that we know only words. If this is true, then we do not know that we know words, and we are not certain that we know words, and we are not certain that we know anything. Hence philosophy is not science.

9. Views which are strange and opposed to ordinary knowledge and common sense should not be called science. But all philosophical views are opposed to ordinary knowledge. For example, the philosophy of Aristotle and St. Thomas seemed novel in their day, and still to many seems just as grotesque as the doctrines of Darwin and Einstein. Hence philosophy is not science.

*Proof*

The word science is sometimes used in a restricted sense, and sometimes in a wide sense. In a restricted sense it is sometimes used as equivalent to the name of a particular science or group of sciences, especially the experimental sciences. In a wide sense it is equivalent to scientific knowledge in general.

The word science, in a wide sense, signifies true and certain knowledge which is more perfect than ordinary knowledge. It signifies knowledge which is not attained by ordinary experience, but by exact observation or measurement and correct thought. One who possesses scientific knowledge of a thing is able to tell how he knows that such a thing exists, or has existed, or will or can exist, even though it is not immediately evident that the object does exist, for example, oxygen. He may also be able to tell precisely what the object is or is made of, how or why it is or acts as it does, whether it is always so, and how he knows it to be so. One who is able to explain any or all of these knows something which is required for the being either of the object, or of his knowledge of it, or both, without which either the object or his knowledge of it would not be. It is commonly admitted that his scientific knowledge consists in knowledge such as this. But this is certain knowledge of the reasons of being, that is, knowledge of what is required for the being either of the object, or of our knowledge of it, or both. Hence the term science, in a wide sense, signifies knowledge of anything that is certain because of a known reason of its being.

Now, philosophy is human knowledge which is more perfect than ordinary knowledge. We commonly consider it an advance over ordinary knowledge if one knows precisely what a thing is or is made of, how or why it is or acts as it does, whether it is always so, and how he knows it to be so. But knowledge of this kind is science. Therefore philosophy is science, that is, knowledge of something that is certain because of a known reason of its being.

*Reply to Difficulties*

1. Philosophers dispute about everything in order to attain more perfect knowledge. They do not all agree upon anything because some maintain doctrines which are contradictory to the evident and certain truths that are contained in ordinary knowledge. Those who agree on what they hold as certain do not dispute about it.

2. We say that we are certain of something when we firmly assent to it as true, without any fear of being in error about it. We can be certain about something either because we see clearly with our own mind that it is true, or because we accept the testimony of a trustworthy witness or authority. In the first case we have the certitude of evident knowledge, as in knowing that a whole cake is larger than any part of it. In the second case we have the certitude of faith or belief, as in knowing that Washington crossed the Delaware. We are very certain of our beliefs when we know that the authority on which we rely is completely worthy of our trust. Yet belief, however certain it may be, is imperfect knowledge precisely because we do not ourselves evidently apprehend the object and perceive it to be as we believe it to be.

It is not immediately evident to us what the reasons of being are. Yet some of the reasons of some things are easy to discover, for example, that a knife is because it is useful for cutting. It is immediately evident to us that something is. The term being is used to signify the concept of what is, and the term not-being or nothing to signify the concept of what is not. It is evidently true and certain that being is not not-being. From experience it appears that at different times or under different aspects some beings both are and are not. Sometimes we are walking and sometimes not. Sometimes our feet are warm while our hands are not. But being is not at the same time and under the same aspect both being and not-being. It is evident also that being has all its reasons of being, that is, everything

that is required for its being. In order that hot soup be hot there must be some heat in it. Thus it is evident to us that the reasons of being are, although it is not immediately evident to us what they are. Science is an advance over ordinary knowledge, and properly consists in knowledge of what the reasons of things are.

3. The philosophers who teach that our knowledge and its object are identical should affirm that being is not-being, and some of them seem to do so. We know that knowledge itself is something, not nothing. Even not-being is an object of our knowledge, as appears from the fact that we speak of something and nothing, and distinguish something from nothing. Hence our knowledge of nothing is something. But it is not both being and not-being at the same time and under the same aspect. This manifests that there is a distinction between our knowledge and its object. If our knowledge and its object were in every way identical, then our knowledge of nothing would be nothing, which it is not from the aspect of knowledge itself, though it is nothing from the aspect of object.

It appears that all the objects of our knowledge have being in our knowledge inasmuch as we know them. But it is evident that some of the objects of our knowledge have being of their own, really distinct from the being which they have in our knowledge. We apprehend sensible things as acting sensibly on us, that is, as having being of their own opposed to that of our knowledge of them. We know that they are distinct from our knowledge of them because we can distinguish between our knowledge and its object, and between the object as it is in itself and the object as it is in our knowledge. When we leave home we take with us many memories of home, but we do not take the house itself. It appears that one and the same thing can properly be in itself, and also be in our knowledge. Hence philosophy may be science not only of our own knowledge but also of things that are distinct from our knowledge of them.

4. The philosophers who teach that being simply is, also

teach that there is only one being. But it appears that there are many beings, for example, knowledge itself and sensible things distinct from our knowledge of them. Of any being, it is true to say that it is, either in itself or in our knowledge or both, and that it has all that is required for its being. It is not immediately evident to us what the reasons of being are. However, it appears that some beings begin to be. We are aware that many of our own activities come into being, and then later cease to be. Often we begin to walk, and after a while cease walking. That which begins to be is of special interest, because previously it was not, and now it is. Such a being has peculiar reasons of being. Inasmuch as it is, it has sufficient reason in itself of being what it is. But inasmuch as it begins to be, it does not produce itself. To do so it would have to be and not be at the same time and under the same aspect, which is contrary to our experience. Nor does it derive its being from nothing, because nothing itself neither is nor acts. Hence it appears to depend for its being on something else distinct from itself. We are well aware that many of our activities spring somehow from ourselves, and depend on ourselves for their being. That which begins to be is called an effect, and the reasons of its being are called causes. Thus it appears that effects have causes, that is, reasons of being which are distinct from the effects themselves, on which effects depend for their being.

5. It seems that we know phenomena both as such, that is, as hot or cold, red or white, and as being, that is, as something sensible which is opposed to and distinct from our knowledge of it. Moreover, it seems that something exists which is not of itself sensible. We know that, although all the sensible aspects of things in us and about us change during our life, still we ourselves are the same individuals. It appears that there is in ourselves a permanent subject of sensible change, which is called our substance or substantial self, and which is really distinct from all our sensible aspects, as well as from our knowledge of ourselves. It seems, then, that we know not only sensible phenomena but also substantial being. The term being properly

signifies the concept of substantial being. Being which is not substantial is called accidental being, for example, our motion while walking. This motion seems to depend for its being on ourself, that is, on our own substance.

6. The philosophers who teach that we cannot be certain of anything may be asked whether they are certain of this. It seems that we are certain of many things, for example, we know that being is, and that we can know being because we do know being, and we know that substantial being exists. Substance is stable being, and has stable reasons of being.

7. The philosophers who teach that, for our scientific knowledge to be true, the object must be in our knowledge exactly as it is in itself, seem to demand too much for truth. By truth in our knowledge we ordinarily understand that our knowledge is conformed to or agrees with its object. The being which an object has in itself may be distinct from its being in our knowledge. The object may be in itself in a way in which it is not in our knowledge. This appears to be the case with individual sensible things. We may know that an apple is green without knowing whether it is sweet or sour, but in itself the apple may be both green and sweet. Truth in our knowledge does not seem to require that the object be in our knowledge exactly as it is in itself. It is sufficient that it be the same object, more or less perfectly known. The mind knows its object according to the mind's own mode of knowing, which does not seem to correspond exactly with the mode of being of the object. When the mind sets to work it transforms the object in various ways, so far as the object's mode of being in knowledge is concerned. But it seems that our knowledge is true when what we know to be is, and when what we know not to be is not.

8. The philosophers who teach that we know only words may be asked what they mean by a word. If we know that a word is something, not nothing, then we know being, and we know that it has all its reasons of being.

9. Philosophical views are opposed to ordinary knowledge

because, on the one hand, ordinary knowledge contains many and great imperfections. But, on the other hand, doctrines which are contradictory to the evident and certain truths contained in ordinary knowledge do not deserve the name philosophy or science when they are proposed as true, because they are not what we ordinarily understand to be truth, but error or falsehood.

## IV—PHILOSOPHY IS EVIDENT SCIENCE

It seems that philosophy is not evident human science, for the following reasons:

1. Only a substance, such as a man or a stone, is and has definite characteristics. But philosophy is not a substance. Therefore philosophy does not have definite characteristics.

2. Things which are evident cannot be doubted. But there are many doubts concerning the things of which philosophers treat, for example, concerning space and time. Therefore philosophy is not evident science.

3. Philosophy is said to be knowledge of hidden and abstruse things. But hidden and abstruse things cannot be known evidently. Therefore philosophy is not evident knowledge.

### *Proof*

Our ordinary knowledge includes knowledge of many things which we admit as certain, without any doubt that they are what we know them to be. We know some evident truths concerning things which are obvious to us, and we do not doubt them because they are so mainfestly true. Some of these are truths concerning particular things, for example, concerning ourself and our own activities. Others are general truths that are evidently true of everything of which we have any experience, for instance, that something is not nothing, that the whole is greater than its part, that being has sufficient reason

of being. It seems that we perform our ordinary human activities with some of these evident and certain truths, both general and particular, somehow in mind. When we hear the whistle of a train, we know evidently and certainly that it is something, not nothing. We take care to preserve the whole self, although we are willing to lose a part, such as a tooth or even an arm or leg, in order to preserve the self. We know that many things are required for our health and happiness, such as food, shelter and friends, and we try to keep or provide them. When we know something that is certain, for example, that we humans are sociable beings, because a reason of being is evident to our mind, for instance, because we cannot be or be happy without the help of others, we possess knowledge of it that is more perfect than the knowledge which we possess when we know merely that it is so, but not why, or believe that it is so on the testimony or authority of some one else, without seeing clearly or understanding with our own mind that it is so. Now, philosophy is human knowledge of things which is more perfect than ordinary knowledge or belief, because the philosopher desires to perfect his knowledge of things by means of his natural powers of observation and thought, not by believing what others have said. Therefore philosophy is evident human science, that is, knowledge of something that is certain because a reason of its being is evident to the human mind.

### *Reply to Difficulties*

1. A substance, like the self or a stone, is something that is or exists in and by itself and has definite characteristics, and is properly said to be or called a being. An accidental being, or accident, like color or figure, walking or thinking, does not exist or have definite characteristics in the same way as a substance, but only in a way somewhat similar. It does not exist in and by itself, but is a modification of a substance. Our knowledge of things is a modification of our substance which consists either in transitory acts, such as seeing or hearing things, or in a more

permanent aptitude for knowing some things, such as appears to be acquired when we memorize a poem or a song. Philosophy is a modification of the substance of a man, and his definite characteristics in a way that is only somewhat similar to a substance. It is either a transitory act or, more properly, an acquired aptitude for knowing something that is certain because a reason of its being is evident to the mind.

2. It seems that things which are very evident to us cannot be doubted, for example, that being is, that we can know being because we do know being, that the substantial self and some of our accidents, such as walking or thinking, exist. But things which are not so evident to us, for instance, what a distant object is, whether it is a horse or a cow, or what a horse is, can be doubted. Philosophers try to attain more perfect knowledge of things and to solve the doubts concerning them by seeking evident knowledge of their reasons of being.

3. Things which are hidden cannot be known evidently until they become manifest to us, and then they are no longer hidden, as when we find a coin in the grass. Many things which are hidden and abstruse in regard to ordinary knowledge can be known evidently and certainly, as appears, for instance, from the wonderful applications of electrical power which men have made in the telephone and radio.

## V—PHILOSOPHY IS WISDOM

### *Difficulties*

It seems that philosophy is not wisdom, for the following reasons:

1. Wisdom is proper to God alone, because only God is wise. This is the reason why some of the Greek philosophers did not call themselves wise and their knowledge wisdom, but the love of wisdom. Hence philosophy is not wisdom, but the love of wisdom.

2. Philosophy presupposes its principles as already known in ordinary knowledge. But no doctrine which presupposes its principles deserves to be called wisdom. Therefore philosophy is not wisdom.

3. Some men are naturally wise, and all nature is called wise. But these do not acquire their wisdom by the labor of observation and thought which is required to attain philosophy. Therefore philosophy is not wisdom.

4. The children of this world are called wise. But they seek wealth and fame and power over others, and this seems unbecoming a philosopher. Therefore philosophy is not wisdom.

*Proof*

The word wisdom, as ordinarily used, signifies a high degree of perfection both in knowledge and in action. A man who is called wise in one respect or another manifests that he knows not merely a few details, but very many, as a wise merchant or banker knows many details of his business. The wise man knows not only the things that are easy to know, but also the things that are difficult, as a wise architect or engineer knows how strong a foundation must be to support a great building or bridge. Moreover, the wise man possesses knowledge that is not merely probable, but certain, as a wise doctor knows how to diagnose a disease and can prescribe a remedy with certainty. The wise man manages his own affairs well and can direct and convince others, and thus appears to know the reasons of things in an orderly way. He is called wise even though he only directs the work of others, and hence it seems that he is considered to be wise chiefly because of the perfection of his knowledge.

But philosophy is human knowledge in a high degree of perfection, because it is evident and certain knowledge of the reasons of things. One who has attained philosophic knowledge possesses all the characteristics of the wise man. He knows

many things in as much as he knows the reasons of things, and many things have similar reasons. He knows difficult things because the reasons of things are difficult to know, as appears from the fact that they are not ordinarily known. His knowledge is certain because evident, and orderly because things are and are knowable in an orderly way. He can make or do things well and can direct and convince others inasmuch as he knows the reasons of things which man can make or do or simply know. His knowledge is chiefly for its own sake because the philosopher principally desires to perfect his own knowledge and to remedy his ignorance by attaining the truth, and because most things are things which man can neither make nor do, but only know, and because knowledge for its own sake seems to be the end of all that we make or do. Hence a philosopher is properly called a wise man, and philosophy is human wisdom.

*Reply to Difficulties*

1. The word wisdom means excellence in knowledge and action. It is first used to signify the concept of human excellence in making and doing things. But by our natural powers of observation and thought we can know that things which begin to be in the course of nature are made by a power that is greater than human, and that this power is a higher than human wisdom, because human wisdom is not sufficient for making natural things such as plants and animals. Thus we can know some of the things that are known by this higher wisdom, though in a way and degree far inferior. The word wisdom does not express any limitation of perfection in knowledge and action. Hence it primarily signifies our concept of that higher or divine wisdom, and secondarily our concept of human wisdom. Divine wisdom is proper to God alone, but human wisdom is befitting to man. The word philosophy is derived from roots which mean love of wisdom, and is used to signify the concept of human wisdom itself. Since human wisdom is imperfect as wisdom, there is reason for calling it philosophy rather than simply wisdom.

2. Philosophy presupposes from ordinary knowledge only an ordinary knowledge of its first principles. That is, it presupposes that some immediately evident and certain truths are known, such as the truth that being is not not-being, and that the whole is greater than its part. It does not presuppose the knowledge of what the reasons of being are, or how anything is known to be true, or why it cannot be otherwise. The reasons of things, of knowledge and being and truth in our knowledge, can be manifested only in the order in which they are evidently knowable to us. But they cannot be scientifically manifested unless the principles from which the demonstration proceeds are admitted as certain. Hence it is necessary for the beginner in philosophy to start with the natural or ordinary certitude which he has concerning immediately evident truths, and he must believe that he can attain in the end scientific certitude concerning his first principles. Thus he can begin with certitude and end with a higher certitude.

No doctrine which derives its principles from any other human science deserves to be called human wisdom in the full sense of the term. The reason is because there is then need of a higher and more perfect science in which these principles are evidently demonstrated or defended. Only that part of philosophy which concerns the ultimate reasons of being, as such, fully deserves to be called human wisdom, because wisdom signifies perfection in knowledge. The other parts of philosophy are less perfect kinds of human wisdom.

3. Because wisdom means excellence in knowledge and action, the name is applied to any course of action which is successfully directed to its end by knowledge. Inanimate nature and the plants and brute animals are said to be wise, not because they properly possess a wisdom of their own, but because they are directed to their end by a wisdom which is higher than man's. Men who are naturally wise possess in their ordinary knowledge more than an ordinary appreciation of the reasons of things, as some know specific medicines.

4. Some people are called wise because they persistently di-

rect their actions to the attainment of the particular goods of this world. The philosopher is not especially interested in these particular goods, because his wisdom consists chiefly in knowledge for its own sake. Yet in his wisdom he does not despise the goods of this world. Rather, he justly appreciates them as means which are often necessary for the satisfaction of our material needs and the attainment of more perfect knowledge and peace.

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## THOMISM AS A FRAME OF REFERENCE

In the early seventeenth century Descartes invented analytical geometry which was a merger of algebra and geometry. The system of axes—abscissa and ordinate—known as Cartesian coordinates, are geometrical quantities used to define the position of points (or a mode of representing geometric position in terms of number) and are familiar to the layman in the form of the charts and graphs of the statistician. A set of coordinates constitutes what is called a frame of reference. We borrow from analytical geometry the notion of a frame of reference and, by a sort of extrapolation or extension, apply it, in a figurative way of course, to the broader and deeper domain of reality itself. Leaving the realm of the metrical, quantitative or mathematical, we employ the phrase in the sphere of being or ultimate truth. Our philosophic frame of reference is only analogous to the four-dimensional manifold or space-time continuum of Minkowski and Einstein which is a scientific conception and pertains consequently to the world of accidents only, i. e. to quantities and relations, space and time.

We hasten to add that whereas in modern physics there are arbitrary coordinates, relative frames of reference or particular spaces, the figurative frame of reference, which is in our view the chief desideratum of philosophy today, must be something constant, absolute, ultimate, essential, universal and objective, for such is the nature of the transcendental order or metaphysical realm. As Poincaré pointed out years ago, mathematical physics is interested in relations rather than realities and in elegance and rigor rather than truth. A philosophic frame of reference, however, must be rooted or anchored in reality.

The feature of the philosophic frame of reference which we intend to stress in this paper is its moderate, conservative or central character. It can be for speculative exploration what the anchor, the beacon, the rudder and the compass are to navigation.

## I

It is not fashionable just now to deride philosophy as the sterile product of an ivory tower. Indeed all the schools and systems enjoy a current vogue which is highly desirable. Three probable reasons may be advanced for the present and recent popularity of serious speculation. First, the World War shook the very foundations of western civilization and induced more than a modicum of thought upon fundamental problems. Second, the post-war conditions and especially the Depression of the last decade have caused and are still causing a searching inquiry into the postulates and preconceptions of social thought, of economic theory and of political ideology. Thirdly, and perhaps most importantly, has been the self-consciousness of science, which, thanks largely to the rapid progress of the New Physics and Nuclear Physics, has forced savants to a realization of the epistemological implications of their legacy from Galileo, Francis Bacon and Newton. As a result we have half a dozen leading thinkers in the field of philosophy who began their careers as men of science and we have a new philosophic discipline which is called the " philosophy of science."

For these three reasons it is no longer usual to dismiss as " academic questions " those ultimate problems which are the province of philosophy. Even the practical man of affairs, the man of action, has learned to respect the contemplative life if only because of its very practical consequences. The man on the street is now aware that the dreamer, the visionary and the doctrinaire, whether he be a Gobineau or a Marx, can be the motive power behind marching armies. The same man in the street may have read Henry Adams on the " Dynamo and the Virgin." In any case, the most superficial journalist with the most pragmatic and utilitarian outlook cannot ignore the closet theorist or his cabinet doctrine. As O. W. Holmes [1] said of Montesquieu: " Like Descartes or Kant, he commanded the future from his study more than Napoleon from his throne."

[1] *Collected Legal Papers,* New York: Harcourt Brace, 1920, pp. 201, 202, 264.

There is an increasing number of serious-minded people who today will join with William James in applauding G. K. Chesterton [2] for writing: "There are some people, nevertheless—and I am one of them—who think that the most practical and important thing about a man is still his view of the universe. We think that for a landlady considering a lodger, it is important to know his income, but still more important to know his philosophy. We think that for a general about to fight an enemy, it is important to know the enemy's numbers, but still more important to know the enemy's philosophy. We think the question is not whether the theory of the cosmos affects matters, but whether, in the long run, anything else affects them."

## II

In the nineteenth century when many thought that Darwinism was the crown added to a mechanism whose foundations were laid by Newton, philosophy, in the sense of metaphysics, was frowned upon as a sort of Procrustes' bed which facts were forced to fit and as a "search for premises that would yield preconceived conclusions." Speaking of the strained relations between science and philosophy at that time, Bavink [3] lays the responsibility

> with the unfortunate "nature philosophy" of the Schelling-Hegel period, which was arrogant enough to thrust aside laborious empiricism and attempt to distil the essence of all things from pure speculation, according to the scheme thesis-antithesis-synthesis. As an example of the nonsense which resulted we may take Hegel's remarkable definition of heat: "Heat is the self-restoration of matter in its formlessness, its liquidity the triumph of its abstract homogeneity over specific definiteness, its abstract, purely self-existing continuity as negation of negation, is here set as activity."

One can sympathize with Lord Kelvin's hostility to such thermodynamics.

[2] *Heretics,* London: John Lane, 1928, pp. 7, 8.

[3] *The Natural Sciences,* New York: Century Co., 1932, pp. 29, 30.

Needless to say not all types of philosophy are as eligible for the labels "autistic thinking" and "rationalizing." But all schools of philosophy did suffer, at least in popular esteem, because of the airy speculations of an *impractical* transcendentalism.

That the philosophy which is called "Modern" is in a bankrupt state is a thesis which has been demonstrated in a score of books published in the last two decades. Is it not significant that the following two quotations should be taken from contemporary non-Scholastic thinkers? In his Gifford Lectures [4] entitled *Nature, Man and God*, William Temple, Archbishop of York, confesses: "If I were asked what was the most disastrous moment in the history of Europe I should be strongly tempted to answer that it was that period of leisure when René Descartes, having no claims to meet, remained for a whole day 'shut up alone in a stove.'" If we add to that opinion the following estimate of Kant by Bertrand Russell, we have an appraisal of the two major figures in "Modern Philosophy" with which a Thomist would be warmly inclined to agree. In his volume, *Philosophy*,[5] Russell asserts: "Kant deluged the philosophic world with muddle and mystery, from which it is only now beginning to emerge. Kant has the reputation of being the greatest of modern philosophers, but to my mind he was a mere misfortune."

## III

The insolvency of Modern Philosophy is largely responsible for the increasingly loud pleas for synthesis which have emanated of late from a variety of sources. Painfully conscious of the myopic view of man which modern science with its excessive departmentalization affords, Alexis Carrel [6] advocates the establishment of a Superscience as a remedy; a sort of brain-

[4] London: Macmillan, 1935, p. 57. Cf. also *Science*, July 6, 1934, re "Cartesianism."

[5] New York: Norton & Co., 1927, p. 80.

[6] *Man the Unknown*, New York: Harper, 1935, pp. 47, 285, 288.

trust of medical engineers to renovate modern man which will have in its membership a group that will first serve a twenty-five year apprenticeship. But one objects to the insinuation that a truly macroscopic or synoptic viewpoint can be obtained from a sum-total of the special sciences. Herbert Spencer attempted that kind of synthetic philosophy and his "grandiose hypothesis" was admittedly a failure. Such a scheme is also reminiscent of Comte who recommended a priestly guild of scientists in the service of Humanity.

Another plea for synthesis comes from H. G. Wells [7] who favors the idea of a "World Encyclopedia" to function as a "world brain" which will save our tottering civilization. In this connection one wonders whether anything resembling unanimity on ultimate questions and basic issues could conceivably be attained by a cosmopolitan board of editors? Would an international staff of experts be capable of ideological harmony? Are all the contributors to the *Encyclopedia Britannica*, who are for the most part British and American writers, subscribers to a common creed and code? Who would write the articles on "God," on "Fascism," on "Communism?" Etienne Gilson [8] tells us that at the University of Paris in the thirteenth century "not a single one of the most famous professors was French" and "they were not asked by the University to teach what was French, but what was true." But it may be doubted that such a detached, impartial, objective and universal attitude could be achieved by any group of modern scientists or scholars especially in the sphere of the human or social sciences—ignoring the controversies in the domain of natural science. Consider the ethnologic doctrines of contemporary German and Italian scholars and the fact that a distinguished learned society in the United States blackballed its German confreres during the World War. Yes, there is nationalism among the scientists as among the politicians and dema-

[7] "The Idea of a World Encyclopedia" in *Nature*, suppl., Nov. 28, 1936; and in *Harper's Monthly*, vol. 174, pp. 472-482 (April 1937). Cf. also the same author's *World Brain*, New York: Doubleday Doran, 1938.

[8] *Medieval Universalism*, New York: Sheed & Ward, 1937, pp. 5, 12, 22.

gogues. As Charles Singer [9] puts it: "The majority of men of science, like the majority of other men have small philosophic powers." We cannot look to them for the synthesis we need. Wherever there is room for chauvinism or jingoism in the settlement, for instance, of conflicting claims to priority of discovery (as in the Newton-Leibnitz case) it is enlightening to consult a few histories of science written by Englishmen and then compare them with similar works by German authors.

A more serious undertaking, under the auspices of scholars of established repute instead of journalists but along the same lines as those projected by Wells, has already been inaugurated. An *International Encyclopedia of Unified Science* [10] is proposed by Otto Neurath, Rudolf Carnap and their distinguished associates. One may venture the prediction that nominalism, empiricism, operationalism, pragmatism and mathematicism will be the predominant hues in this panoramic spectrum but it is a highly significant symptom of the widespread feeling that there is today a deep need for unity and synthesis in the sphere of thought.

Another plea from Robert Maynard Hutchins [11] for a principle of integration in the curriculum "to remove the disunity, discord and disorder that have overtaken our educational system" is widely recognized as an approach toward Thomism. This educator opposes atomistic specialization and the accumulation of facts, data and cases for their own sake. The return to Aristotle, the establishing of metaphysics as a fulcrum, a focus or a pivot among the branches of learning and the emphasis upon the hegemony of intellect—these proposals are highly promising to Thomists.

[9] *Religion and Science,* London: Ernest Benn, 1928, p. 77.

[10] Of the twenty monographs which comprise the two introductory volumes of this proposed international encyclopedia, the University of Chicago Press has already issued two.

[11] *No Friendly Voice,* University of Chicago Press, 1936; *The Higher Learning in America,* New Haven: Yale University Press, 1936; and "What is a General Education?" in *Harper's Monthly,* Nov. 1936.

## IV

Having enumerated a few conspicuous appeals for unity in modern thought, we proceed to suggest that *there is available as a key or guide to such unity an intellectual structure, namely, the Thomistic Synthesis, which is an adequate frame of reference, point of departure and general index for the widest and deepest speculations of the human mind.* St. Thomas Aquinas created a vast and closely interrelated hierarchical system of thought whose architectonic excellence is once again coming to be widely appreciated. Since the publication of the encyclical, *Aeterni Patris*, which may be described as the manifesto of the Thomist movement, that movement has without pyrotechnical or spectacular display gradually but steadily exerted a profound influence throughout the entire intellectual world. Our time is one of " isms." We have had for decades a veritable plethora of cults and fads many of which represent the ravings of the " lunatic fringe " of fanatics, crusaders and reformers, while others have a more respectable pedigree although they testify no less to the instability, mental chaos, intellectual anarchy and turmoil of our day. Consider, for example, the New Humanism, the Cooperative Movement, Technocracy, Social Credit, the Oxford Group, Socialism, Communism, Fascism, Naziism, Racism, Nudism and a half dozen others, some sane, some silly. Ignoring the psychopathic but as yet unincarcerated groups, one may say that with few exceptions these proposed remedies for the ills of contemporary civilization are confined, even in the practical order, to questions of ways and means rather than to problems of ends; they are strong on tactics, techniques and procedures but weak on the wider matters of policy, method and strategy and frequently devoid of anything that deserves the name of doctrine or principle. An economic program, a political plan or a social scheme which is not consciously based upon a moral code (and this is also true of jurisprudence and nomology) will nevertheless have behind it an unconscious, implicit, surreptitious and covert set of postulates which are,

willynilly, its ethical or practical philosophy and behind this in turn will be a metaphysic or speculative philosophy. The obsession of educationists with methods of teaching and learning and their neglect of the content of the curriculum (deplored by Hutchins) is but one instance of a wider situation.

It is almost a truism that every man has a philosophy, that even those illiterates who do not know the meaning of the word *philosophy* have a set of convictions on fundamental and ultimate issues and that this credo or system of beliefs is their philosophy whether or not it has ever been consciously and explicitly formulated. Thus, the layman whose *summum bonum* is pleasure, is a hedonist quite as much as the professional thinker who subscribes to the teachings of Epicurus. Similarly whoever guides his thought and conduct by mere expediency, opportunism and convenience, is a pragmatist.

Because, therefore, a philosophy of some sort is inevitable and indispensable and because it is obviously preferable that this philosophy be one that is explicit and consciously held, the Thomistic system is advocated by literally thousands of serious thinkers throughout the world as the best ideologic framework yet conceived by the mind of man. And just as this edifice of thought was in its origins, as Mercier pointed out, the product of no single genius, so the present members of this school of thought belong to different racial groups, are loyal subjects under different political régimes and need not subscribe to the same theological dogmas. Indeed, most of its theses should be acceptable to orthodox Protestant Christians, many of its tenets are compatible with Jewish doctrine, and, with the notable exception of the doctrine of free-will, much of it is not irreconcilable with the Islamic faith. Moreover, it would be possible by a facile eclecticism to find premises for the proof of every major Scholastic thesis in the writings of non-Scholastic thinkers. Proof of this pudding is to be found in instances of the adoption of Scholastic text-books in non-Catholic colleges and in the representatives of other faiths than Catholicism among the memberships of Thomistic societies as well as among the contributors to Thomistic journals. Of course such representa-

tion is not as extensive as could be desired but it is slowly increasing.

In his *Introduction to the History of Science*, George Sarton[12] writes: "The neo-Thomist movement is the most conspicuous extension of medievalism in modern times. Its influence is very great within its own religious sphere but because of its very sectarianism, limited. Its fate is subordinated to that of the Roman Catholic Church; at least it can hardly affect the non-Catholic world." In the light of the preceding paragraph, it is obvious that we cannot agree with Sarton on this point. If the premises in the syllogisms used to prove Thomistic theses were quotations from Holy Scripture or from Papal Encyclicals, one might agree with Sarton, but they invariably are statements of fact or of principle. In the philosophic sphere, the Thomist appeals to the natural light of reason, not to authority or extrinsic evidence, even Revelation, and in so doing he is following the spirit and tradition of the Angelic Doctor[13] himself who wrote: "*locus ab auctoritate, quae fundatur super ratione humana, est infirmissimus.*" The heated controversies during the Middle Ages on abstract and purely philosophic questions are elementary historical facts which refute the nonsense in histories of the Renaissance as to intellectual emancipation from the shackles and fetters of medieval authoritarianism.

Evidence that Sarton's prediction is grotesquely out of focus may be found in the pages of the non-technical and semi-popular journals of opinion where mentions of Aquinas and Thomism are becoming increasingly frequent. It is no longer necessary to explain, after one has quoted St. Thomas, that one refers to Aquinas and not to Thomas à Kempis or Thomas à Becket. Indeed the present writer was pleasantly surprised to see an allusion to Aquinas on the front page of a large metropolitan newspaper two years ago. While such occurrences are unimportant in themselves, they are symptomatic of the trend

[12] Washington: Carnegie Institution, 1931, Vol. II, part ii, p. 917.

[13] *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 1, a. 8, ad 2.

of opinion. Conditions in this respect have improved considerably since the publication of Zybura's *Present Day Thinkers and the New Scholasticism.*

The reasons for this welcome change of attitude are the recently increased attention given to the philosophic foundations of modern thought and culture, which we discussed above, the consequent dissatisfaction with the leaders of "Modern Philosophy" and the light shed by historic research into the mediaeval period. The study of the period of the Crusades, the Feudal System, the Institution of Chivalry, the Manorial system, the Guild System and Gothic architecture could not but enhance acquaintance with and interest in Scholasticism. The very existence of the Mediaeval Academy of America and of its journal, *Speculum*, is a significant phenomenon. While there are those who seem to regret that this work, or much of it, is in the hands of non-Scholastics and insinuate that we have sold our birthright, it should be realized that this legacy from the Middle Ages rightly belongs to mankind rather than to any one denomination or faction and that the more inheritors there are, the better it will be for the world and for Christendom. Writes D. C. Somervell: [14] "Nearly all the art and most of the learning of the early Middle Ages was inspired by religion; and even those who think they know better than the mediaeval theologians condescend to admire the cathedrals." The more acquaintance, familiarity and intimacy there are with other aspects of mediaeval civilization, the better will be the eventual appreciation of Thomism. Thus, for example, Ralph Adams Cram [15] declares:

> I discovered I could not argue with any deep confidence, because all the art of a thousand years, in which I was fast becoming immersed, was getting in its deadly work, and I was beginning to realize that if it had any validity, if it related itself to life, it was

[14] *A History of England*, London: Ernest Benn, 1930; p. 28.
[15] *My Life in Architecture*, Boston: Little Brown, 1936, p. 59.

not the life of rationalism and physical science and liberal Unitarianism, but was very specifically the life of the Catholic Church.

Here we have an illustration of one who is steeped in medieval culture and who as a result cannot but deplore the Renaissance, the Reformation and the French Revolution—" the three R's," as he calls them.

It is interesting, also, to note a change of attitude toward the Middle Ages on the part of scientists. Henri Poincaré [16] deserves a major share of the credit for having revealed the inadequacy of a purely Baconian method in science. Observation and experiment are by themselves almost sterile; hypothesis plays the leading role in the scientific drama and induction seldom goes far without deduction. It is one of the ironies of our times that the throne of natural science should have been usurped by mathematicians whose method is more purely deductive than that of the Scholastics of the Middle Ages. When induction is understood " as a simple, easily understood, all-sufficing and alone legitimate process of passing from particulars to the general," to quote MacIver,[17] " so understood, induction is a chimera and is never the method by which scientific generalization is attained." It is recognized today that despite the *Novum Organon* which had long been regarded as the very bible of induction, the example of Roger Bacon, Robert Grosseteste and Albertus Magnus was more eloquent than the precepts of Francis Bacon over three centuries later. An article by Dr. Fernando Sanford [18] entitled " Francis and Roger Bacon and Modern Science " illustrates the changed attitude of scientists toward matters mediaeval and is significant because it shows that a revived mediaevalism is not merely of literary, humanistic and archeological interest.

One likewise cannot resist noting that while the alchemists of

[16] *Foundations of Science*, New York: The Science Press, 1929.

[17] " Is Sociology a Natural Science? " in *Publication of the American Sociological Society*, vol. XXV, May 1931, pp. 25-26.

[18] *Scientific Monthly*, vol. 44 (1937), pp. 440-452.

the Middle Ages were utterly ignorant of radioactivity whether natural or artificial, and of electrons, protons, positrons and neutrons, their basic ideas regarding the transmutation of elements were not as silly as they came to be regarded by chemists from the days of Boyle and Dalton to about 1890. Lord Rutherford's last book was entitled *The Newer Alchemy* (Cambridge, 1937). Secondly, in the light of the abundant literature on the news-stands these days concerning " horoscopes," " signs of the zodiac," " astrology " and the like, and considering the improvement in the available means for propagating nonsense, as well as the increase in world population since the thirteenth century, is it not about time that the twentieth century stopped describing the thirteenth century as superstitious? A comparative reading of the *Summa Contra Gentiles*, Book III, Part II, Chapters 84 to 87, of samples of current popular treatises on astrology and of the article by H. T. Stetson [19] dealing with " The Influence of the Sun on Human Affairs " would enlighten those who still speak of the Middle Ages as the " dark ages." Thirdly, one is tempted to stretch a point in order to suggest the striking similarity between the " humours " (about which we read so much from Galen onward to Shakespeare) and the " hormones " of contemporary physiology. Finally, along the same lines and more amusing, is the article by W. Franklin Dove [20] which treats of the " Artificial Production of the Fabulous Unicorn." In giving his " modern interpretation of an ancient myth," this scientist bases his conclusions on an experiment wherein he actually succeeded in breeding " unicorns " and thus perpetrated a thremmatological joke on those sceptics who ridicule mediaeval legends.

[19] *Scientific Monthly*, July 1936. Cf. also " A propos d'Astrologie " in *L'Ami du Clergé*, 6 Mai, 1937; (6e serie, no. 18).

[20] *Scientific Monthly*, vol. 42 (1936), pp. 431-436.

## V

One important merit of the Thomistic system as a frame of reference is its middle-of-the-road character. Aristotle's famous doctrine of the golden mean in the second book of his *Ethics* is applicable to truth as well as to goodness or virtue. Verity is also a *via media*. Maurice De Wulf [21] names the two "doctrinal characteristics of Scholasticism" as (1) moderation, sense of limit, measure and equilibrium; and (2) coherence and interdependence. The avoidance of extremes is the path of wisdom. Speaking of Aristotle in this connection, J. A. K. Thomson [22] says: "It is, of course, preposterous to criticise him as if he had said that there was a danger of being too virtuous. A man cannot be too virtuous any more than he can be too healthy. A man cannot steer too well between Scylla and Charybdis." In these days when political outlooks, economic doctrines and social theories are of extreme types, being either conservative or liberal, Tory or progressive, reactionary or radical, right or left, white or red, it is advisable to examine a truly central philosophy, which can provide postulates for a truly central code of ethics, which, in turn, can supply principles of a central, focal and pivotal position as a fulcrum for the solution of social issues, political problems and economic questions.

Let us examine a dozen or more illustrations of Thomism as a middle-ground philosophy. (1) Thomistic thought subscribes to a theism which is midway between atheism and pantheism, between the view which says there is no God and the view which says there is nothing but God or that everything is divine. (2) This same theism is also midway between deism which overemphasizes the transcendence of God and pantheism which exaggerates the immanence of God at the expense of

[21] *Mediaeval Philosophy,* Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1926, p. 146.
[22] *Plato and Aristotle,* London: Benn, 1932, p. 74.

His transcendence. (3) This same theism is likewise, on the question of the knowability of God, midway between agnosticism which denies the knowability of God and ontologism which claims that man has a direct or intuitive insight into deity. (4) The Thomistic doctrine of analogy enables it (among other things) to predicate attributes of God while avoiding the extremes of anthropomorphism and mere symbolism or agnosticism.[23] If the perfections attributed to God were univocally predicated, then the charge of anthropomorphism, which has been made by Xenophanes and others down through Voltaire to Mencken, would be justified. On the other hand, if these attributes are equivocally or ambiguously predicated, then what we say of God, philosophically, amounts to but empty formalism. (5) Two other extremes which Thomism avoids are occasionalism which denies to secondary causes any genuine causation of their own, holding them to be merely the occasions of the causal efficiency of the first cause, and molinism which, to quote Garrigou-Lagrange,[24] is the " opposite extreme which holds that the secondary cause can act without divine premotion." (6) The dualism or polarity, which is a theme running through the entire Thomistic symphony of thought, gives it an intermediate status between monism and singularism on the one hand and pluralism on the other. In answering the questions whether there is one kind of reality or more and whether there is one reality or more, the Thomistic answer recognizes both the plurality and multiplicity of the sphere of sense and the unity and universality of the realm of intellect. (7) This same dualism, in the guise of hylemorphism, affords a theory of the constitution of matter which, despite misgivings in some quarters, still has validity and which recognizes both the passive, inert, static, generic, and homogeneous aspect of corporeal substance and the dynamic, kinetic, active, specific, and heterogeneous features of bodies. Thus, hylemor-

[23] Cf. A. D. Sertillanges, *Foundations of Thomistic Philosophy,* St. Louis: Herder, 1931, p. 86.

[24] *Dieu, Son Existence et sa Nature,* Paris: Beauchesne, 1928, p. 475.

phism avoids the extreme represented by atomism which accounts for the generic phase of matter at the expense of its specific aspects, and dynamism or energism which explains the latter to the neglect of the former. (8) At the upper level of the traditional four grades of being, the Thomist position is again dualistic and may be described as midway between the ultra-dualism of Descartes (who " bisected man " and for whom the psycho-physical union is an accidental and even violent union of two essentially incompatible or antagonistic factors) and those theories of man which attempt to derive matter and spirit from some *tertium quid,* some neutral stuff and which have such names as the double-aspect theory, the identity hypothesis, or disguised monism. (9) Looking at nature as a whole, the Thomist doctrine avoids both materialism which admits only matter as the fundamental matrix in nature and ultra-spiritualism (or absolutism or objective idealism or panpsychism) which admits nothing but spirit as a primitive substratum by maintaining the existence in nature, at least in human nature, of both matter and spirit. One might say that vitalism, animism, and spiritualistic dualism with reference to plants, animals and man, respectively, are but applications, extensions or extrapolations of hylemorphism to the higher grades of being. It is the same doctrine of dualism on all four levels but it provides explanation for both the continuity in nature and the levels in nature. Thus, man differs in kind and not merely in degree from the animal level but he is also a microcosm or miniature universe embracing the lower grades of being in nature. On all four levels of existence, there is a substantial union or coalition of two ingredients or components. One component is the passive, undetermined but determinable principle or potential constituent while the other factor is the actual, specifying, determining principle of orientation, operation and finality. There is but one kind of prime matter on all four levels and that is the philosophic reason why there is nothing chemically mysterious about man that could account for his superior status in nature. The same carbon, oxygen, hydrogen and ni-

trogen which are the major constituents of protoplasm or the physical stuff of all living organisms from amoeba to man, are also found in inorganic nature, i. e., on mineral level.

Turning now from metaphysics and the philosophy of nature to the epistemological sphere, we have further instances of Thomism as a theory of moderation. (10) Between the empiricism of the British school with its attempt to reduce all human knowledge to the sensory level and the rationalism or innatism of Descartes, Spinoza, Leibnitz and Hegel, the Thomistic view is empirico-rational, inducto-deductive and *a priori—a posteriori*. Against the former of these two extremes, the Thomist insists that concepts are not reducible to percepts or to composite images or to vague, blurred images or averages and that judgment is not reducible to mere association. On the other hand, Thomism also opposes the doctrine of innate ideas and insists that the mind at birth is a *tabula rasa*. In other words, the intellect does have what is called an extrinsic or objective dependence upon the senses, which provide the raw-material of experience from which by its process of abstraction it elaborates its universal concepts and then unites them in the act of judgment. The psychological question of the source of knowledge is a preliminary to the epistemological problem of the validity of knowledge and is quite as urgent today as it was in the days of Locke. Thus Einstein [25] refers to the " eternal antithesis of the two inseparable constituents of human knowledge, Experience and Reason." (11) Again, the Thomistic solution of the celebrated mediaeval problem of universals is a moderate realism, between nominalism and conceptualism at one extreme and ultra-realism at the opposite extreme. That is to say, the universal idea or concept is neither an empty sound or mere name or purely subjective picture without basis in objective reality, nor is it on the other hand something which exists as such outside the mind. It exists as such in the mind but it has a basis in reality, namely, the common nature which all members of the same species have. Nor is this problem a purely academic

[25] *On the Method of Theoretical Physics*, New York: Oxford Univ. Press, 1933, p. 7.

issue of mediaeval hair-splitters which could have only archeological interest for our contemporaries. The occasionally current notions of world-soul, cosmic consciousness, universal mind, Group Mind and the like are akin philosophically to the Platonic Ideas. When Coleridge objects to " the multitudinous public shaped into personal unity by the magic of abstraction " he refers to the same type of ultra-realistic entity. Whether it be Public Opinion, or Society, or Humanity or Race it is the same hypostatized abstraction as those in the "world of ideas " which ultra-realism objectifies. (12) The same Thomistic moderate realism is in a central position between the naive realism of the man in the street and the idealism, subjectivism and solipsism of Berkeley and others. The former of these two extremes regards the mind as purely passive and comparable to a mirror or a camera but it cannot, consequently, explain the fact of error. The latter extreme exaggerates the activity of the mind by regarding the object as a concoction or figment of the mind and hence reduces the entire objective world to a " projection of the ego on a background of nothingness." The Thomist concedes that the subject contributes something to the knowledge-product but insists that its contribution is not, as in Kant, of such preponderant proportion as to falsify, vitiate or corrupt the objective contribution. Just as Kant does not go as far as Berkeley in the direction of idealism, so the Thomist does not go as far as the ingenuous realist in the direction of crude realism. (13) As a final illustration of the moderation of Thomism in the epistemological realm, we stress the Thomist conception of the true relation between reason and Revelation. This conception is midway between the rationalism of the deists and free-thinkers on the one hand and fideism, traditionalism and revelationism on the other hand. We emphasize this moderate and reasonable position especially because of the frequently encountered objections as to the alleged dogma-ridden character of all forms of mediaeval thought. Ignoring the debate as to whether there is such a thing as a Christian philosophy, we merely call attention to the views of St. Thomas as a middle

ground between certain mystics and certain rationalists of the thirteenth century. It is widely acknowledged that one of the distinctive contributions of St. Thomas Aquinas to the Scholastic synthesis was precisely this distinction between the natural light of reason and faith.

If we turn now to the Thomistic teaching on Providence and teleology and the problem of evil, we find a doctrine (14) intermediate between tychism and fatalism. While there is determinism in nature as far as animals, plants and minerals are concerned, Thomism harmonizes human freedom or libertarianism with Divine Providence and repudiates both pure chance at one extreme and anything like insuperable destiny, nemesis or kismet at the opposite pole. Likewise Thomism (15) advocates a moderate or relative optimism in the place of either the optimism of Malebranche or Leibnitz on the one hand or of the pessimism of Schopenhauer at the other extreme.

As a final example one should note, because of it current importance, that the personalism (16) of the Thomistic account of human nature and society can provide a key for a compromise between the two extremes of individualism, liberalism, capitalism or utilitarianism as against collectivism, socialism, communism, totalitarianism or political absolutism. Thomism recognizes in the free-will of man coupled with his social nature a key within man's own paradoxical nature to the ancient dilemma provided by the antithesis of law and liberty, organization and freedom, society and individual, authority and conscience, order and progress, State and citizen, ruler and subject.

## VI

Lest any reader think that these illustrations of the moderate character of Thomism are mostly instances of obsolete controversies, it must be noted that whereas political debates and scientific disputes are frequently ephemeral, the dialectical duels of philosophers, dealing as they do with the essential or

universal order of things instead of the merely existential or historical order, are truly perennial. For example, the discussions in the Middle Ages concerning the problem of universals can no longer be dismissed as logic-chopping or hair-splitting (even if the gibes of Butler's *Hudibras*, or of Rabelais, or of Molierè were deserved by the later, decadent Scholastics) because we have nominalists with us today. From Mach to Vaihinger and Eddington there has been a revived nominalism or at least a conceptualism. If atoms are regarded as fictions, if electrons are described as symbols or " part of the A-B-C of physics " and if a scientific theory is called a " conceptual scheme of symbols "—to quote Hobson—nominalism and conceptualism are with us again. A medieval nominalist would be quite at home in the realm of " conventions " and " constructs."

Wrote Jacques Maritain: " Whether they be neo-Kantians or neo-positivists, idealists, Bergsonians, logistics, pragmatists, neo-Spinozists or neo-mysticists, one ancient sin works in the roots of all modern philosophies—the old error of nominalism." [26]

Nominalism (in its concrete application to a philosophy of life) was given expression in a popular novel by Ernest Hemingway [27]—the passage has been cited by MacIver, Joad and others—in these words: " I was always embarrassed by the words sacred, glorious, and sacrifice and the expression in vain. . . . There were many words that you could not stand to hear and finally only the names of places had dignity. . . . Abstract words such as glory, honor, courage or hallow were obscene beside the concrete names of villages, the numbers of roads, the names of rivers, the numbers of regiments and dates." Speaking of this " intellectual revolt which pervades the fiction of our age," MacIver [28] remarks: " But man's spirit cannot long be content with names and dates, and science cannot survive on mere facts and figures. If old theories pass, new

[26] *The Degrees of Knowledge*, New York: Scribner's, 1938, p. 1.

[27] *A Farewell to Arms*, New York: Scribner's, 1929, p. 196.

[28] *A Quarter Century of Learning*, New York: Columbia Univ. Press, 1931, p. 87.

ones must take their place, for without laws there is no science." And one might ask what Hemingway means by dignity?

Again, in the province of jurisprudence today we encounter nominalism. In his chapter entitled, " The Law," which he contributed to a recent symposium,[29] Z. Chafee, Jr. refers to those " Realists " such as Thurman Arnold, Jerome Frank and Prof. Karl N. Llewellyn, for whom " law is not a collection of abstract rules but the totality of social behavior, or at least of official behavior." And he says: " These Realists (as they call themselves, though philosophically they are nominalists) insist that we ought to concentrate our attention on what the judge and jury do, and not on what the judge says."

The problem of universals gave rise to no merely transitory controversy; it was a problem for the ancients, the mediaevals and the moderns. It is a current issue, a contemporary question, today—indeed it is perennial. Nor is it impossible to solve as the late Paul Shorey [30] seemed to think; it *was* solved by St. Thomas Aquinas.

A recent work on semantics for popular consumption by Stuart Chase, entitled *The Tyranny of Words*, contained some good advice for those who would clarify their thinking—although the author seemed blissfully ignorant of the lore of Scholastic dialectics and its rules of definition, or of the Trivium with its integration of grammar, rhetoric and logic, or of the art and science of exegesis and hermeneutics with its fourfold sense or meaning, viz., literal or historical and spiritual or figurative, the latter including the allegorical, the moral or tropological and the anagogical, mystical or prophetic. But apart from his innocence with respect to textual criticism and his nescience with respect to first and second intentions, first and second impositions, categorematic and syncategorematic terms, etc., etc., the author's zeal toward the abolition of the " fallacy of misplaced concreteness " was so excessive as to lead

[29] *America Now*, Harold Stearns (ed), New York: Scribner's, 1938, pp. 314, 316.

[30] *Platonism, ancient and modern*, Berkeley: Univ. of Calif. Press, 1938, pp. 96, 102.

him to adopt an unmitigated nominalism. That such a position is inconsistent and impossible is more than evident because, of course, he is obligated to use universals and abstractions to prove that such things belong to folklore and mythology.

Nominalism is extremely prevalent today and it leads directly to skepticism, whose counterpart in the practical order is cynicism, pessimism or futilitarianism. It follows that if this philosophic fallacy is accepted as truth, the entire structure of political theory, of jurisprudential doctrine and of economic and sociological principles (together with the concrete policies and practical programs which presuppose the former) will be demolished and chaos in thought, confusion in word, and disorder in deed will result. In other words " judgment will have fled to brutish beasts and men will have lost their reason."

An exciting and highly significant controversy on the respective roles of observation and theory and the comparative merits of induction and deduction took place in the pages of the British scientific weekly, *Nature*,[31] in the spring of 1937. Herbert Dingle began the discussion by sharply criticizing Eddington, Milne and Dirac whose methods and underlying philosophy he erratically termed " Modern Aristotelianism " and by pleading for a return to Galileo, Newton, and the original purposes of the Royal Society, i. e. experience and the observation of nature. One month later Dingle's article was commented upon by a series of contributors many of whom agreed with his strictures. The majority of these distinguished British scientists seemed to be as opposed to *a priori* idealism and rationalistic subjectivism as a Thomist would be. Several of them also pointed out that Dingle used the wrong historical characters to exemplify the contrasting positions, that he really reversed these figures. On the one hand, as Father McEntegart put it: " The fiction that the peripatetic philosophy is an airy tissue of aprioristic deduction should by now be outworn. It is,

[31] " Modern Aristotelianism," May 8, 1937 (vol. 139); " Physical Science and Philosophy," suppl., June 12, 1937.

itself, a rationalization of experience, firmly keyed to reality." On the other hand, to quote G. Dawes Hicks (who also came to the rescue of Aristotle, as did others): "It was not merely by patient observation of the facts that this revolution came about. . . . Rather was the Copernican hypothesis adopted because it enabled the movements of the heavenly bodies to be expressed in simple mathematical formulae." Likewise another contributor remarks: "It is well know that the driving force of Kepler's work was his belief in the existence of mathematical harmonies in Nature."

The same sort of protest as that made by Dingle was made by Frederick Soddy,[32] himself a Nobel-prizeman in chemistry, in his *The Interpretation of the Atom* in 1932. Wrote Soddy:

> Personally I come more and more to regard the purely formal and mathematical presentation of physical theories as a disguise and evasion of the real problems rather than as any solution of them. I have tried, in other fields, to show the incredible confusions, of which the whole world is now one seething example, that have followed from the invention by the Hindu mathematicians of negative quantities, and their justification from their analogy to debt. So that naturally I am not among those who can bow down and worship the square-root of minus one.

And again, in reference to Prout's hypothesis, under the heading "Imagination versus Experiment," he complains;

> Even in science . . . it happens that the prize is not always to the accurate, meritorious and deserving investigator. . . . There is something, surely, akin if not transcending tragedy in the fate that has overtaken the life work of that distinguished galaxy of 19th century chemists . . . while upon a mere amateur, with natural imagination untrammelled by knowledge, descends the laurel crown of undying fame.

We could add Mendeléeff and Einstein to the list of warnings to those who are steeped in Baconian empiricism. But instead of regarding sense and reason as totally disconnected or

[32] New York: Putnam, 1932, pp. vi, 49.

mutually antipathetic the Thomistic system is the only school of thought which offers an account of their relationship, with abstraction as the key, that recognizes the legitimate claims of both levels of knowledge. Moreover this theory of the true relations between experience and thought, is coupled with a philosophy of life which is also one of moderation.

| *Levels of knowledge* | *Levels of Life* |
|---|---|
| Revelation | Supernatural |
| Reason | Humanistic |
| Sense | Naturalistic |

Considering the levels of human knowledge, a Thomist will agree with those rationalists (as the term is used in epistemology) who champion a higher kind of knowledge than mere sense-perception even when he disagrees with these same rationalists on the question of innate ideas. But the Thomist differs from the rationalist (as the term is used in apologetics to signify deists, free-thinkers and agnostics) who claims that reason is capable without Revelation of reaching all truths, even religious. In other words, the Thomist agrees with the rationalist against the lower but opposes him when he opposes the higher kind of knowledge.

We have a parallel situation with respect to the levels of life. Thomists deplore the humanism of the Renaissance because it repudiated the higher, or religious, life of the Middle Ages. But the Thomist can with complete consistency join hands with the "New Humanist" of our time (as far as the latter goes) because the New Humanist advocates a step upward from the lower animalistic or naturalistic level and mode of life which has recently been predominant in many phases of our civilization. The Thomist's sole complaint is that the New Humanist does not go high enough.

## VII

In conclusion, let us point out that when we describe Thomism as a frame of reference and a point of departure, we do not mean to imply that it is an empty outline or mere skeleton. On the contrary it is a rich corpus of doctrine. But it is not a closed system and those who follow the spirit and tradition of St. Thomas Aquinas will endeavor to be as open-minded as he was. They will heed the advice of Pope Leo XIII in an attempt *vetera novis augere et perficere.*

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# PROBLEMS FOR THOMISTS

## I. THE PROBLEM OF SPECIES

*(Second Installment)*

### IV. EXPOSITION OF THE PROBLEM IN THE PHILOSOPHY OF NATURE

14. There appear to be two answers to the question, how many species of composite substance are there? The answers not only seem, at first, to be irreconcilable, but upon further examination they appear to arise from different conceptions of the relation of such species to one another and to their genera. What these underlying conceptions are, and whether they, too, are incompatible, are the objects of this inquiry. We are not primarily concerned with the precise number used to answer the question, how many species are there? The point is not whether there are five or six or twelve, on the one hand, or 1000 or 100,000, on the other. The point is rather that, because the question about the number of species is answered either by saying that it is a small finite number which can be definitely assigned or by saying that it is a comparatively large finite number which must remain indefinite,[63] we are forced to acknowledge two fundamentally different positions about the existence and relation of species. More than that, we are compelled to wonder whether we know what a species is.

For convenience in the discussion to follow, I shall uniformly refer to the conception of species, indicated by the answer that there are five (or some similar number), as the *first position*; and to the conception indicated by the answer that there is an indefinitely large number, as the *second position*.

Our procedure will be as follows. We shall consider the two positions in the order named. In each case, we shall first examine the leading or typical texts in the works of Aristotle and St. Thomas

[63] I shall use the number "five" as symbolic of all answers of the first sort, simply because that number is the one traditionally assigned in the texts which express this point of view. It should also be said that the numerical indefiniteness which is involved in the other point of view, has nothing to do with evolution, or the possibility that the contingent future will bring forth new species now undreamed of. If there is such a possibility, it affects both positions equally. The numerical indefiniteness means that so long as observing and thinking men are at work, there is always the possibility that new species may be discovered, even if there are no further additions to the order of species by a future origin of new species.

which *seem* to take the position under consideration; we shall then attempt a brief explication of the position itself, both by way of commentary on the texts and for the sake of summary; and finally, we shall add a few references to modern or contemporary works which seem to align themselves with the given point of view. This whole section will be devoted to exposition; the dialectic of objections and replies will be reserved for the immediately following section. But it is impossible to make an intelligible exposition of these two theories without including some statement of the reasons on which they are grounded,—the premises or principles they appeal to, the evidence they regard as persuasive. That can be done, however, without any weighing of merits and demerits. Our task at this point is exclusively to understand the opposed doctrines, and not to judge them. Our aim should be to certify the genuineness of the problem before we attempt to solve it.

15. *The first position.* The texts fall into three groups: (1) texts concerned with the order of species generally; (2) texts dealing with the species of living things; (3) texts dealing with the species of non-living things.

(a) *The order of species.* Here the capital text is from Aristotle's *Metaphysics,* VIII, 3:

> It is also obvious that, if all substances are in a sense numbers, they are so in this sense, and not, as some say, numbers of units. For definition is a sort of number; for (1) it is divisible and into indivisible parts (for definitory formulae are not infinite), and number also is of this nature. And (2) just as nothing can be taken away or added to a number, without changing the number, even though only a minimum be taken away or added; so the definition and the essense will no longer remain when anything has been added or taken away. . . . And as number does not admit of the more and the less, neither does substance, in the sense of form; for if substance does, it is only insofar as it involves matter ($1043^b$ 32-$1044^a$ 10).

There are a number of other passages in which Aristotle compares essences, definitions or species to numbers, but this one is the fullest utterance on the point. In every case, the context makes it clear that by " number " is meant an integral number, and that " essence " or " definition " refers to the species of composite substances. Thus, in the paragraph immediately preceding the one just quoted, Aristotle remarks: " One kind of substance can be defined and formulated, i. e., the composite kind; . . . but the primary parts of which this consists cannot be defined since a definitory formula predicates something of something, and one part of the definition must play the part of matter and the other of form " ($1043^b$28-32).

On the capital text quoted above there is the commentary of St. Thomas, which makes its meaning more explicit:

He sets forth a certain likeness of substances, which definition signifies, to numbers. And he says that if something be added to or subtracted from any number, even if it be a minimum, it will not be the same number according to species. For the minimum in numbers is unity; which if it is added to a ternary makes a quaternary, which is another species of number; but if it be subtracted from the same, there remains the binary, which is also another species of number. And this is the case because that ultimate difference gives the species to numbers.

And similarly it is the case in definition and in essence (*quod quid erat esse*), which definition signifies; because whatever minimum be added or subtracted, there is another definition and another nature or species. For if we take sensitive, animated substance alone, this is the definition of animal; if you add to this rational, you constitute the species of man; if you subtract sensitive, you constitute the species of plant, because likewise the ultimate difference gives the species (*In Meta.*, Bk. VIII. Lect. III, # 1723-4).

There are many passages in the *Summa Theologica* and *Summa Contra Gentiles* which repeat this in various ways. For example:

The form itself is signified by the species; for everything is placed in its species by its form. Hence the number is said to give the species, for definitions signifying species are like numbers, according to the Philosopher; for as a unit added to, or taken away from, a number, changes its species, so a difference added to, or taken from, a definition, changes its species (*S. T.*, I, 5, 5).

No substantial form is susceptive of more or less; but the addition of greater perfection constitutes another species, just as the addition of unity constitutes another species of number (*S. T.*, I, 118, 2, ad 2). Cf. *Summa Theologica*, I-II, 52, 1.

If we run through the various species, we find that one species has an additional grade of perfection over another. . . . Hence Aristotle says that the definitions of things are like numbers, the species of which is changed by the subtraction or addition of unity: in the same way as a different species results in definitions, if a difference be removed or added (*S. C. G.*, II, 95).

It is impossible for anything extraneous to be united in unity of nature to a species that is already complete, without doing away with the species. For since species are like numbers, in which either the addition or the subtraction of unity changes the species, if any addition be made to an already complete species, the result must needs be another species. Thus, if you add sensitivity to a substance that is only animate, you have another species; because animal and plant are different species (*S. C. G.*, IV, 41).

We turn now to a set of texts which go further than the above in that they *seem* to project the complete series of natural species, each member of the series being related to the one preceding by the addition of a unit difference, a grade of perfection, and to the one following by the subtraction of a difference. Like the series of integral numbers, beginning with one, the species of substances are perfectly ordered as prior and posterior, as lower and higher in degree of perfection. No two are simultaneous or coordinate.[64] Since the added or subtracted difference is in each case an indivisible or unit difference, the series is not a continuum but a hierarchy.[65] The following texts are capital:

Formal distinction always requires inequality, because, as the Philosopher says, the forms of things are like numbers in which species vary by addition or subtraction of unity. Hence in natural things, species seem to be arranged in degrees; as the mixed things are more perfect than the elements, and plants than minerals (i. e., mixed bodies), and animals than plants, and men than other animals; and in each of these one species is more perfect than others (*S. T.*, I, 47, 2).[66]

We must observe that the nobler a form is, the more it rises above corporeal matter, the less it is merged in matter, and the more it excels matter

[64] "The species of a given genus are to one another as before and after, like numbers and figures, if considered in their nature; although they may be said to be simultaneous, according as they receive the predication of the common genus" (*S. T.*, I, 77, 4, ad 1). This text raises the problem whether there are any univocal genera in the substantial order, or whether a substantial species has a genus only in an analogical sense. We shall return to this problem later.

[65] The word "continuum" is here used for any series in which fractional differences can be found between any two members; "hierarchy" designates a series of members, ordered as prior and posterior, in which the difference is a whole step up or down. We shall use the words "continuum" and "hierarchy" in this way to signify contrary types of ordered series.

[66] There can be no doubt that the last clause here, "*et in singulis horum una species perfectior aliis invenitur*," introduces a notion of species other than that expressed by the same word in the rest of the passage. If in "each of these,"—i. e., the five species already named,—there are other species, then either the five species are genera, or the "other species" referred to are not species. In any case, the word is not being used univocally. This text can be cited for the first or for the second position according as the first or the second use of "species" is taken as signifying *infima species*. The other use will then have to be interpreted accordingly. Further, we should note that in the last clause of the passage, what is said is that "one species is more perfect than others," not that "each species is more or less perfect than another." The ordering of species is always described in the latter way when the five species are being discussed.

There is a text, almost parallel to *S. T.*, I, 47, 2, which unambiguously indicates that the five forms are *genera* under which many species are ordered as higher and lower. That text is *QQ. Disp. de Anima*, Q. 1, A. 7. It will be discussed more fully later in the account of the second position. Vd. Part IV, Section 16, c, *infra*.

by its power and its operation; hence we find that the form of a mixed body has another operation not caused by its elemental qualities. And the higher we advance in the nobility of forms, the more we find that the power of the form excels the elementary matter; as the vegetative soul excels the form of the metal, and the sensitive soul excels the vegetative soul. Now the human soul is the highest and noblest of forms. Wherefore it excels corporeal matter in its power by the fact that it has an operation and a power in which corporeal matter has no share whatever (*S. T.*, I, 76, 1).

This last passage quoted occurs in the context of a discussion of matter and form, souls and substantial forms. Since the substantial form constitutes the species of a substance, the order of the five forms which variously perfect the potentialities of matter, or excel it entirely, is the hierarchy of species.[67] Let this suffice for the order of species generally, and their enumeration as five.

(b) *The species of living things.* We are concerned here with the specification of living substances, but in passing to this more restricted subject we should observe that in the *De Anima* and elsewhere, Aristotle *seems* to say that the distinction between living and non-living things is essential and not accidental.[68] The capital text on the hierarchy of living things is to be found in *De Anima*, II, 3:

It is now evident that a single definition can be given of soul only in the sense as one can be given of figure. For, as in that case, there is no figure distinguishable and apart from triangle, quadrangle, etc., so here there is no soul apart from the forms of soul just enumerated. It is true that a highly general definition can be given for figure which will fit all figures without expressing the peculiar nature of any figure. So here in the case of soul and its specific forms. . . . The cases of figure and soul are exactly parallel; for the particulars subsumed under the common name in both cases—figures and living beings—constitute a series, each successive term of which potentially contains its predecessor, e. g., the quadrangle the triangle, the sensory power the self-nutritive. Hence we must ask in the case

[67] "We observe in matter various degrees of perfection, as existence, living, sensing, and understanding. Now what is added is always more perfect. Therefore that form which gives matter only the first degree of perfection is the most imperfect, while that form which gives the first, second and third degree, and so on, is the most perfect: and yet it adheres to matter immediately" (*S. T.*, I, 76, 4, ad 3). The context indicates that there are five degrees of perfection to be found in material things because of the five forms or species.

[68] In other words, the living and non-living are discontinuous; the transition from the non-living to the living is a whole step up in the hierarchy of natural forms. "It is certainly difficult to find a state intermediate between life and the absence of life" (Aristotle, *De Plantis*, 815$^{b}$ 36). I use the word "seems" in the text because there are other passages in which Aristotle *seems* to say the contrary. These will be cited later in connection with the second position.

of each order of living things, What is its soul, i.e., what is the soul of plant, animal, man? ($414^b$ 20-31).

It would appear that there are three souls, related as triangle, quadrangle, and pentagon, each one more or less than another by the addition or subtraction of a difference which is signified by the presence or absence of a vital power.[69] If soul is the substantial form of a living thing, then there can be only as many species of living things as there are distinct "species" of soul.[70] That five generic vital powers are enumerated, and four modes of living, is not regarded as inconsistent with the position that there are only three species of soul, and hence three species of living substance. St. Thomas's commentary confirms this interpretation.[71] Distinguishing between the materiality of vegetative operations and the immateriality of cognitive acts, and then further distinguishing between the degree of immateriality involved in sensation and intellection, he writes:

> Therefore operations which belong to the living thing according to its material being are the operations which are attributed to the vegetative soul; which although it is ordered to the same end to which also are ordered the actions of inanimate things, namely, to attain and maintain being, nevertheless in living things this is brought about through a higher and more noble mode. . . . But the operations which are attributed to living things according to their completely immaterial being, pertain to the

[69] "Of the psychic powers above enumerated some kinds of living things, as we have said, possess all, some less than all, some one only. Those we have mentioned are the nutritive, the appetitive, the sensory, the locomotive and the power of thinking. Plants have none but the first, the nutritive; while another order of living things has this *plus* the sensory. If any order of living things has the sensory it must also have the appetitive. . . . Certain kinds of animals possess in addition the power of locomotion, and still another order of animate beings, i.e., man, and possibly another order like man or superior to him, the power of thinking, i.e., mind" (*De Anima*, II, 3, $414^a$ 28-$414^b$ 20). Two things should be noted here: first, that although only three kinds of souls are definitely mentioned in the immediately following passage cited above, here a "kind of animal" distinguished from another kind by the addition of the power of locomotion, is spoken of. Why, then, are there not four kinds of souls, and four species of living things? We shall return to this point later in considering objections to the first position. Secondly, what is suggested by the words "possibly another order like man or superior to him?" Another species of "rational animal" or angels?

[70] When we speak of "species" of soul, or "definition" of soul, we are of course not using the words in the same univocal sense as when we speak of "species" or "definition" of substances; for souls, like figures, are forms not substances; they are *entia entis*, as St. Thomas says, not *beings*, but *of beings*. Forms and accidents, i.e., substantial and accidental forms, can be defined but they do not have essences or species in the primary sense in which substances do. Vd. Aquinas, *In De Anima*, Bk. II, Lect. 2.

[71] Vd. Aquinas, *In De Anima*, Bk. II, Lect. 3, 5.

intellective part of the soul; those which are attributed to it according to the being which is a mean between these two pertain to the sensitive part of the soul. And according to this threefold being there is generally distinguished a threefold soul: namely, vegetative, sensitive, and rational (*In De Anima*, Bk. II, Lect. 5, # 285).[72]

To complete the picture, we need only be assured that the soul is the substantial form of the matter to which it is united, and that the number of substantial forms found in living matter is the same as the number of souls. For if that is the case, then the number of living species would seem to be definitely indicated, and by "species" here we must mean *infima species* and not genera, for no genus is as such a substantial form. This assurance we receive from the articles in the Treatise on Man which answer the question whether there are several souls in man, or only one. These articles are not only absolutely unequivocal about the unicity of substantial forms, making strikingly plain the error of pluralism, but they also tell us the way in which a soul of inferior grade is *virtually* contained in its superior, how, in fact, each substantial form contains *virtually* all inferior forms, and thus perfects matter with all the perfections appropriate to each. The notion of *virtuality* enables St. Thomas to say with greater metaphysical precision what Aristotle tried to explain about the way in which the sensitive soul is in the rational soul as the triangle is in the quadrangle. Aristotle uses the word "potentiality," but the inferior form is not in the superior as any form is in matter, i.e., *potentially*; hence, the distinction between virtual presence and potentiality.[73] Furthermore, in the following passages the discussion of the virtual presence of an inferior form explains the sense in which it said that a genus is present in a species as a less determinate form subject to further determination or perfection.[74]

We must therefore conclude that in man the sensitive soul, the intellective soul, and the nutritive soul are numerically one soul. This can easily be explained if we consider the differences of species and forms. . . . Aristotle (*Meta.*, VIII, 3) compares the species of things to numbers, which

[72] Cf. the fuller exposition of the position that there are five generic powers, four modes of living, but only three souls, in *Summa Theologica*, I, 78, 1.

[73] Vd. my discussion of this point in *What Man Has Made of Man*, Note 35.

[74] According to this view, a form which in one substance constitutes its specific nature,—as the sensitive soul in brute animals,—is the proximate genus as it is virtually present in the form which involves an additional perfection,—as the sensitive soul in men. Thus, although both "sensitive soul" and "rational soul" name substantial forms, and hence relate to *infima species*, "sensitive soul" also names a generic form which is virtually present in another *infima species* immediately higher in rank. We shall discuss this point more fully later.

differ in species by the addition or subtraction of unity. And (*De Anima*, II, 3) he compares the various souls to the species of figures, one of which contains another; as a pentagon contains and exceeds a tetragon. Thus the intellective soul contains virtually whatever belongs to the sensitive soul of brute animals, and to the nutritive soul of plants. Therefore, as a surface which is of a pentagonal shape is not tetragonal by one shape and pentagonal by another,—since a tetragonal shape would be superfluous as contained in the pentagonal,—so neither is Socrates a man by one soul, and animal by another; but by one and the same soul he is both animal and man (*S. T.*, I, 76, 3).

Of one thing there is but one substantial being. But the substantial form gives substantial being. Therefore of one thing there is but one substantial form. But the soul is the substantial form of man. Therefore it is impossible for there to be in man another substantial form besides the intellective soul. . . .

Whence we must conclude that there is no other substantial form in man besides the intellective soul; and that this soul, as it virtually contains the sensitive and nutritive souls, so does it virtually contain all inferior forms, and itself alone does whatever the imperfect forms do in other things. The same is to be said of the sensitive soul in brute animals, and of the nutritive soul in plants, and universally of all more perfect forms with regard to the imperfect (*S. T.*, I, 76, 4).

This last passage, by its mention of forms inferior to the three souls, leads us now to the consideration of the species of non-living things according to the number of their substantial forms.

(c) *The species of non-living things.* The question here is whether elements and mixtures (i. e., mixed bodies) exhaust the species of non-living substances, or whether there are more than these two substantial forms in the world of inorganic matter. What Aristotle has to say on this question is so diffusely scattered through a number of works,[75] that I shall be content to present here a series of texts from St. Thomas, which are much more precise in their wording and more compact.

In the context of the article, already cited, in which he argues that the intellective soul, as the substantial form of man, includes the perfections of all inferior forms which matter can receive, St. Thomas considers the formalities inferior to soul.

Avicenna held that the substantial forms of the elements remain entire in the mixed body, and that the mixture is made by the contrary qualities

[75] Vd. *De Caelo*, I, 2; III, 3-8; IV, 3-5; *De Generatione et Corruptione*, II, 1-8. These texts appear to make the point that all non-living bodies are either elements or compounds of elements (mixtures). But they also seem to say that there are at least four *species* of elements, and certainly as many, if not more, species of mixture. The same texts must, therefore, be cited later as supporting the second position.

of the elements being reduced to an average. But this is impossible. . . . Averroes maintained that the forms of elements, by reason of their imperfection, are a medium between accidental and substantial forms, and so can be *more* or *less*; and therefore in the mixture they are modified and reduced to an average, so that one form emerges from them. But this is even still more impossible. . . . Therefore, we must say, in accordance with the Philosopher (*De Gener.*, I, 10) that the forms of the elements remain in the mixed body, not actually but virtually. For the proper qualities of the elements remain, though modified; and in them is the power of the elementary forms. This quality of the mixture is the proper disposition for the substantial form of the mixed body; for instance, the form of a stone, or of any sort of soul (*S.T.*, I, 76, 4, ad 4).[76]

Clearer statements on the point occur in the context of other discussions, namely, of generation, of the final conflagration, of the resurrection of the body:

Certain grades are to be found in the acts of forms. For primary matter is in potentiality, first of all, to the elemental form. While under the elemental form, it is in potentiality to the form of a mixed body: whereby the elements are the matter of a mixed body. Considered as under the form of a mixed body, it is in potentiality to a vegetative soul; for the act of such a body is a soul. Again, the vegetative soul is in potentiality to the sensitive, and the sensitive to the intellective. This is proved by the process of generation; for in generation we have first the foetus living with a plant life, afterwards with animal life, and lastly with human life (*S. C. G.*, III, 22).[77]

[76] It must be admitted that this passage permits the same double interpretation as the texts of Aristotle on which it is founded. Vd. fn. 75 *supra*. For other passages dealing with the virtual presence of elements in mixtures, vd. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 56; and Opusc. III, *De Mixtione Elementorum*.

[77] Cf. *Summa Contra Gentiles*, II, 89. Whether the polymorphic theory of human generation is tenable is not a relevant concern for us. We are concerned only with the fact of hierarchy that is presented in this and similar passages. Vd. *S. C. G.*, II, 90: "The nearer a body is to primary matter, the less noble it is, according as it is more in potentiality and less in complete actuality. Now the elements are nearer than mixed bodies to primary matter, since they are the proximate matter of mixed bodies. Consequently the elemental bodies are less noble than mixed bodies as to their species." That there are only two species of non-living substances, according as the forms are "element" or "mixture" would seem to follow, if there are only three species of living substances, according to the three souls. It would follow according to the point which St. Thomas makes in his commentary on *De Anima*: "The soul, since it is the most perfect form among the forms of corporeal things, is the principle of diverse operations . . . (whereas) the forms of inanimate things, because of their imperfection, are principles of few operations" (Bk. II, Lect. 1, # 230). The greater diversity of operations among living things, hence of their powers, would accord with a larger number of substantial forms (kinds of soul) in which these diverse powers are rooted. Hence the number of living species would be greater than the number of non-living,—on the condition, of course, that the number of species is the same as the number of souls.

The form of a mixed body and the form of an element may be considered in two ways: either as regards the perfection of the species, and thus a mixed body is more perfect,—or as regards their continual endurance; and thus the simple body is more noble, because it is not in itself the cause of corruption, unless it be corrupted by something extrinsic; whereas a mixed body has in itself the cause of its corruption, namely, the composition of contraries (*S. T.*, III, Sup., 74, 1, ad 3).[78]

Even as a simple quality is not the substantial form of an element, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby its matter is rendered proper to such a form; so the form of a mixed body, which form is a quality resulting from simple qualities reduced to a mean, is not the substantial form of the mixed body, but its proper accident, and the disposition whereby the matter is in need of the form (*S. T.*, III, Sup., 79, 1, ad 4).

This last text raises a number of interesting points.[79] If diverse qualities (i. e., passive affections) are the proper accidents or properties of elements, and not their substantial form, then it would seem to follow that there are as many distinct species of elemental bodies as there are properties belonging to one element and not to another. But these qualities are related to one another as contraries, and in this respect differ radically from the vital powers which are the properties of diverse species of living substances. Furthermore, the elements differ from one another by the possession of one quality, and the privation of all the others; hence if these qualities, as proper accidents, flow from diverse substantial forms of elemental bodies, then these species of elements cannot be ordered as higher and lower, for such ordering can obtain only when, as among living things, a given species, in addition to having a specific power as its proper accident, also has the generic powers which are common to it and inferior forms, because the superior form includes the inferior ones virtually. But one elemental form does not seem to include another in this way. Hence we are forced to conclude: *either* that *element* is not a genus subsuming species, but is itself an infima species, subject to accidental differences according as diverse qualities inhere in such simple bodies in addition to the substantial form; *or* that the nature of inorganic species is radically

[78] Cf. *Summa Theologica*, III, Sup., 91, 5, which also discusses the incorruptibility of the elements. Here as before (vd. fn. 77, *supra*) we need not be concerned with contextual doctrine. This text is illuminating for us because of what it says about the contrary qualities in a mixture, due to the virtual presence there of the elements. If the proper qualities of the elements are related as contraries, we may wonder whether the distinct elements can be different as species, since substantial species are not related as contraries, but ordered as higher and lower by addition or subtraction.

[79] Vd. fn. 78, *supra*.

different from that of living things. The same argument applies to mixed bodies. We shall return to this problem later in the dialectic of the issue made by the two opposed doctrines concerning species. In order to read the foregoing texts as supporting the first position, we must choose the first conclusion, above mentioned.

Let this suffice as a survey of the leading passages from Aristotle and St. Thomas which *appear* to support the first position. We shall now undertake a brief summary of the doctrine which they can be interpreted as expressing. This can be done by a formulation of the propositions which constitute the doctrine, and briefly, since it is hoped they will need little explication beyond the commentary which has already occurred in the text or footnotes accompanying the passages quoted. This is a summary of the argument and not a defense of it. Controversial points will be reserved for the dialectical section to follow.

(1) In the substantial order, each species is either higher or lower than another, i. e., a more or less determinate form of being, perfecting matter to a greater or less degree. Like the series of integral numbers or plane figures, the series of substantial species is a hierarchy rather than a continuum. No two species are ontologically coordinate, nor is there any intermediate between them, if the second is constituted by the first *plus* a difference.

(2) One species is higher or lower than another by the addition or subtraction of a unit difference. It is the *same* difference which is added in the one case, and subtracted in the other. Thus, to state the point formally, let X and Y be two species related as higher and lower, and let d(x) be the difference. Then $Y + d(x)$ equals X, and $X - d(x)$ equals Y. In material terms, "plant" plus "sensitivity" is "animal," and "animal" minus "sensitivity" is "plant." There are *not* two differences here. "Insensitive" is not simply a difference, but a difference marked by a negative sign for subtraction. Thus, to say that a plant is an "insensitive living thing" is the same as to say that a plant is an "animal minus sensitivity." "Insensitive" and "irrational" cannot be added as differences, except in the way in which negative numbers are added, for as in algebra to add a negative is to subtract, so in ontology to add a privation is to subtract a form.

(3) The difference which is added or subtracted exists formally in the substantial order, as does the genus to which it is added or the species from which it is subtracted, for the genus plus the difference constitutes the species which is a substantial form, and its

constitutive principles must be substantial formalities. But because such substantial differences are hidden from us, we substitute differences which, predicamentally speaking, are in the accidental order, and if these are essential differences, i. e., proper accidents or properties, they are necessary accidents of the substance because they are determined as belonging to it by the substantial form. Such properties are always powers, and never any other kind of accidental form, never a passive affection or other kind of quality, never a quantity, or an action or passion, or a relation, etc. Thus, in the case of the species Y, let us use d(y) to signify the substantial difference, and p(y) to signify the property which follows from it. Then, in the case of plants and animals, what we *observe* to be added to plants is the power of sensitivity p(y), and this signifies the added substantial difference d(y). Two further points must be added here:

(3a) The *specific* property of a substance is the power, the addition of which is correlative with the addition of the substantial difference constituting that species. But since the genus to which the difference has been added is, by the subtraction of this difference, also a species, it too has a specific property or power, and this is in the superior species as a *generic* property. Thus, if p(y) is the property which specifically differentiates X and Y, and p(z) the property which specifically differentiates Y and Z, the superior species Z will have p(z) as its specific property, and p(y) as a generic property. It will have as many generic properties as the number of inferior forms it virtually contains, and these properties will be ordered in generality according as the forms are graded in inferiority. "Rationality" is the specific property of man, and "sensitivity" a generic property, according as the sensitive soul is virtually contained in the rational.

(3b) What in treatises on logic are traditionally called "properties" are, strictly, not properties correlative with substantial differences, according to ontological analysis. To take one familiar example, which perfectly illustrates the error, "risibility" is not the property of man, but rationality or, more precisely, the intellect as a power, the power of understanding.[80] Risibility, like the ability

[80] "Whence it is clear that all the powers of the soul, whether their subject be the soul alone, or the composite, flow from the essence of the soul, as from their principle" (*Summa Theologica*, I, 77, 6). "The power of the soul flows from the essence, not by a transmutation, but by a certain natural resultance, and is simultaneous with the soul" (*S. T.*, I, 77, 7, ad 1). Thus, the power as property is convertible (simultaneous) with the soul as substantial form or essence. "Those

to govern or be governed, the ability to cook, to speak grammatically, to act morally or immorally, is not a property of man, but a consequence of his specific property, the power of understanding and reasoning.[80a] The error here is probably due to a failure to see that the word "rational" signifies both a property (i. e., a power) and a substantial difference. Taking it exclusively as a substantial difference resulted in other names being used to signify properties. But these so-called properties are merely substitutes for the property strictly speaking. As "rationality," naming the specific power of man, points to the substantial difference which constitutes his species, so "risibility" and "linguistic ability," etc., point to the property (i. e., power) which flows from that essence. And, in a sense, they flow from it, as it in turn flows from the essence.

(4) The differences which differentiate species are themselves diverse rather than different, for they are not in turn differentiated by a difference. This can be said equally of the difference, "d," as it exists in the substantial order, or the accidental difference, "p," which is the consequent property of the substance thus specified. Further, two differences, such as "rationality" and "sensitivity," are never related as contraries, for the substantial species, of which

powers, which we say do not actually remain in the separated soul, are not the *properties* of the soul alone, but of the composite" (*S. T.*, I, 77, 8, ad 2). The capital text on this point is, however, I, 77, 1, ad 5., where the distinction is made between powers as accidents, predicamentally speaking, because outside the essence, and as properties, because a medium between essence and accident: "For the substance is all that belongs to the essence of a thing, whereas whatever is beyond the essence of a thing cannot be called accident in this sense; but only what is not caused by the essential principle of the species. For the *proper* does not belong to the essence of a thing, but is caused by the essential principles of the species; wherefore it is a medium between the essence and the accident thus understood. In this sense the powers of the soul may be said to be a medium between essence and accident, *as being natural properties of the soul*" or of the composite. (Italics mine.) Cf. *ibid.*, ad 7.

[80a] It is clear that such words as "risibility," "linguistic ability," "ability to govern," etc., do not name either generic or specific powers of the soul. Since they signify potencies of some sort, they do not name operations either. Therefore, they must signify something intermediate between power and act, something like habit which is a development of power. Perhaps, it can be said that they do name habits, for power is the principle of habit, and rationality is the principle of such things as "risibility," etc. Thus, "grammatical ability" names an art, i. e., a habit which can be formed in the power of reason; so "ability to govern or be governed" names the habit of prudence; and "ability to act morally or immorally" names the moral habits. Since a power is in potentiality not only to act, but also to habit, habits can be said to be in the power potentially. In this sense, the various things which logic books call "properties" of man are potentially in the intellectual power which, strictly speaking, is man's only specific property.

they are constitutive, " d," or consequences, " p," are never contraries. In fact they are related precisely in the same way as substantial species are, as higher and lower, as perfect and imperfect. Their diversity is strictly in accordance with the difference of the species to which they belong.[81] There is a hierarchy of differences and properties (powers), just as there is a hierarchy of species. As said before, in a given substance all the differences and properties which are inferior to its specific difference and specific property, are present through the virtual inclusion of inferior forms in its substantial form.

(5) The ontological order of substantial species is not the same as the logical order which relates concepts according to their generality, whether extensionally or by the determinateness of their comprehension. Considering species ontologically, we deal, of course, only with *infima* species, and treat of genera only so far as in the constitution of each species there are two formal constituents, a genus and a difference. In the light of the principle that each substantial form virtually contains all inferior substantial forms, we see the sense in which it must be said that all specific forms inferior to it are present in the constitution of a given species. The specific form which is its proximate inferior functions as the proximate genus in the composition of the essence: it is that to which the difference is added in such composition; it functions as the matter receiving the difference as form, and thus the essence of a composite substance is also composite, and in a manner paralleling the composition of the substance itself.[82]

In the order of concepts, on the other hand, the genus is not the proximate inferior species, but a universal which is common to two or more other universal terms because it is indeterminate in a respect in which they are determinate. Each specific concept determines the generic concept by adding a difference thereto, and the difference which each adds is a diverse determination of the generic concept in the respect in which it is indeterminate. It should be noted, here, that the several specific concepts each differ *directly* from their common genus by the difference which they add to it, and *indirectly* from each other by the diversity of their several differences. When we speak ontologically we say that one species *differs*

[81] " The powers of the soul are opposed to one another as perfect and imperfect; as also are the species of numbers and figures " (*Summa Theologica,* I, 77, 7, ad 3).

[82] This raises a problem about the constitution of the one species which is inferior to all the rest in the ontological series. What acts as the matter in the composition of its essence, since there is no inferior species to which a difference is added as to a genus?

from another, and quite properly so because the difference which the superior species adds has been added to the proximately inferior species which enters into the composition of its superior as the genus. But when we speak logically we must say that each of several species *differs* from their common genus, because it is to that genus, common to them all, that each adds a specifying difference. The notion of a " common genus " is thus seen to be logical rather than ontological.[83] The differences between the two orders can be summarized as follows. *Logically,* apart from infima species, every species is in turn a genus, and apart from summa genera, every genus is in turn a species; whereas, *ontologically,* every species is an infima species, every species except the highest or most perfect is as a genus or as matter in the constitution of its proximate superior, and every form which can be as a genus in the constitution of another species is itself an infima species. Furthermore, *logically,* any infima species is made by the last difference which can be added in a series of specifications, and the highest genus is the universal most remote from infima species in the same category; whereas, *ontologically,* only the highest species is constituted by the addition of the last difference, and the highest genus is that form which in itself is the lowest, least perfect, species of substance. These dissimilarities between the ordering of substantial forms and the ordering of concepts in the category of substance can also be shown by the two following diagrams. For the sake of simplicity I will employ *plant, animal* and *man* illustratively as three infima species, in both diagrams.

ONTOLOGICAL ORDER


Species X (plant)
plus or minus: the same difference: d(y) sensitivity
Species Y (animal)
plus or minus: the same difference: d(z) rationality
Species Z (man)

[83] The only way in which we can talk of a " common genus " ontologically is to speak of a substantial form which is inferior to both of two higher species; as, for example, *plant* is inferior to both *animal* and *man,* and hence is common to both as generic matter in their constitution. But the point must be qualified by saying that plant is *not common to both in the same way,* for it is the proximate genus of animal, and a remote genus of man, included in the essence of man because it is already included in the essence of animal. The logical " common genus " is common to each of several species in precisely the same way; there can be, in short, one and the same proximate genus for two or more species logically, but not ontologically.

LOGICAL ORDER




NOTE: In the diagram of the logical order, d (x) determines the mode of life as *vegetative*, and d (b) determines it as *cognitive*; further, d (y) and d (z) determine the mode of cognition as *sensitive* and as *rational*.

The diagram of the logical order of species and genera indicates two further points. In the first place, it is sometimes difficult to avoid using the same word to signify the genus and one of its species; thus, the word "animal" is sometimes used to name both the genus (cognitive, living thing) and the species (sensitive, living thing). In the second place, in the specification of a given genus, one difference must be understood as including another; thus, the cognitive mode of life must be understood as including the vegetative, and the rational mode of cognition as including the sensitive, for otherwise the species thus differentiated could not be ordered as higher and lower than one another. This last point is important because the common genus is capable of being regarded either as a univocal or an analogical universal. It is univocally applied when the species are regarded as participating equally in the generic idea, and thus they are simply diverse, through differing diversely from the genus which is indeterminate in the same way for them all. But when the species are regarded in themselves as determinate ideas, then one is understood to signify a nature higher or lower than another, and the common genus applies to them analogically, because unequally. As univocally employed, the genus is predicated of its species in a purely categoreal manner; as analogically employed, the genus is predicated in a transcendental manner, as a form of being or some other transcendental idea. Clearly, then, the logical arrangement of species reflects the ontological order only when the common genus is regarded analogically, for only then is one species understood to be higher or lower than another.[84]

[84] "When a univocal genus is divided into its species, the members of the division are on a par in the point of the generic idea; although considered in their nature as things, one species may surpass another in rank and perfection, as man

In the light of the foregoing, it can be seen how the Tree of Porphyry is thoroughly misleading if it be taken ontologically rather than logically. Properly understood, it consists of concepts ordered as higher and lower according to generality (in extension) or to determinateness (in comprehension). The genera set forth are to be interpreted as univocal universals, and hence the infima species are not regarded as higher or lower than one another. But the Tree of Porphyry encourages an ontological interpretation because of the way in which it uses such terms as " irrational " and " insensitive " to name specifying differences. The following diagram is an adaptation of the Porphyrian divisions, made comparable to the two previous diagrams by the restriction to three species, e. g., *plant, animal, man.*

PORPHYRIAN DIVISION OF SUBSTANCES




NOTE: Here d (not-b) signifies the difference *insensitive,* and d (not-z) signifies the difference *irrational,* whereas d (b) signifies *sensitive,* and d (z) *rational.*

Such differences as *insensitive* and *irrational* do not determine the common genus in the respect in which it is indeterminate. They indicate a lack of determination. They signify a privation of form, not the addition of a specifying form to the genus. If, as we have

in respect of other animals. But when we divide an analogous term, which is applied to several things, but to one before it is applied to another, nothing hinders one from ranking before another, even in the point of the generic idea; as the notion of being is applied to substance principally in relation to accident. Such is the division of virtue; since the good defined by reason is not found in the same way in all things " (*Summa Theologica,* I-II, 61, 1, ad 1). In other words, virtue as a genus in the category of quality can be regarded univocally when it signifies habit, and thus it is specified according to differences in powers subjected or objects; but when it signifies a *good* habit, the virtues do not divide it equally, for as good, the virtues are more or less perfect. The several virtues thus participate in it analogically, i. e., unequally. The same would hold for any term which, as a genus, involves a transcendental as well as a categoreal signification, whether the transcendental be *good, or true* or *being,* and whether the category be *substance, quality, action,* etc.

already pointed out in our ontological account of the ordering of species, it is the same difference which is added to the inferior species to make its proximate superior and, analytically at least, subtracted from the superior to make its proximate inferior, and if, ontologically, the addition of a privation is the same as the subtraction of a form, then the Porphyrian style of division may be a confusion of the ontological with the logical.[85] The genus *sensitive animate* is further determined by the difference *rational*; but the addition of *irrational* does not similarly determine it; in fact, it leaves it unchanged in signification, and therefore, the generic concept expressed by the words "sensitive animate" is the same, in extension or comprehension, as the specific concept expressed by the word "animal."

As a further consequence, the Porphyrian scheme orders species as higher and lower, because the species which is constituted by the addition of the positive difference, such as *rational* or *sensitive*, is clearly and explicitly superior to the species which is constituted by the addition of the negative difference, signifying a privation. The Porphyrian table calls for the interpretation that one species is higher or lower than another (*man* and *animal*) by the addition or subtraction of the same difference (*rational* and *irrational*). Since in the logical order, each of two or more species must add a diverse difference to their common genus, the basic error in the scheme of Porphyry,—i. e., the use of the privation of one difference as a diverse difference,—indicates that the famous Tree is not purely a logical representation of the arrangement of concepts, but a confusion of logical with ontological ordering. Wherever the philosophical tradition has followed or been influenced by Porphyry, this confusion appears.[86] The rigorous avoidance of this confusion is necessary if we are to clarify the issue concerning species; for,

[85] Vd. point (2) in the summary, *supra*.

[86] Aristotle is himself not without fault. The *Categories* confuses physical and logical analyses in many places. Porphyry's *Isagoge* merely solidifies the errors. Again and again Porphyry will write as follows: "Since animal is a genus, it is predicated of man and ox and horse, which differ from one another not only in number, but also in species;" yet he will also say "difference is that wherein the species exceeds the genus. For man has more than animal has, that is, it has rational. For animal is not any of that (for if it were, how would species have differences?), nor does it have all the opposite differences,"—without detecting the slip from logic into ontology. The reason is not far to seek, for he writes that "rational and irrational separate man and horse, which are of the same genus animal." It might be added that the last, and not least important, link in the perpetuation of the error is Boethius' *Commentary* on Porphyry's *Introduction to the Predicaments of Aristotle*. The error is a characteristic consequence of the platonizing of Aristotelian science,—making the discussion of forms identical with the discussion of substances.

as we shall see in a subsequent discussion of the second position, the question whether *horse* and *cow* are species dividing the genus *animal,*—rather than accidental concretions subsumed by *animal,* as *Aryan* and *negro* are subsumed by *man,*—will turn on the manner in which their differentiation is understood: either by the addition of diverse differences to a common genus, or by the addition or subtraction of the same difference to or from the other. Since all logical speciation is of the former sort, and all ontological speciation of the latter, it is necessary to speak of species in the first or the second intention and not to mix the two modes of discourse.

A word should be added about accidents. Because of the fact that accidents do not have essences, species or definitions in the same way that substances do; because an accident is a simple being, whereas a substance is composite of matter and form, and hence the essence of a substance is itself intrinsically composite, whereas the essence of an accident is composite only in the sense that the definition must posit the substance in which it inheres; for these reasons, the logical analysis of the genera and species of accidents may more closely resemble their ontological disposition. In the case of accidents, as well as substance, a common genus may be regarded either as univocal or analogical, according as the species are subsumed by it equally in view of the generic idea, or according as they are viewed in their own natures as more and less perfect participations of being or some other transcendental. But species of accidents are also ordered *inter se* explicitly by the way in which they severally determine their common genus in the respect in which it is indeterminate. Let us take, for example, the genus *figure* which is indeterminate with respect to multitude of sides; and two species, *triangle* and *quadrangle,* which differ from it by the addition of diverse differences, such as *three-sided* and *four-sided,* each determining the genus on the same point. These species not only diversely differ from their common genus by diversely determining it, but they also differ directly from each other by the addition and subtraction of the same difference, namely, *one-side.* The difference between the two species is a quantity of the generic type of difference (number of sides), which each determinately adds to their common genus. In the case of colors, the difference between two species is a fractional degree of the generic type of difference (intensity or chroma) by which each species of color determines the genus common to them all. Species of substance do not differ from each other under a common genus in this way. The difference which one adds *is not a quantity,*—whether an integral unit or a fractional degree,—*of the same generic type of difference which another species adds to the same genus.* In other words, species of

substance cannot be regarded as higher and lower without *explicating* the *relation* of their differences in such a way that the genus must be regarded as analogical; whereas species of an accidental genus can be,—in fact, must be,—ordered as more and less by the very way in which their several differences are explicitly related as diversely determining their common genus; hence, *figure* can be univocally applied to *triangle* and *quadrangle*, even though these two species are ordered as less and more with respect to number of sides. It does not follow from the fact of its having more sides that a quadrangle is a more perfect participation of being than a triangle. In a sense, therefore, the logical order of accidental species reflects the ontological order explicitly, in a way that is not possible among substances. One wonders whether the confusion of logic and ontology in the Porphyrian tradition is also a confusion of the orders of substance and accident. The comparison which Aristotle draws between souls and figures, or species and numbers, is perfectly apt so long as it is remembered that species and souls are forms, and that forms (substantial forms), like accidents (accidental forms), are *entia entis* and do not have essences in the same way that substances do. Remembering that, we will not forget that the order of substances according to their species is, as an ontological series, different from the ontological ordering of accidents.

The foregoing five propositions expound the first doctrine concerning species quite apart from any concern with the number of species. All of these propositions remain true, if they are true, whether there are five, six, or 500 species. The next three propositions summarize that part of the doctrine which is concerned with the number of species. It is independent in the sense that it does not follow as a conclusion from the first five propositions; but it is not absolutely independent, as the first part is of these three propositions, because they presuppose the general conceptions concerning the order and constitution of species which the first five propositions enunciate.[87]

(6) There are only three *infima species* of living things *because* there are only three souls, the vegetative, the sensitive, and the intellective. The sense of this proposition might be better exhibited in a hypothetical formulation: *if* there are only three souls, *then* there are only three *infima* species of living substances. We are not concerned here to establish the antecedent: it is enough to

[87] In other words, if the first five propositions were false, the last three propositions might still be true, but they would be much less intelligible; whereas the last three propositions could be false without affecting the truth or intelligibility of the first five.

note that the thesis concerning three souls is traditionally accepted. But whether it is true or false, the consequent *necessarily* follows, namely, that there are then only three living species. We are concerned to demonstrate the necessity of this sequence, by the following steps: (a) a soul is the the substantial form of a living corporeal substance; (b) the substantial form of a substance is the completely determinate principle of its specification, i. e., constitutes its *infima* specific nature, i. e., is not a merely generic formality involved in its specific nature; (c) therefore, there cannot be more or fewer substantial species than there are distinct substantial forms; (d) therefore, there are as many species of living substance as there are souls; (e) hence, if there are three souls, there must be three species of living substance. The necessary truth of this hypothetical formulation carries an obvious logical consequence: if there are more than three species of living things, then there must be more than three species of soul; if there are a thousand or ten thousand infima species in the genera of *plant* and *animal*,—as biological science might suggest,—then there are an equal number of distinct souls; [87a] or to put the matter most concretely, *if oak* and *tulip* and *onion* are infima species in the genus *plant*, and *sponge*, *crab*, *spider*, *frog*, and *elephant* are infima species in the genus *animal*, *then* there *must* be an oak soul, a tulip soul, and so on, a sponge soul, a crab soul, and so on.

(7) There are only two species of non-living things, namely, elemental bodies (elements) and mixed bodies (mixtures). Here there is no apparent *because*, no *if* from which the thesis follows, as in the case of living things. There is an *a fortiori* argument, however, of the following sort: *if* there are only three species of living things, *then* there are fewer species of non-living things; but there cannot be one, therefore, there must be two. The necessity of this hypothetical is not as clear as in the case of souls and living species. It is explicated as follows: (a) the distinction of species is correlated with a distinction of powers, for every substantial difference causes a difference in powers (properties); (b) there cannot be

[87a] According to the most recent authoritative estimates, there are 822,765 species of *animal* and 233,000 species of *plant* (H. S. Pratt, *A Manual of the Common Invertebrate Animals*, Philadelphia, 1935). "That these totals fall short of the actually existing number of species is clear. . . . A million and a half species of animals and plants combined is a conservative estimate" (T. Dobzhansky, *Genetics and the Origin of Species*, New York, 1937: p. 3). There is, of course, the question how many of these scientifically distinguished "kinds" would be regarded by proponents of the second position as *natural* species, and how many as *systematic* species, according to a distinction current among contemporary scholastic writers on the philosophy of nature. We shall return to this point later.

more distinct species, therefore, than there are distinct powers, though there can be fewer species than there are distinct powers; [88] (c) but there are fewer distinct types of operation in the inorganic order; [89] (d) since there cannot be more distinct powers than there are types of operation, though there can be fewer, there must be fewer distinct inanimate powers than the number of distinct vital powers; (e) hence there cannot be a larger number of inanimate substantial forms than there are souls; (f) but there cannot be only one such form because the operations proper to simple and to compound bodies are formally distinct and require diverse powers as their principles; (g) therefore, there are at least two and not more than two species of non-living substance. In this sequence, two steps are crucial, namely (c) and (f). I am not here asserting that they are true in fact, but only that they have both been traditionally accepted. The proposition that the number of species is the same as the number of substantial forms is, of course, common to this argument and to the one about souls; hence it was not repeated explicitly here. With these points noted, we are compelled to admit that this argument has the same formal cogency and necessity as the preceding one. And because of the logical relation between the two arguments,—i. e., the one about souls and this one about inanimate forms,—we must observe a striking logical consequence: if there are more than two species of non-living things, then there must be more than three souls. To put the matter more concretely: *if* there are four or more infima species of *element*, and *if*, as would then follow, there are an even larger number of infima species of *mixture*, *then* it follows inevitably that the number of infima species in the order of *living things* must be larger than the sum of these two, and the number of souls must be equal thereto.

(8) Whatever distinctions are inferior to the five species above enumerated must be *either* individual differences (i. e., numerical distinctions) *or* racial differences (i. e., distinctions having a certain *universality* because constituted by the composition of an *infima specific* subject and one or more general accidents). This last proposition is required to complete the doctrine of the first position. There is no need for elucidation of the first alternative beyond saying that individual substances (first substances, *supposita*, *hypostases*) can be numerically distinct participations in one and the same *infima* specific form. We need not be here concerned further

[88] Thus, there are only three species of soul, but five generic vital powers. Vd. *Summa Theologica*, I, 78, 1.

[89] "The forms of inanimate things, because of their imperfection, are principles of (fewer) operations" than the forms of living things (Aquinas, *In De Anima*, Bk. II, Lect. 1, # 230). Cf. *Summa Theologica*, I, 77, 2. Vd. fn. 77, *supra*.

with the problem of individuation, the role played therein by the dispositions of signate matter and the correlation between numerical distinction and the diversity of contingent accidents.[90] There is no difference between the first and second position in their treatment of individual differences within *infima* species, however the latter are constituted and enumerated. The second alternative is, for the present purposes, more important because it reveals how the first position treats what the second position calls species, i. e., forms which are inferior in universality to the five forms above enumerated. This point, therefore, deserves further elucidation.

In the first place, it is generally acknowledged,—and in this both positions agree,—that, logically speaking, there are universal forms extensionally inferior in generality to infima species, which therefore classify individuals into sub-groups of a given species. Since nothing less than a specific distinction is essential, these sub-classes must be accidentally different; but whereas individual differences, which are also accidental, are strictly numerical in the sense that there is only one thing having a given individually determined nature, these accidental differences are not numerical but universal, in the sense that more than one individual can participate in such an accidentally constituted class. This indicates how sub-specific forms are constituted: one element in their composition must be specific substantial form; the other, one or more general accidents,—the latter, of course, being contingent and not proper or necessary. So far the two positions agree, differing only as to which forms shall be treated as *infima specific,* and which as *sub-specific* universals. According to the first position, all universal forms, in the substantial order, inferior to the five, are *sub-specific.*[90a] There are several ways of naming such forms. They can be called " sub-species," " accidental concretions," " accidental classes," " varieties " or " races." We shall use all these words as formally synonymous, although the last two, as a matter of usage, are customarily employed in biological classifications exclusively.

In the second place, each infima species is, with respect to the accidental classes which divide it, a univocal and common universal. In this respect, a species stands to its sub-species, as it stands to its individuals: so far as the specific nature is concerned, every individual and each sub-species participates equally. That this must

[90] Such matters will be treated in a subsequent article dealing with the problem of generation, i. e., substantial change.

[90a] We can place such accidental concretions in the substantial order by reduction, in view of the fact that one of the two elements in their composition is a substance; just as we say that works of art, the forms of which are accidental, can be regarded as substantial in terms of their matter, which is always a substance or substances.

be the case is readily shown. A specific form is indeterminate with respect to accidental differences of all sorts, both singular and general. By the addition of singular accidents, the specific form receives an individual determination; by the addition of general accidents, it receives a sub-specific determination. These additions, however, are entirely extrinsic; they are in no sense constitutive of the specific form. Hence the specific form can be univocally common to all the individuals and sub-species which belong to it and which differ from each other by the addition of diverse accidental determinations where the specific form is indeterminate. Just as a generic accidental form, such as figure or color, is indeterminate, and therefore can subsume accidental species which differ *inter se* by adding diverse determinations thereto, so a substantial form, which is specifically or essentially determinate, can subsume subspecies because it remains determinable accidentally. The point made earlier should be remembered here, namely, that in the accidental order, the logical arrangement of universals resembles the ontological disposition of accidental forms. It applies to the present discussion of " accidental concretions."

The diagramming of the two cases is perfectly parallel, although in the one case we speak of an essential, i. e., specific, division of an accidental genus, and in the other of an accidental, i. e., sub-specific, division of a substantial species.

SPECIFIC DIVISION OF AN ACCIDENTAL GENUS




ACCIDENTAL DIVISION OF A SUBSTANTIAL SPECIES


Species (e. g., man, as accidentally indeterminate)
plus d (m)
plus d (n): " m " and " n " being general accidents
Sub-species M
(e. g., Aryan)
Sub-species N
(e. g., Negro)
plus dn (1)
plus dn (2): " 1 " and " 2 " representing singular accidents
Individual I
Individual II

In the third place, we must consider how to understand the ordering of accidental forms as higher and lower. The question applies equally to accidental species and to sub-species (accidental classes, accidental concretions) in the substantial order. There are two possibilities. One is indicated by the way in which the species of figure are ordered; the other by the way in which the species of color are ordered. In the first case, the series is discontinuous. The species of figure are discrete. That is why the comparison of the hierarchy of substantial forms with the series of figures is so apt.[91] But that also makes the series of figures anomalous in the accidental order. In the second case, that of colors, the series is continuous: taking white and black as absolute contraries, i. e., as the limits of the series, we can posit an indefinite (or potentially infinite?) number of intermediates, each of which is a species of color, more black and less white, or more white and less black, and regarded as the contrary of the more remote extreme. If we say that white is the perfection of color, then this series of accidental species is an order of less and more perfect participations in a common genus as we pass from black to white. Such a continuous series has fractional instead of unit differences, as in the case of figures. We say, therefore, that the species of color differ in degree. We cannot say the same of figures. We should note that contrariety and degree are two correlative properties of any series of accidental species which is continuous rather than discrete. In fact, they define the meaning of " continuity " in distinguishing it from " hierarchy," in which there is neither contrariety nor degree.[92]

[91] Like multitudes, figures are discrete quantities. Furthermore, as with all quantities, there are no contraries, with the possible exception of odd and even in the case of integers; but this is a very special type of contrariety, since there are no intermediate forms. One may ask, however, in what sense a quadrangle is more perfect than a triangle, and whether the circle is the limiting case, the ideal plane figure, having an infinite number of sides, which is the same as having none.

[92] The case of numbers is paradoxical. The integral numbers are, of course, ordered hierarchically, as figures are. But what modern mathematics calls the real numbers,—the series including all rational fractions and the irrationals,—constitutes a continuum, made more dense by adding the imaginary numbers. In fact, it is the prototype of all continua. Yet according to the basic analysis of quantity, every species of quantity, a fraction or an irrational number as well as an integer or a figure, is discrete and *not a contrary* of any other species. The inconsistency here is only apparent, because it is the series which is said to be continuous, and not its members. The series of real numbers is continuous in the same sense as any magnitude. There are two sorts of continua, therefore: (1) quantitative continua, as the magnitudes or the series of real numbers, which are not bounded by extremes related as contraries; (2) qualitative continua, as the color series, which are so bounded. This may be the difference between infinite and finite series, so far as the potential infinite of addition goes. Both may, of course, be infinite according to the potential infinite of division.

The question, therefore, is: supposing the sub-species or accidental classes in the substantial order to be related as higher and lower, are they constituted as a hierarchy, in the manner of figures, or as a continuum, in the manner of colors? Since the answer to this question has major dialectical relevance to the dispute between the two positions concerning species, we shall postpone further consideration of this matter until later. Suffice it here to say that even if the answer be "hierarchy" *in some sense,* the order of the sub-species must, according to the first position, be like that of triangle, quadrangle, etc., sharing in a common genus, and not like the hierarchy of substantial forms.

In the fourth place, we must note another point about the speciation of accidental forms, because it has a parallel in the case of subspecies or accidental concretions in the substantial order. Accidents can be cross-classified. There can be multiple divisions of the same accidental genus, because it may be indeterminate in a number of different respects. Hence different specifications will occur according as determinations are added to the genus with regard to this or that particular respect in which it is indeterminate. Thus, the genus color is indeterminate with respect to brightness and chroma or hue: according to the first point of indetermination, we can generate the brightness series of species of light varying by degrees from white to black; according to the second point of indetermination, we can generate the chromatic series of species of light varying by degrees from one end of the spectrum to the other. Furthermore, these two series can be combined into a third, because the genus color is also indeterminate with respect to saturation, i. e., the mixture of the achromatic and the chromatic variables. When, therefore, we consider a particular color, and ask whether it is more or less than another, the answer may be different according as we regard the same color as a species in one or another of these series. The same color must be specific in all three respects, because while the genus color is indeterminate in all three respects, no specific color,—except, perhaps, absolute black,—can exist except as determinate in all three respects. Because these determinations can be independent of one another, the same species of color can be *both* higher *and* lower than another species of color, *though not in the same respect.* In other words, the order of accidental species which constitute a continuum is multilinear rather than unilinear. Wherever such multilinear ordering results from independent determinations of a genus, a given species can be, *though need not be,* both higher and lower than another in different determinate respects.[93]

[93] Whether all series of accidental species are multilinear, whether only some are,

We are again faced with an important but difficult question: supposing the sub-species or accidental classes of substances to be related as higher and lower, are they ordered in a unilinear manner or in a multilinear manner? Making the foregoing supposition, if M and N are two sub-classes of the species man, is M always superior to N in every respect, or can M be superior to N in one or some respects, and N superior to M in another or other respects? Two conditions relevant to answering this question are clear: (1) the several sub-species are constituted either by one or by more accidental determinations being added to the specific form; if the former is the case, then unilinear ordering is necessary; if the latter, then multilinear ordering is possible; because (2) if more than one accidental determination is added, they are either independent of one another or strictly correlated; and only in the first case will the possibility of multilinearity be realized. This matter is also involved in the dialectic of the two positions, and so we shall reserve further discussion of it until later.[94]

Finally, there is the question whether each individual in the substantial order is higher or lower than another, or higher and lower than another in different respects. The point of this question is not the choice between the alternatives of unilinear and multilinear ordering,—for that choice would be the same in the case of individuals as among sub-species,—but rather whether the ordering of the sub-species, however many there are, and however many independent orders there are if more than one, is anything *over and above* the ordering, unilinear or multilinear, of the individuals in the species. There are two possibilities here: either (1) there is one (or more) ordering(s) of sub-classes in a given species, according to higher and lower, *and* within each of these sub-classes, the individuals therein subsumed are also subject to one or several such orderings; or (2) only the individuals are ordered in one or more respects as higher and lower, and the sub-species merely reflect such

whether those which are, are the continuous as opposed to the discontinuous sort of series, are questions difficult to answer without much detailed investigation. It is clear, however, that such multilinearity occurs among quantities: *figure* is indeterminate not only with respect to *number* of sides, but also on the point of *equality* of sides. A specific figure must not only be a triangle, quadrangle, etc., but also equilateral or irregular, etc.

[94] An illustration of multilinear ordering of accidental concretions is afforded by works of art. The genus here, *artificiatum*, is indeterminate with respect to the distinction between fine and useful. In one way works of art can be classified as fine or useful exclusively, i. e., according to mode of imitation and object thereof. But in another way, i. e., by relation to the recipient of the work, whether it is used or enjoyed, the same work can be both fine and useful, and one work may be superior to another, as fine, and inferior to that other, as useful.

ordering in a general way. In the latter alternative, the sub-species would be purely *arbitrary* classes, marking points in the series of individuals; whereas in the former, there would be two different sorts of series contained within a substantial species: one, a series of sub-species, either continuous or hierarchical, and either unilinear or multilinear; the other, a series of individuals, either continuous or hierarchical, and either unilinear or multilinear. This last question thus adds a final complication to the two questions already asked about the ordering of everything inferior to species. Here as before we shall postpone any further discussion, because this whole, complex discussion will take on greater significance in the light of the issue between the two doctrines about species.[95] However the question is answered, a basic point is unaltered, namely, that the infima species of substance become analogical universals when they are common to sub-species or individuals ordered as higher and lower according as they are more or less perfect participations in substantial being.[96]

One thing remains to complete our exposition of the first position. We have marked the traditional texts which *seem* to express this doctrine, more or less explicitly.[97] Can we find any modern or contemporary expressions of this same doctrine, or any indications of it? Because my knowledge of the literature is so inadequate, my answer to this question must be unsatisfactory, though it may be suggestive of other materials unknown to me.

The " neo-scholastic " text-books make one distinction which is relevant to our inquiry. In dealing with the sphere of life, they distinguish between what they call " natural species " and " system-

[95] As we shall see, this whole question bears upon the interpretation of the famous maxim that all things are disposed in number, weight and measure, or, as it is sometimes said, mode, species and order. The truth of this maxim is, of course, common to the two doctrines, but the interpretation of it, the precise application of it to the world of substances, will not be the same.

[96] Even though such ordering must be according to accidental respects, since all sub-species and individuals share equally in the specific nature, nevertheless more and less of substantial being results because a substance as it exists is the *totality* of its substantial and accidental forms, i. e., the individual nature is the *totum* comprising all the forms which inhere in *this* matter. We need not be concerned here with the problem, which occurs only in the case of man, of individual differences in the substantial order due to the created individuality of each human soul, an individuality apart from, though transcendentally related to, the disposition of the individual matter to which the soul is joined. Vd. Slavin, *The Philosophical Basis for Individual Differences, According to St. Thomas Aquinas*, Washington, 1936.

[97] I am compelled to admit that some of the points made in the foregoing exposition are in the texts quoted *less* rather than *more* explicitly. But they seem inextricably involved with what is there with maximum explicitness. The further explication is, therefore, justified.

atic species." But it is difficult to be sure that this distinction is strictly parallel to the one between infima species (i. e., true substantial forms) and their sub-species (i. e., accidental classifications, races, varieties, etc.). Sometimes, the language they use seems to point that way, and sometimes it is quite contrary in its significance. For example, Brennan defines a systematic species as a " taxonomic designation which we give to a group of animals or plants that have one or more distinctive features in common and are *inter se* fertile; " and a natural species as " the primitive group or groups from which our present systematic species, genera and families have been derived." [98] The only ground one has for supposing that the " natural species " here spoken of involve the substantial forms of *plant*, *animal* and *man*, and no more, is the fact that Brennan, in discussing evolution, maintains that animal life has not developed from plant life, nor human life from animal life in the same way that systematic species are derived from natural species or from systematic genera.[99] This is, of course, at best an oblique indication of the position that there are only three infima species of living things, i. e., natural or primitive species. It is strongly counteracted by the fact that Brennan favors the theory of polyphyletic origins in both plant and animal kingdoms, in which case *plant* and *animal* must be genera subsuming several natural,—i. e., primitive or underived,—species.

One's uncertainty is increased if one turns to another treatise which also uses the words " natural " and " systematic " as qualifying " species." According to Phillips, a " natural species will be one which differs from other things by an essential difference," whereas a systematic species is " a collection of individuals belonging to the same natural species, which have certain accidental characteristics in common, which characteristics are not found in the other members of the same natural species." [100] He goes on to say, however, that " we may not be able to distinguish more than three natural species,"—enumerating them as *plant, animal, man,*—" yet it seems not unreasonable, regarding the matter in the concrete, to say that a natural species in a general and wider sense, is a collection of individuals which preserve the same powers and the same type, by means of generation from one another." Though what

[98] Fr. R. E. Brennan, O. P., *General Psychology* (according to St. Thomas), New York, 1937: pp. 295-6. The definition here given of systematic species inadequately expresses current scientific usage, for it fails to distinguish " species " in systematic classification from " races " on the one hand, and from " genera," " families," etc., on the other. Cf. Dobzhansky, *op. cit.*, (fn. 87a, *supra*): Ch. X.

[99] Vd. *op. cit.*, pp. 312-313. Cf. pp. 72-80.

[100] Fr. R. P. Phillips, *Modern Thomistic Philosophy*, London, 1934: I, p. 341

Phillips calls a systematic species is clearly an accidental class of substances, it is difficult to know what the intermediate thing is,—that which is neither a systematic species nor a natural species, in the strictest metaphysical sense, but a natural species considered in "a general and wider sense." He gives us an example of what he means by citing reptiles and birds as natural species in the broader sense.[101] But this does not solve the question, for by the unavoidable principles which govern the question, "reptile" and "bird" must name *either* distinct substantial forms, different souls, and hence true infima species of substance; or they must name races or varieties of the infima species *animal*. There is no middle ground.[102] One further source of uncertainty in reading such writers as Phillips is the fact that they seem to have no doubt that there are many specifically distinct elements and even a larger number of specific mixtures. If they are to be understood as meaning that there are a large number of substantial forms among non-living bodies, then, as we have seen, they cannot consistently hold that there are only three souls, three "natural species" of living things.[103]

The only writer, to my knowledge, who avows principles which affiliate him with the doctrine of five substantial forms is Charles De Koninck. Although he has not published anything dealing with this problem primarily, his brilliant essay on *The Problem of Indeterminism* [104] contains passages which are directly relevant to matters we have considered. Unfortunately, they touch only on the sphere of living things explicitly.

The substantial forms of composite substances, or what De Koninck calls "cosmic" forms or essences, are intrinsically contingent,

[101] Vd. *op. cit.*, p. 340.

[102] It should be noted, furthermore, that Phillips' broader conception of "natural species" seems to concur with Brennan's conception of "systematic species" in one important point, namely, constancy of type in generation. It is also interesting that Phillips should quote with approval the remark of J. Guilbert in *Les Origines* that "however difficult the problem of the origin of species may be, it is without doubt more accessible than that of the distinction of essences" (*op. cit.*, p. 343). But how the former problem could be solved without a prior solution of the latter is, indeed, a question. Is it not amazing how many authors are willing to discuss the origin of species,—problems of evolution and transformism,—without first answering definitely questions about the constitution, order and number of substantial species, in the strictest sense; or failing to do that, without suspending judgment on the posterior questions.

[103] Vd. Phillips, *op. cit.*, Pt. I, esp. Ch. 11.

[104] *Le Problème de L'Indéterminisme*, Québec, 1937 (Extrait des rapports de la Sixième Session (1935), de L'Académie Canadienne Saint-Thomas d'Aquin). This essay appeared in approximately the same form, under the title, *Réflexions sur le Problème de L'Indéterminisme*, in the Revue Thomiste, XLIII, Nos. 2 and 3 (1937): see esp. No. 2, pp. 233-241.

he points out, not because they are forms received in matter, but because such a form " is not sufficiently determined in itself. Moreover, it is the absence of complete determination, and the incapacity for self-individuation which call for matter, and which are the last cause of the essential complexity of *entia mobilia*." [105] The fact that substantial forms do not exist except under the additional accidental determinations which are needed to constitute sub-specific varieties and individual differences, is the mark of their contingency. They are indeterminate with respect to accidental notes, just as an accidental genus, such as figure, is indeterminate with respect to specific notes; and just as figure as such cannot exist, but only triangle, so no substantial form exists as such.

De Koninck then distinguishes between angelic forms, which are determinate species able to exist as such, the natural absolute species which are indeterminate with respect to accidents and cannot exist apart from such determination, and what he calls varieties or sub-species which add accidental determinations to the specific forms. If I understand him aright, the last two items are strictly equivalent to what we have so far called substantial forms and accidental concretions, or accidental classes, in the substantial order.[106] " Two proximate angelic forms are infinitely close in that they admit no intermediary species; they are also infinitely distant in that a transition from one species to the other is impossible, for they do not communicate in a physical genus; they are absolutely heterogeneous. The natural sub-species, on the contrary, are infinitely close by reason of their natural common genus; but also infinitely distant because of the real possibility of an infinity of other intermediary sub-species. Thus, the vegetable kingdom has no absolute extreme limits. Between the most perfect plants that exist and the lowest animals, there is a possibility of an infinity of plants more perfect and of animals less perfect, even if that infinity is impossible from the point of view of existence. The natural species ought to be conceived as zones of probability. No particular natural or individual form is the absolute type of its natural species. " Dog " and " carrot " are statistical entities like " the French " and " the English." They do not, any or all of them, exhaust the essence of their class." [107]

[105] *Op. cit.*, p. 123.

[106] " By existing varieties I mean the sub-species comprised in the limits of the natural absolute species. Note, moreover, that a sub-species which constitutes in fact a limit of a natural species, is never the absolute limit of that natural species. It tends toward a limit which is found at the infinite " (*op. cit.*, p. 125, fn.).

[107] *Op. cit.*, p. 126. He adds parenthetically: " That is why racism which erects

What De Koninck calls the absolute species are ordered hierarchically, but within each sphere of the hierarchy,—which, because of the intrinsic indetermination and contingency of these forms, is a zone of probability,—there is a continuum of sub-species, varieties, or races which are only "statistical entities." There can be little doubt, therefore, that he is affirming the thesis that only *plant*, *animal*, and *man* differ essentially (i. e., are truly species), and that all inferior forms differ accidentally and by degrees, hence cannot be species in the strict sense of the word. In view of the general principles of De Koninck's analysis, there is as little reason to doubt that he would treat *element* and *mixture* in the same way.[107a]

The further implications of his analysis go deeply into such problems as the ordering of the sub-species, the relation of individual differences to sub-specific variation, the relation of continuity and hierarchy in the world of sensible things, and the significance of the contingency intrinsic to species for the dynamism of the physical order as a whole, for its process in time, for the maturation of the world, or evolution, as it is called. But these matters, as we have already seen, are relevant to the dialectical exploration of the issue between the two doctrines concerning the nature and number of species, by way of examining their consequences for other questions in the philosophy of nature. We shall reserve discussion of De Koninck's further points until later, and turn now to an exposition of the opposing theory.

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*(To be continued)*

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nations into absolute entities, and its contrary, atomism, are forms of determinism. The satirical poet has reason to say

> 'All men are fools, and for all their care and stress,
> They only differ each from each as one is more or less.'

The reasonable man is also only a statistical entity." Racism, it appears, is the double error of mistaking an accidental class for a species, and then of regarding that species as perfectly determinate.

[107a] One passage in the article in the Revue Thomiste suggests that DeKoninck views the hierarchy of nature as constituted by four rather than five grades. "The natural species, which are quasi-genera in relation to the sub-species, are certain *a priori*, because they constitute irreducible degrees of being: there is nothing intermediary between 'being,' 'living,' 'cognizing,' and 'understanding'" (*loc. cit.*, No. 2; p. 234).

**EDITORS' NOTE: We append Dr. Adler's outline of the complete problem and its investigation. Sub-headings 1-13 were covered in the First Installment (April 1939 issue). The present (Second) installment covers sub-headings 14 and 15.**

## THE PROBLEM OF SPECIES

### Outline

I. Introduction

1. The series of articles projected: nature of philosophical *problems*
2. Significance of problems *for Thomists*
3. The limited scope of the first article as dealing with the problem of species: its locus in the philosophy of nature, and its relation to other departments of philosophy
4. Outline of the article in its main divisions.

II. Antecedent Principles

5. Preliminary statement: why these principles must be stated to formulate the problem
6. } Three metaphysical principles, *directly* relevant
7. }
8. }
9. Transition to other principles relevant only *tangentially*
10. Logical and epistemological considerations: their discussion
11. Indicates why a separate section must be devoted to the theory of our knowledge of species.

III. Epistemological Dimension of the Problem

12. Exposition of 4 answers to the question: how many substantial species do we know adequately (by real definitions)?
    a. The position of Rousselot: none
    b. The position of Maritain and Garrigou-Lagrange: one
    c. The position of the decadent scholastics: a very large number
    d. The fourth position: five
13. Dialectical summary of the opposition of these four doctrines, which leads to the discovery that the epistemological issue cannot be resolved at all unless the ontological problem of species can be independently solved.

IV. Exposition of the Problem in the Philosophy of Nature

14. Preliminary statement of the issue as constituted by two positions, i.e., two answers to questions concerning the order and number of substantial species
15. Exposition of the first position
    1. Capital texts from Aristotle and St. Thomas
        a. Texts in re: the order of species
        b. Texts in re: the species of living things
        c. Texts in re: the species of non-living things
    2. Propositional summary and analytical explication of the doctrine contained in these texts
        a. Five propositions concerning the constitution and order of species
        b. Two propositions concerning the number of species
        c. One proposition concerning infra-specific distinctions
    3. Texts from contemporary writers in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas, which *appear* to take this first position

16. Exposition of the second position
    1. Capital texts from Aristotle and St. Thomas
        a. Texts in re: the species of non-living things
        b. Texts in re: the species of living things
        c. Texts in re: the order of species
    2. Propositional summary and analytical explication of the doctrine contained in these texts
    3. Texts from contemporary writers in the tradition of Aristotle and St. Thomas, which *appear* to take this second position
17. Comparison of the two positions
    1. What is common to the two positions
    2. Wherein they differ principally
    3. Why no third position is possible
    4. The dialectical possibilities: either one doctrine is true and the other is false; or some reconciliation of the two is possible by an equivocal use of the word "species."

V. The Dialectic of the Issue

18. Preliminary statement of the dialectical procedure
19. Objections to the second position, with answers so far as possible
20. Objections to the first position, with answers so far as possible
21. Consequences of this dialectic for the epistemological dimension of the problem
22. Consequences of this dialectic for other problems in the philosophy of nature (e. g., evolution, continuity and hierarchy, etc.)
23. Indication of two possible reconciliations, and why we shall attempt one of these as a tentative resolution of the problem.

VI. Hypothetical Resolution of the Issue

24. The principle of the reconciliation: its formulation
25. Consequences of the reconciliation
    a. For the epistemological aspect of the problem
    b. For other problems in the philosophy of nature.

VII. Conclusion

26. Review of the entire argument with a view to determining whether the problem is genuine or false, if genuine whether a mystery or solvable, etc.
27. Transition to the second article on the problem of substantial change, with a note on how that problem is affected by this first one about species.

# EDITORIAL NOTES

We are looking forward with some eagerness to the reception of the article by Father Kane which appears in this issue. The impression it will make on non-professional philosophers, and even on the professionals who have not enjoyed an intimacy with the text of the *Summa Theologica* of St. Thomas, will be of particular interest.

* * *

The austere clarity and economic profundity of that famous work has long been a byword, indeed a frightening byword. Little has been said of the simple beauty of St. Thomas' text, a beauty which makes each page a guileless child's face solemnly and wisely scanning the parade of the centuries. Those familiar with the *Summa* have seen and gloried in its aptly mysterious majesty that gives the great book entry into all ages with something of the divine right of a richly simple gown which wins acceptance without challenge alike in the dwellings of beggars and princes. Father Kane, molding an article in the form of the articles of the *Summa*, has somehow caught that aura of guileless, limpid innocence of language, of simple beauty. But, like that of the text of Thomas, this innocence is not that of inexperience nor is the simplicity poverty's shamefaced best.

* * *

A tired philosopher in a recent number of a philosophical journal notes thankfully that philosophers have not ceased their interest in life. The expression is enveloped in the frail wrapping of a sigh of relief: the patient may be low, but at least he is not yet dead.

* * *

That intimacy of philosophy and life was given splendid emphasis in the majestic presidential address of R. T. Flewelling to the Pacific Division of the American Philosophical Association when he said: " To the wise man in search of reality nothing human can be alien."

* * *

So it has always been, so must it always be. Philosophy is to be found where men are living human lives humanly. If we may do so without irreverence, we might make a comparison with a friendly mastiff that hesitates to stir from its warm corner when the family goes from the room. But soon, regretfully perhaps, with a lazy stretch, it follows after and curls up again in the very midst of the group. But philosophy is no family hanger-on, not even a loved hanger-on with the privileges of a pet of the

human family. It is not kept alive and cared for by men for sentimental reasons. When it lags behind it has given up its claim to the name philosophy. By its very nature it is a leader, a trail-breaker, preceding every man's every step—for men's steps go no farther than their heart's drive and the heart must not step ahead of the mind. Philosophy has no business carrying on without men; men have no chance of carrying on without philosophy.

* * *

It is a peculiar blindness, then, that looks for philosophy only in textbooks, learned journals or classrooms. It is indeed a blindness that ultimately forgets the very features of philosophy and allows the former philosopher to become dodderingly content with the quiet peace of his playroom and the ready acquiescence of his toys.

* * *

All this is by way of saying that American life is bristling with challenges to philosophic wars. The tension has gone far beyond anything comparable in the political situations of the world; further compromise has become impossible and open warfare must flare up.

* * *

We are immersed in crises; and the realization of the fact brings a smile of anticipation to the lover of truth. A war in the world of philosophy is a splendid thing. After each battle the field is strewn with the corpses of error, for in this fighting only the errors are liable to destruction. When night falls it is only the sentimentally proud who slip out to bury the dead with tears, or to bind up the gaping wounds of a beloved error.

* * *

To take but one example, there is the matter of education. The fight here has been smouldering for a long time. There has been some name-calling in the worst philosophical tradition. But finally the gage has been thrown down, the issues sharply defined and shown to revolve around contrary conceptions of the nature of knowledge and the nature of man.

* * *

The significance of such a battle for philosophy is apparent. On that ground alone, its significance for life is momentous. Unfortunately philosophy has too long been a sluggard; the minds and hearts of men have run on ahead, hotly pursuing a mirage that destroys both wisdom and men. By now the issue is already a matter of concrete living: of intellectual development or stagnation, of liberty's discipline or libertinism's slavery, of the ideals of independent thought or indoctrination's destruction of the capacity for thought.

* * *

These are issues worthy of a philosophical duel to the death, whether in a philosophical journal or on a street corner. But to date there has been no philosophical fight; yet every moment of delay only increases the ominous possibilities involved in a peace without honor. Indeed it begins to appear that there may never be a philosophical war on these issues at all. There is little more tragic that could be said of American philosophy.

Perhaps this is, after all, too tragic to be more than poor prophecy. At least up to the present we have had no more than a burlesque of a duel in which one party hurls ideas which the other parries with myths or tools, the while complaining of the unfairness of a method of fighting which was not developed in our own day. In the final analysis the crisis comes to this: unless there are philosophers enlisted on both sides, equipped with philosophical armament, there is no more chance of a decisive engagement than there is between an eagle and a termite. Yet it is desperately important for the living of human life that this battle be fought, and to a finish.

Travel undoubtedly broadens a man; but it is no less true that travel kindles the fires of patriotism to an intense degree, perhaps because to appreciate things we must be able to see them, and we can see them only by being apart from them. So a man can laugh at himself, or even philosophize about himself, because in a real sense he can step aside and look at himself. To regain that "old fresh view" of the world and of men, there is nothing like stepping out of the world of nature and looking down on it from the world of the supernatural.

Theology's contribution to this profoundly wise, thoroughly appreciative insight into mankind is strikingly illustrated by two articles in the most recent numbers of the *Revue Thomiste*. Side by side with a penetrating study of the mystery of sin is a no less keen scrutiny of the Queen of Heaven's title to royalty. Both articles are splendid specimens of clear, complete, profound, and, in a sense, ruthless thinking; but the ruthlessnes is only that strong love of truth that does not confuse respect or kindness with sentimentality. Here are the heights and depths; and so here is to be found the fullest understanding of the level places. Man can lay claim to a share in royalty or slavery; and it is only in understanding this that we can appreciate the breathless battle each man must make for his own freedom. It is by seeing clearly that both sinners and saints crowded about Christ that we can face the paradox of high heroism and bitter surrender that jostle each other constantly in the lives of the tremendous majority of men who are neither great sinners nor great saints.

# BOOK REVIEWS

*The Journals of Soren Kierkegaard.* A Selection Edited and Translated by Alexander Dru. London: Oxford University Press, 1938. Pp. lxi, 603.

"I mentioned as perhaps the greatest of difficulties in the approach to Kierkegaard that twofold complexity which is due to the fusion at every stage of the work with the person—and moreover with an extraordinary and exceptional person."

"The being and essence of the person are the elements which Kierkegaard brought into philosophy, staking, one might say, his own personality."

The truth of these two statements, from the essay on Soren Kierkegaard by Theodor Haecker, published by the Oxford University Press in 1937, suggests the wisdom of that house's present choice in publishing the Journals as the first substantial introduction of Kierkegaard's writings to English-speaking readers. It follows a full length biography by Dr. Walter Lowrie, published in 1937, and *Philosophical Fragments*, one of the smaller works, published earlier in 1938.

*The Journals*, consisting of the translator's selections from a much larger work, is a book of nearly 600 large octavo pages and covers the whole of Kierkegaard's life as an author. It covers also the whole range of his thought in the form of reflections on the ideas developed in his very considerable philosophical and theological works, on the recurring crises in his career as an author, on his own relationship to his work, to his readers, and, in his work and life, to God.

But the word "reflections" must not suggest detachment from the spiritual issues with which he was concerned. His attitude towards the matters of which he wrote is shown from the following entry,

(1110) Christianity is as good as done away with. But first a poet's heart must break, or a poet must be torn in two in such a way as to close the way to all deceptions.

That is the check; and in our limited sphere that is my task.

and in the works themselves,

(988) The moment I take Christianity as a doctrine and so indulge my cleverness or profundity or my eloquence or my imaginative powers in depicting it: people are very pleased; I am looked upon as a serious Christian.

The moment I begin to express existentially what I say, and consequently to bring Christianity into reality: it is just as though I had exploded existence—the *scandal* is there at once.

For him "to express existentially" was more than a matter of literary style, it was indeed to stake his personality on the truth he expressed and

to back his work with his life. The effort led him into complexities of spiritual conflict which the Journals labour to unravel. It led his thought to a depth unparalleled in modern philosophy into the problem of human personality and its theological implications. In addition, no one, perhaps, has expressed more acutely the tension between the power of genius and supernatural grace in the Christian: a tension which reaches contradiction in the quotation from *The Concept of Dread* made by Alexander Dru at the beginning of his introduction:

> That such an existence as genius, in spite of its brilliance, magnificence and importance, should be sin, it certainly requires courage to understand; and one can hardly understand it at all until one has learnt to moderate the hungry longings of the soul.

This profound conflict was fought out over an increasing faith that " Every best gift and every perfect gift is from above, coming down from the Father of lights, with whom there is no change, nor shadow of alteration."

For such a nature, as Haecker points out, to doubt the existence of God was a contingency which could never arise. But the more terrible temptation, to doubt the truth of the Scripture that God is Love, haunted him from his childhood, in which " inborn dread " was combined with an irresistible attraction to Christianity in its most uncompromising form. The circumstances of this childhood are revealed in many passages of the Journals. He wrote that " everyone is essentially what they are to be when they are ten years old." From the biographical elements in the Journals it is evident that by that age the knot was already tied which could only be undone by the surrender of his whole existence to the grace of God.

> (681) In a certain sense my whole misfortune lies in this: had I not had means it would never have been possible for me to preserve the terrible secret of my melancholy. (Merciful God, my father too was terribly unjust to me in his melancholy—an old man who put the whole weight of his melancholy upon a child, not to speak of something even more frightful, and yet for all that he was the best of fathers.) But then I should never have become the man I have become. I should have been *compelled* either to go mad or to break through. As it is I have succeeded in making a *salto mortale* into a purely spiritual existence. But then again in that way I have become completely heterogeneous from mankind in general. What I really lack is the physical side and all the assumptions that go with it.

To this very revealing and compendious entry the developments of his thought will be referred later. His life, says the translator, was a progression from inborn dread to faith.

His difficult legacy as a philosopher is described by the group of words associated with his name: " the existential," " subjectivity," " the individual "; and, on the margins of his thought and life and inseparably connected with both, by his conceptions of " genius " and " the excep-

tional." That this legacy has been fruitful is evidenced in new directions given to modern German thought, where, with Professor Jaspers of Heidelberg, the existential becomes the principle of a philosophical system (hardly, one would think, what Kierkegaard most desired) and the theologians of the Barthian school number Kierkegaard among the ancestors of present-day Protestantism together with such figures as Irenaeus, Augustine, Luther.

Brought up in the dialectic of Hegel—it was the current intellectual regimen of his age in Copenhagen as it was in Berlin for Karl Marx—Kierkegaard wrote truly that " dialectic is the essential qualification of my nature." But if for him his " very being is dialectic," it is a dialectic which demands to come to rest in what is beyond dialectics. The whole entry (1278) is worth quoting as expressing what dialectic meant for his life:

*Either-Or*

That is what I was called at the time. What a series of definitions of the interpretation of my Or I have already run through!

I showed marriage as Or, but it was not my life's Or, I lie far further away from that Either. That Either means the enjoyment of life in its most unbridled sense. There lie all the intermediary stages: enjoyment but with an addition of ethics. But this is not my Or. Then comes: enjoyment with an ethical-religious addition; but it is still not my Or.

So there is only one Or left: suffering, self-denial, religiously to become less than nothing in this world.

If I am a genuine dialectician, if my very being is dialectic, then I should only find peace in the last Or, not in any intermediate Or; for it is only by coming to rest in the last Or that one has exhausted: Either-Or.

Elsewhere he says (900) " In one way or another dialectic always ends in pathos " and he adduces a humorous example of " the necessary knot which had to be tied in the dialectical thread." Without the knotted thread dialectic has no hold on reality. So his most splendid intolerance is for the dialectical system which poses as reality or indeed, as in Hegel, as the self-knowledge of God.

In one aspect his thought is a process of growing out of Hegel: from the early entries (185) " Those who have got beyond Hegel are like the people living in the country who have always to address their letters *via* a big town " and (286) " Verily, we do not need Hegel to tell us that relative contradictions can be mediated . . . personality will protest in all eternity against the proposition that absolute contradictions can be mediated " to the fine scorn of his mature mind in (1323) " There were philosophers even before Hegel who took it upon themselves to explain existence, history. And it is true of all such attempts that providence can only smile at them. . . . But Hegel! . . . A miserable don like that who had seen

through the necessity of everything and got the whole thing off by heart: ye Gods! " But unlike Marx, whose boast that he had turned Hegel upside down and so put his feet to the ground and his head where it ought to be revealed that he was still imprisoned in a logic posing as reality, Kierkegaard in growing out of Hegel really reached beyond.

Immediacy in the life of the senses and the practical life is the one non-dialectical pole from which thought begins. At the other pole dialectic is left behind in silent adoration of God Who reveals Himself not with the negative attributes of natural theology but as all-compelling Love. In thought as in living we must reach through to the ultimate dialectical question, and it is a fatal error to abandon dialectic too soon. In another context he called himself the genius of reflection, and it is precisely the combination of immediacy with powerful dialectic skill which gives to his genius its strength and profundity, though for him immediacy is always *after* reflection.

His main philosophical ideas may best be approached by considering first three important extracts:

(712) The fundamental error of modern times (which runs into logic, metaphysics, dogmatics, and the whole of modern life) lies in the fact that the yawning abyss of quality in the difference between God and man has been removed. The result in dogmatic theology (from logic and metaphysics) is a mockery of God such as was unknown in paganism (for paganism knew what it meant to mock God, and that is exactly what is forgotten in our day in that theocentric doctrine), and in ethics an impertinent indifference, or better still the complete absence of ethics.

A careful paragraph (1027) goes on to analyse the philosophical basis of this criticism:

What confuses the whole doctrine about " being " in logic is that people do not notice that they are always operating with the " concept " existence. But the *concept* existence is an ideality and the difficulty is, of course, whether existence can be reduced to a concept. So that Spinoza may be right: *essentia involvit existentiam*, namely conceptual existence, i.e. ideal existence. . . . In ideal relationships it is always true that *essentia* is *existentia*—if one may use the concept *existentia* at all in that case. Leibnitz's proposition that: if God is possible he is necessary, is perfectly correct. Nothing is added to a concept whether it has existence or not; that is a matter of complete indifference; it has got existence, i.e. conceptual existence, ideal existence.

But existence corresponds to the individual thing, the individual, which even Aristotle teaches lies outside, or at least cannot be reduced to a concept. For an individual animal, plant, or man, existence (to be or not to be) is of quite decisive importance; an individual man has not after all a conceptual existence. The way in which modern philosophy talks about existence shows that it does not believe in the individual's immortality; it does not believe at all, it merely conceives the " concept " eternity.

And on the relationship of conceptual to real existence:

(1054) "Reality" cannot be conceived. . . . To conceive reality is to reduce it to *possibility*—but in that case it is impossible to conceive it, because to conceive it is to reduce it to possibility, and consequently not to hold fast to it as reality. Compared with reality to conceive is a step backwards and not progress. Not as though "reality" were not conceivable; not at all, no, the concept which results from reducing it to possibility by conceiving it is also in reality, but there is something more—that it is reality. To go from possibility to reality is a progress (except in relation to evil), to go from reality to possibility is a step backwards.

But the unhappy confusion is due to the fact that in the modern world "reality" has been included in logic and thus in distraction it is forgotten that "reality" in logic is only a "reality which is thought" i. e. possibility.

The apparent strangeness of the last quotation will be discussed later. In the meantime Kierkegaard is increasingly insistent on the real distinction between essence and existence, a distinction which the "ontological" proof of God's existence, profoundly misunderstands. But his thought, however full of food it is for the metaphysician, does not proceed to a systematical metaphysic for two reasons: because he lacked the explicit principle of analogy, and because his real concern was that it should proceed to "silent adoration" in which alone it could come to rest. Nevertheless nothing is further from Kierkegaard than that univocal conception of being which eliminates the hierarchy of existence by equating the *esse* of metaphysics with the *esse* of logic. Indeed he says, "Everything depends on making the difference between quantitative and qualitative dialectic absolute. The whole of logic is quantitative or modal dialectic, since everything is and everything is one and the same. Qualitative dialectic is concerned with existence." And qualitative dialectic here is metaphysic as really distinct from logic.

St. Thomas, it may be noted, equally rejects from the consideration of metaphysics the *esse univocum* of logic. "Being" is an analogical concept. It is the known-unknown which, while it indicates to the mind a similarity proportionately realised in different orders of reality, nevertheless is *realised* in ways *simpliciter diversa, secundum quid eadem.* Analogy is the objective presupposition of the metaphysician's respect for reality and the intrinsic hierarchy of existence. If Kierkegaard is concerned for the subjective presuppositions of this respect, the respect is for the same reality. As against the "Don," his personation of the idealist philosopher whose one concern is to enclose the whole of reality within the competence of his dialectic and his explanations, he fights the same battle from a different front.

Reality always holds something that is beyond thought, something which thought grasps in grasping reality, but cannot penetrate—the individuality of its own existence. The essence conceived in the mind is in possibility towards that real existence. In *Philosophical Fragments,* Kierkegaard

rejects a distinction which would indubitably have helped his thought and would have kept it in closer continuity with the *philosophia perennis:* the distinction, namely, that possibility is of two kinds, absolute possibility (*per convenientiam terminorum*) and possibility which includes the power to become. To analyse the entry in the Journals which has been quoted, we may say that art, science, poetry, have to do with the first, with possibility " in the sense of ideal reality." It is ethics and religion which have to do with the second, and here the " power to become " does not lie in man but is given by God. So soon as the progress from possibility to reality is mentioned Kierkegaard is at once thinking ethically. He is indeed thinking ethically all the time in so far as he is thinking of the whole man as a personal reality in relationship with other realities and always, dominantly, in relationship with the reality of God.

This peculiarity of his thought is precisely his difficulty, and it is the whole of his lesson. If he rounds very severely on the idealists for explaining away existence, it is by no means his task to explain *away* what Haecker calls " the world of ideas." He rebukes Hegel because as soon as he knows a thing he has done with it. He rebukes the pantheistic and irreligious " scientism " of the dons, not because science is to be explained away as worthless (though in another context he marks down the use of intelligence as a debit entry in the spiritual life) but because he is concerned with the whole man while the don relegates everything to a mental attic.

He does not dispute the truth of intellectual knowledge, though he says more than once " the fight is against intelligence." He is concerned for what may be called the " reality " of thought, which is, psychologically, quite another kettle of fish than the agreement of propositions. The reality of knowledge presupposes its truth. But it adds to truth what was necessary to call attention from the desiccated truth of dialectics—where the thinker is superior to his thought in which he masters an aspect of reality—to existence as the God-given fulness of reality. This " reality " he presents as subjectivity.

He says in one place, " The curious thing is: that there is a ' how ' which has this quality, that if *it* is truly given, then the ' what ' is also given; and that is the ' how ' of ' faith ' ";—a proposition which can be verified only on condition that the " how " in question is real assent to the authority of God revealing. Kierkegaard's " subjectivity " is in fact developed against a background of authority; and authority, though he did not pursue its implications—and still less its ecclesiastical implications—to the end, is the presupposition of his often paradoxical utterances concerning faith. The focus and proper sphere of his thought is " in subjectivity " in relationship with God as " infinite compelling subjectivity." That is the total relationship of a person to a Person. He could not consider God as an " object " of thought on the analogy of a mere thing.

In effect his thought is in a true sense infinitely more objective than a mere subjectivism. What is vulgarly called the " protestant principle of private judgment " in matters of faith would have appalled him. He says " truth lies in subjectivity." The context of the phrase is as follows:

> The most objective truth which is necessarily and universally true for everyone and for the whole of creation, the truth that God exists, is given to you—to *you* in the most emphatic sense of the word—most safely hidden by the most subjective truth which in all the immensity of the creation is *only* valid for you, which you can communicate to no one except to God alone, and which remains for all eternity a secret between you and God and which you can only communicate to God because it was he who first communicated it to you in your conscience. Truth lies in subjectivity.

and this also explains how the quotation is consistent with entry 809 in the Journals:

> The communication of Christianity must ultimately end in " bearing witness," the maieutic form can never be final. For truth, from the Christian point of view, does not lie in the subject (as Socrates understood it) but in a revelation which must be proclaimed.

The reconciliation of the above passages is in his own words " inwardness at its maximum proving to be objectivity once again," but it can prove to be objectivity only because the revelation of Christ is really objective and is really given, and because the inwardness of real assent is the condition of our really receiving *that.*

His philosophical thought directs attention away from the construction of systems to the penetration in depth of the God-given fact of existence. To penetrate in depth the structure of human personality is not an affair of intelligence alone. He says, " In order to put an end to subjectivity, in so far as it is untruth we must . . . go right through to the individual—before God." The context of this statement is the rejection of a plea for greater objectivity in thought put forward by the upholders of the natural sciences; and it would be well at this stage to examine further what in Kierkegaard the words objectivity-subjectivity really mean.

The meaning of " objectivity " varies as he accepts for analysis the meaning given to it by his contemporaries, uses it with his contemporaries in mind—and so polemically—or as he uses it in quiet reflection, moulding his thought upon reality without distraction. What his contemporaries meant by objectivity was something very different from what Thomist tradition means by the word. The mysterious phrase used by the nominalist Barthians that God must be objectified in order to be brought in relationship with thought, the view that to be an object of thought is a derogation of the divine majesty, is in direct continuity with that " objectivity " which Kierkegaard opposed, and echoes his opposition. In so far

God is " objectified " He is included in a concept, brought into intrinsic relation with other concepts, and becomes part of the mental universe. So the yawning abyss of quality between God and the world is disregarded.

The true objectivity of St. Thomas's natural theology, for whom the natural relation of reason to the divine is summed up in the proposition that we know of God *that* He exists but not *what* He is; the mind's awe of the divine reality expressed in the principle of analogy, in the *via remotionis* and the *via eminentiae,* through which we may attain a true natural theodicy but on condition that the perfections we affirm are analogical, that is, that they are perfections of being, as such, identified in the divine reality in a way utterly beyond our comprehension because proportioned to the divine *reality*—but nevertheless truly identified and truly proportioned—all this was obscured by a false theory of knowledge. Where knowledge is the construction and manipulation of ideal reality " the whole concept of objectivity, which has been made into our salvation, is merely the food of sickness."

What then did Kierkegaard do? He insisted, with a force which has attached the word " existential " permanently to his memory, on the real distinction of essence and existence. It is rather more than a coincidence, perhaps, and there is at least symbolic significance in the fact, that one of the earliest works of St. Thomas should be the *De Ente et Essentia*—with this note in the first sentence, that a small mistake in the beginning is a great error at the end. If the point of agreement were not so profound we might say that it ends there. For while this *veritas fundamentalis* is for St. Thomas at the foundations of a philosophy and a guiding principle of his theology, for Kierkegaard it is the foundation of his approach to the Christian life, and philosophy and theology in so far as these are " sciences " may save themselves if they can.

It must not be forgotten, however, that Kierkegaard wrote in awareness of the historical predicament of his age, and the philosophy of the dons was, in his time, hardly to be brought to its knees before God by merely being provided with an architectonic principle which the don would proceed to add to his lecture. He was keenly aware that his time, his vocation, his exceptional relationship with God, called him to sanctity as something opposed to professorship in anything that that could mean for the 19th century. " Here is another aspect of the fundamental mistake," he wrote, " that Christianity is proclaimed by teachers and not by witnesses." And we could not say of St. Thomas, remembering that in him the quality of saint dominates that of theologian, that he would have taught in the same manner as he did in Paris of the 13th century if he had been born in Copenhagen in 1813.

For no one would it be a greater injustice to separate his thought from his historical vocation than for Kierkegaard. The translator notes that

" he worked as a ' corrective ' and not to supply ready made results." How could he show the way back to reality and to God to a Christendom sunk in mediocrity and in a philosophy which made Creation irrelevant by deducing historical reality from its abstract ideas? By himself, in the measure of the grace given him by God, representing the historical, the existential, as a witness so that his life would " cry out after his death " and not merely his writings stimulate the interest of philosophers. That was how the question presented itself to him, and that was how he answered it.

The evil he attacked was the whole attitude of mind of his generation towards reality and *a fortiori* towards God. This attitude of mind was represented in the objectivity he opposed, and it is important to remember that the " subjectivity " with which he countered it was an historical rather than a speculative remedy. " A mind so gravely realistic," wrote the late Dr. H. R. Mackintosh (Types of Modern Theology), " could never have been touched or tempted by the subjectivity of ' religion without an object.' On the other hand, two prominent forms of so-called objective thinking in religion awakened his bitter and scornful censure. One is the cold and futile objectiveness of speculative divinity,[1] which dissolves the Gospel in ideas,[2] rejects the unique Incarnation of God in Christ, robs men thus of a commanding spiritual authority, and shirks the imperative duty of calling upon them to make up their minds for God. This is the unpardonable sin of thinking dispassionately about God and eternity. The other is the tepid objectiveness of conventional Churchmanship, which lives at peace with the world, atrophies the sense for spiritual heroism, and displaces personal concern about salvation by decent or prosperous membership of an institution. When Kierkegaard said that truth is subjectivity, then, he bade men recollect that personal Christianity without *decision* is nothing better than a phrase."

" Under the guise of objectivity," says Kierkegaard himself, " people have wished to sacrifice individualities completely. That is the whole question." He rebukes elsewhere the pantheistic scientific attitude of the Dons. The objectivity it claims eliminates the individual. It can speculate detachedly about ethics but it cannot act, because the individual loses himself in it as in a drunken dream. The depths of his personality are untouched and truth does not *exist* in him. So Kierkegaard's decisive answer to idealistic pantheism posing as Christian theology is ethical and is

[1] Dr. Mackintosh is speaking here of the post-Hegelian German theologians, and of Hegelianism he notes that " with its serene objectivity and optimistic acceptance of the actual (it) is the worst possible framework in which authentic Christian belief can be set. Hegel stood for . . . the exclusive supremacy of the so-called creative reason of man."

[2] Hegel, the author points out, strove to deduce religion from immanent principles of cognition.

backed by his life. He writes, "Kant held that man was his own law (autonomy) i. e. bound himself under the law which he gave himself. In a deeper sense that means to say: lawlessness or experimentation. It is no harder than the thwacks which Sancha Panza applied to his own bottom." And from the experience of his own spiritual struggle he adds, "If during the whole course of his life a man never acts in so decisive a way that the educator can get a hold on him: well, then the man is certainly allowed to live on complacently in a state of illusion, imagination, experimentation— but that also connotes: the greatest lack of grace." And here is the force of his repeated imperative "We must go right through to the individual—the individual before God." It is precisely in acting decisively in the presence of God that the individual lets reality get a hold on him.

For Kierkegaard, subjectivity and personality are inseparable, and the thinking subject is not merely an empty house in which the birds of thought come home to roost; as the person it is that which is most intimately proportioned to the act of existence. When he speaks of God as infinite compelling subjectivity he speaks of one in whom essence and existence are eternal act; from Whom in Christ we have the revelation of His holiness and love, and from whom we have also the existence in which His revelation and His grace are received. The process of thought in Kierkegaard does not, as Haecker points out, go from things over the person of the thinker, as an empty centre of reference, to things again, but from a Person over things to a person, and this communication from God to man compels the return from man to God. Where this communication is halted as by a short circuit in the idealistic philosophy of his time then "personality will protest in eternity." An illuminating instance of this whole movement of his thought is:

(1051) The most tremendous thing which has been granted to man is: the choice, freedom. And if you desire to save it and preserve it there is only one way: in the very same second unconditionally and in complete resignation to give it back to God, and yourself with it. If the sight of what is granted to you tempts you, and if you give way to the temptation and look with egoistic desire upon the freedom of choice, then you lose your freedom. And your punishment is: to go on in a kind of confusion priding yourself on having freedom of choice, but woe upon you, that is your judgment: You still have freedom of choice, you say, and still you have not chosen God. Then you will grow ill, freedom of choice will become your *idée fixe,* till at last you will be like the rich man who imagines that he is poor, and will die of want. . . ."

In his life he was aware that he must co-operate with the grace of Christ to achieve his eternal salvation through his exceptional vocation as a writer and, not to mince words, as a genius. He wrote and lived in the presence of God, and he demanded of philosophical and theological thought in

Christendom that it should, in the context of the Christian revelation of Christ's atonement, be a serious occupation before God. With whatever fell short of such seriousness he showed no mercy.

So far the attempt has been made to expound some aspects of Kierkegaard's thought from the book under review in constant reference to a Thomist framework of ideas. The result would be wholly misleading if the sometimes precarious correspondences were not offset by contrasts which are often violent. Nevertheless it was necessary that the attempt should be made, for otherwise it would be impossible to show from the writer's more characteristically paradoxical passages that his thought has any connexion with or contribution to the *philosophia perennis*. Kierkegaard has more in keeping with St. Augustine than St. Thomas, and in many respects his model is Tertullian.

What I have called his metaphysic—his "qualitative dialectic"—has been described by H. R. Mackintosh as "the sustained effort to bring out absolute distinctions, each aspect of which calls the other in question." This is not a logical game. Its deeper and truer quality is dramatic. Indeed the dramatic qualities of his thought go deeper than the literary technique of personifying his ideas and so speaking of such and such a type of person rather than of a human quality in abstraction. He tends to think in terms of the whole and individual human person and he does not overlook the fact that there is no science of the individual as individual. Faith for him is an individual communication with God Who makes Himself historically present to mankind in Christ. It is a "passion" of the whole person of the believer in response to Christ, presenting in Himself the dramatic crisis (judgment) of history and of the believer's whole existence.

He had little critical occasion to think of "being" save as the logical copula, and in this role he quite rightly points out its metaphysical futility. In his own creative writing he treats of being as individual historical existence and so opens the way to the thorough-going nominalism and dramatization of thought which is perhaps the most dangerously attractive element of contemporary Protestant theology of the schools of Barth and Brunner. Nevertheless the problems he raises: the nature of the historical, the relation of history and of historical existence to grace and God's transcendence are real ones. They are urgent in Protestant theology—with Tillich, for instance, the formal identification of history and drama is pronounced—and they are problems to which it is difficult to find that St. Thomas gives any ready-made solution, though he gives background and cautions without which no sound solution is possible.

To pick up the thread of an earlier quotation: "As it is I have succeeded in making a *salto mortale* into a purely spiritual existence. But then again in that way I have become completely heterogeneous from mankind

in general. What I really lack is the physical side and all the assumptions that go with it." This is the most accurate self-knowledge. A pure dramatization of human life and history becomes unreal. It becomes a fleshless struggle between the poles of paradox. Elsewhere he gives as his opinion that robust physical health is incompatible with true spiritual life. His estrangement from mankind in general more than any other single psychological factor explains his lack of traditional metaphysics and the great dearth in him of ecclesiological doctrine. It explains why he remained on the side of Protestant subjectivism even though he reached the conclusion that Protestantism as an historical " corrective " had served its purpose and could no longer offer itself as a norm of the spiritual life.

Even so, the fact that he wrote polemically and offered his own work as a " corrective " makes it difficult to regard his implied nominalism as irreformable. His favourite reading included the Nicomachean ethics and there are phases in the Journals where it seems at least arguable that such a book as Pere Gardeil's *Le Donné Révélé* would have given him the illumination he needed on *L'Être, Valeur Révélatrice de Dieu.* At least it must be said and let it therefore be said that to go beyond Kierkegaard is to go beyond nominalism.

His isolated position makes him a prophetic genius rather than a traditional one of the type which is continuous with European culture. This does not mean that he was unversed in European culture. It does not mean that he was a barbarian or even a provincial. If he is keenly aware of the predicament of a genius in a provincial town where his fate is " the prolonged agony of being trampled to death by geese " he cannot be suspected in literature of wearing borrowed dress clothes.

But he does not write from within the central tradition of European culture. He writes as one who has had to make the choice beween Christ and everything else whatever. He strips contemporary culture bare and compels his reader to the same choice he has made himself. From the typical point of view of a Catholic cultural tradition which would smile at the suggestion of having to choose *between* Christ and Vergil, the Gospels and Racine, conversion and philosophy, his tendency to force contrasts into contradiction, his pressure towards moral and religious decision will seem exaggerated. But Kierkegaard had made a more fundamental choice in the recurrent crises of his life—between Christ and himself. His spirituality is based on the joyful conviction that against God we are always in the wrong, and that we must ask forgiveness for our best as well as for our worst. That is the last state of the young man rich in spiritual gifts.

He does not lack the gifts of culture. He lacks both at the superficial level of the demagogue and at the deepest level of the member of Christ's Mystical Body that communication in what is universally human and, in

Christ, corporately divine which would have enabled him to use the word "we" without embarrassment. It is from this that his doctrine of faith suffers.

He is literature's supreme example of the isolated individual, and the very temper of his age heightened his isolation from it. The state of Christendom, of Protestantism, of contemporary Denmark, forced him into the position of a witness from outside his age to the extreme demands of Christianity which it must answer in the affirmative or perish. What belongs to the level of mediocrity in thought, in morals, in culture, is alien to him. He can understand the heights and the depths but has no tolerance for the half-way house. Christianity has need of such witnesses, and the sheaf of problems he has left unsolved invites the work of theologians.

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*True Humanism.* By JACQUES MARITAIN. Translated by Margot Adamson. New York: Charles Scribner's Sons, 1938. Pp. xvii + 304. $3.50.

This, one of Maritain's latest works, might easily stand as the synthesis of his cultural philosophy, the fast maturing fruit of his philosophical speculations. However, the book is not speculative, but practical, though to many readers it may seem utopian, a perfect example of what is to be expected from impractical philosophers. Yet here we have merely a forecast of Christianity in action, or a picture of what Christendom would be like if Christians acted in accordance with their principles. Rarely has it happened that the majority of men in any major portion of the world acted in a truly Christian manner: the closest historical approach to the ideal can be found in the Middle Ages.

We might say that *True Humanism* is bounded by two historical moments, the Middle Ages and the New Christendom: the Middle Ages are an historical reality, the New Christendom, an historical possibility. There is, of course, no question of transplanting the Middle Ages to the future, nor even of striving to realize their structure in a New Christendom. It is important to keep in mind the distinction between Christianity (more definitely, Catholicism) and Christendom. "Let it be called to mind that this word, Christendom (as I understand it), describes a certain *temporal* regime whose formations, in very varying degrees and in very varying ways, bear the stamp of the Christian conception of life. There is only one integral religious truth; there is only one Catholic Church; there can be diverse christian civilizations, diverse forms of Christendom." Hence there

will be an essential distinction between the Christendom of the 13th century and the Christendom of the 20th or 21st century. There will be a new incarnation of the christian spirit, because there will be new structures, political, economic, and social, to be erected under its guidance.

*True Humanism* (the French title: *Humanisme Intégrale,* is more significant) may be divided into three parts. In the Introduction and in Chapters I and II the author considers the meaning of humanism and its dialectic. Chapter III is transitional, considering the relations of the Christian and the World. In the remaining four chapters and the Appendix Maritain presents his idea of a New Christendom, which will be characterized by an *integral* humanism.

" Humanism," says Maritain, " essentially tends to render man more truly human and to make his original greatness manifest by causing him to participate in all that can enrich him in nature and in history." And if it turns out that man's greatness can be reached only by a supernatural relation to God, then humanism accepts this completion in an order that is above the human and a participation in the divine.

At the basis of humanism there is a twofold speculative problem: one, anthropological, the nature of man; a second, theological, which is again twofold: (a) the position of man in the face of his destiny, or the relation of the creature to God; (b) the problem of grace and freedom. Centering his exposition around these three problems, Maritain shows how the dialectic of humanism has brought the present age face to face with two pure positions: pure atheism and pure Christianity. He distinguishes three stages in this dialectical process: classical humanism, materialistic bourgeoisism, and atheistic communism.

What answers to these three problems did the Middle Ages give? Man is an animal endowed with reason, which means that he is also a person. Man as he exists is wounded in his nature by original sin, yet he is directed to a supernatural goal. There is, however, an impressive simplicity about these speculations. There is no evidence of the subjective introspection of modern psychologists, especially Freudians. This same simplicity marks the medieval solution to the problem of grace and freedom. There was no attempt to separate created freedom from the universal causality of God. There was, moreover, a simple movement of ascent of creatures to God, their final end—" an ascent of the intellect towards its object, of the soul towards its perfection, of the world towards a social and juridical structure unified in the reign of Christ."

The medieval synthesis was destroyed by the impact of Protestantism and classical humanism. From these two sources flow the conceptions of an anthropocentric humanism. To the Protestant, human nature is essentially corrupted by Original Sin. Man can do nothing for heaven; grace is not a reality, but a viewpoint, a divine viewpoint. Yet for this earth man

has intrinsic worth; of himself he can obtain worldly success. Classical humanism exalted man and gave him an autonomous final end apart from the supernatural.

The dialectic of humanism is traced in what Maritain calls " The Tragedy of Culture " and " The Tragedy of God." In the 16th and 17th centuries men tried to create a human order by force of reason; the pattern was still Christian. In the 18th and 19th centuries an effort was made to liberate man from the superstitions of revealed religion. In the 20th century we witness the revolution, a new humanity is the goal, Marx and Lenin, the prophets. Paralleling this process, we have " The Tragedy of God." In the first period God's existence is admitted, but he is unknowable. In the second God becomes an idea moulded by subjective feeling. Finally, we have the death of God proclaimed in communist Russia. In a brilliant chapter Maritain analyses the relation of communism and atheism and shows that atheism is not the *consequence*, but the *principle* of communism. He also shows that atheism cannot be lived, for the human will is still specified by an infinite good, call it what you wish. In one of the most truly Christian passages of the whole work, Maritain says: " To every soul, even to one ignorant of the name of God, even one reared in atheism, at the moment when the soul deliberates with itself and chooses its final end, grace offers as an object, as something to be loved above all things, under whatever name the soul describes such an end to itself . . . that Reality of absolute goodness, which merits all our love and is able to save our life." With this note of hope that the dialectic of humanism will lead to the ultimate salvation of Russia, Maritain passes on to a consideration of the Christian position, which emerges enriched with the bitter fruits of modern culture.

Maritain characterizes the Christian position as " integralist " and " progressive." Man is looked at as a whole. There is a consciousness of his dignity, his personal worth despite the ravages of sin. There is no annihilation of creature before God (the Barthian position); there is rather a rehabilitation of the creature *in* God, not against God (atheistic communism), nor without God (classical humanism). The solution to the problem of grace and freedom is purged of its molinistic elements, according to which " good and salutary acts are divided, duplicated, shared out between God and man." " The New Christendom will recognize to the full the degree to which created liberty *receives* from God's causality."

It is quite impossible to give a complete account of Maritain's conception of the New Christendom and the means to be used by Christians in bringing it about. The details are too many, for it is a practical question. Perhaps we can sum it up in five characteristics that will distinguish the New Christendom from medieval Christendom. First of all, the " sacred " or " consecrational " conception of the temporal order will give place to a

" secular " conception. The unity of Christendom under the Popes will give way to a pluralism, whose unity will be found in the orientation of all towards a common temporal life in accord with the supra-temporal interests of the human person. The second characteristic will be the admission of the temporal regime as an intermediary end, not as an instrument of the spiritual. Thirdly, there will be an insistence on the " extra-territoriality of the person with regard to temporal and political means." The use of force in the service of God will be displaced by moral suasion and education for perfect freedom. Fourthly, " there will be a certain parity of essence (between the leaders and the led) . . . " This means that leaders will be chosen from the group freely by the group. There will be no caste system. The fifth and last characteristic is: " . . . let us say . . . the common aim is no longer that of realising a divine work here on earth by the hands of man, but rather the realisation on earth of a human task by the passage of something divine, that which we call love, through human operations and even through human work."

Before concluding there are two observations to be made. Near the end of Chapter II (p. 68) there occurs a very remarkable passage. Maritain quotes the phrase of St. Thomas that " the first cause of a lack of grace comes from ourselves " (*Summa Theol.*, I-II, q. 112, a. 3, ad 2um). Then he comments: " If the creature has indeed the first initiative in the line of evil, it thereby—negatively—intervenes in the very moulding of the designs of providence. In that eternal moment, in which all the moments of time are held, God, if one may say so, in making and seeing in one single glance the whole of human history, awaits on each one of us, *on our refusal or acceptance of the gifts* of that sovereign power from which all being and all action derive—all things, save the nothing we may bring." (Italics inserted). The first sentence of the quotation is certainly true. As it stands, the second sentence is a perfect expression of—Molinism. The first thought is that, perhaps, the translator is at fault. But no, she has merely made the statement more explicit, for the French text reads: " *Dieu . . . attend . . . que chacun de nous refuse ou non les dons de l'influx souverain . . .* " The refusal of God's gifts comes from us, no doubt, but we, as Thomists, cannot say that God waits upon our acceptance of them. Unfortunately this entire paragraph seems to lower the Thomistic conception of God and His providence. In the *Summa Theologica*, I, q. 19, a. 5, St. Thomas asks: Whether any cause can be assigned to the divine will? In answer he says: " . . . if anyone in one act wills an end, and in another act the means to that end, his willing the end will be the cause of his willing the means. This cannot be the case if in one act he wills both the end and means; for a thing cannot be its own cause. Yet it will be true to say that he wills to order to the end the means to the end. Now as God by one act understands all things in his essence, so by one act he wills all things in

his goodness. Hence, as in God to understand the cause is not the cause of understanding the effect, for he understands the effect in the cause, so, in Him, to will an end is not the cause of His willing the means, yet He wills the ordering of the means to the end. Therefore, He wills this to be as means to that; but does not will this on account of that." Here we have the true picture of God's act of will and we get a glimpse into the tremendous mystery of divine providence. God alone can will an end that is to be infallibly obtained by free causes, some of which are going to work with Him, some against Him.

The second observation is this: there are many types of people to whom this book could be recommended. There is, however, one type of mind that should be made to read it at least three times. This is the type represented by the following quotation (many others could be given): "There are young men, and older ones, who, sad at the vicissitudes of a world in which so much seems not only in transition but in decay, comfort themselves with the conception of a reality that is Pure and Abstract Form in which one may quietly be absorbed, a mind at peace with an equation. . . . Or they flee to the immutable principles of Thomism and the Catholic Church. . . . Time is the destroyer; let us destroy Time!" (Irwin Edman in *Philosopher's Holiday*, p. 261.) Such statements can be read or heard everywhere. Maritain, in his writings and in his life, is a complete refutation of them. No one is more keenly aware of the troubled state of the world, no one is more penetrated with the tragedy of modern civilization, no one is more willing to live and fight for the benefit of his human brothers than the true Catholic philosopher in his "Ivory Tower." The Church and Thomism offer little consolation to cowards and weaklings. True they demand surrender at first, but only that they may arm men with weapons more worthy of the fight.

Leaders of Catholic Action should find the few pages of the Appendix packed with valuable suggestions. Here Maritian distinguishes three planes of Christian activity. The highest plane is the spiritual; it includes all those activities that are specifically religious, the liturgy and the sacraments, the practise of virtue and contemplation, the apostolate and works of mercy. The lowest plane is the temporal; on this plane we act as citizens of the world, working for a temporal city; it includes our artistic and scientific endeavors, our social, political, and economic activities. All these are specified by their proper objects, which are not supernatural. Nevertheless all these activities must be animated by our Catholic spirit; there can be no dichotomy between these two planes, for the temporal is always subordinate to the spiritual.

The third plane is of great importance, for it lies midway between the other two, at the point where the spiritual actually joins the temporal. There are many aspects of the temporal order, e. g. in economics and

politics, in marriage and education, where the revealed truths of the Catholic faith play a very positive rôle. This is the plane of what is technically known as Catholic Action. Here we find those general truths of the practical order on which *all* Catholics should *agree*. This is the domain of the Papal Encyclicals. On the other hand, in the purely temporal order there is, and there should be, great *diversity* of opinion among Catholic leaders. There is no reason why there should be, for example, a Catholic political party, in which all Catholics would stand on the same platform. In the sphere of contingent activities of the temporal regime, Catholics can take sides; disagreement does not in any way reflect upon the Church, for then Catholics are not acting precisely as members of the Church, but as citizens of the world. True the motivation of the opposed parties must always be Catholic, that is, their activities must proceed from love; but disagreement does not destroy love. Maritain offers a sensible suggestion: Catholic periodicals should be divided into two classes. Some should treat of the principles of Catholic Action and not enter into the controversies of affairs; others should treat these controversies, take sides, report the news, all from a Catholic viewpoint and with assent to the firm principles of Catholic Action. If this suggestion were followed, both Catholics and Protestants would not take occasion to be scandalized by the difference between Catholic leaders.

A word of commendation is owing to the translator, who has rendered the thought of Maritain into precise and clear English. The work does not make easy reading, but that is due to the profundity of the thought and its ramifications and is not the fault of the translator.

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